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INTRODUCTION

With the callousness of an unfeeling coroner, Nietzsche announced a
dramatic societal shift with a simple three-word phrase: “God is dead.”1
Regardless of the metaphysical validity of Nietzsche’s statement, he
illuminated a fundamental truth in Western civilization—the declining role
of the Augustinian model of God2 as a functional all defining and exclusive
paradigm, which provides absolute and definitive meaning to the world.
With the traditional image of God and religion being subsumed in the
United States beneath a potent force of materialistic progress, relativist/
postmodernist thought, alternative scientific paradigms for defining the
world, and exploding cultural and religious diversity,3 the courts face an
increasingly varied and complicated religious environment. Within that
dynamic, religion, including traditional religion, remains a powerful force.4
Defined by “its diversity and radical pluralism,”5 the United States, in large
part due to the religious liberty available in this nation, has the most diverse
religious landscape in the world.6
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 167 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1882).
2. Augustine’s understanding of God is of an all encompassing unitary figure, who is,
[t]he greatest and the best, mightiest, almighty, most merciful and most just, utterly
hidden and utterly present, most beautiful and most strong, abiding yet mysterious,
suffering no change and changing all things: . . . gathering all things to Thee and
needing none; sustaining and fulfilling and protecting, creating and nourishing and
making perfect; ever seeking though lacking nothing.
AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 5 (F.J. Sheed trans., 1943).
3. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125 (2002) (“The United States
is not a purely theistic nation; this country is home to 1,032,000 Hindus, 1,150,000 atheists, and
2,450,000 Buddhists.” (citing BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 801 (2001)); see Steele v.
Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 132 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“1,558 religious groups sufficiently stable and
distinctive to be identified as one of the existing religions in this country.” (citing J. GORDON
MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 870-71 (1991)); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1069 & n.78 (1978) [hereinafter
Harvard Note] (“In 1960 there existed ‘more than 400 more or less definitely organized bodies . . .
[not including] the multitude of store-front churches, local sects, cults, and unclassifiable quasireligious associations which operate ephemerally but often vigorously in the American scene. . . .’
The listed groups ranged in size from the 35-million-member Roman Catholic communion to the
Church of Jesus Christ (Cutler) with a single congregation of sixteen members.” (citing A.
Jamison, Religions on the Christian Perimeter, in 1 RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 162, 167 (J.
Smith & A. Jamison eds., 1961)).
4. Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 973, 979 (2001) (“We were a religious country when our country was founded; we
continue to be a religious country today. A recent Newsweek poll revealed that eighty-four
percent of adult Americans believe that God performs miracles and forty-eight percent report that
they personally have experienced or witnessed a miracle.” (citing What Miracles Mean,
NEWSWEEK, May 2000, at 55-56)).
5. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1069 n.77 (citing S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 3-4 (1972)).
6. John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It’s Established?, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 522 (2003) (citing DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A
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Protecting religious liberty from governmental encroachment, the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution begins with the guarantee that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Thomas Jefferson described “the
constitutional freedom of religion as ‘the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights.’”7 Jefferson is not the only American then, or now, that
would agree with this statement. Professor Mary Ann Glendon has indicated that although legal academics do not normally give religious liberty
such primacy, the American people generally believe that religious freedom
is the most important right enshrined in the Constitution.8
Although the significance of religious liberty in the United States is of
paramount importance, confusion surrounds the core of this protection because uncertainty exists as to what exactly constitutes “religion.” Courts
often assume religion is implicated in a case, or presume that it is not, without expressly defining the term, and commentators, despite numerous
scholarly efforts, have been unable to reach any consensus as to the meaning of religion under the First Amendment.9 The United States Supreme
Court has noted that defining what is religious is a delicate and difficult
task.10 Courts struggling with the changing religious climate in the United
States have offered divergent formulations and made varying assumptions
about what constitutes a religion. Beginning in the 1940s, courts started to
look beyond traditional legal tools to define religion turning to psychologists such as William James, and in the 1960s to theologians like Paul
Tillich.
This article attempts to explore from many vantage points one word
within one context—the word “religion” in the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The article begins with placing our understanding of religion in a historical context. By exploring the history of religious
liberty in the colonies and the Founders’ view thereof, an understanding of
what the Founders were seeking to protect by safeguarding religious liberty
will be gained. Having established this framework, the article then
“CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION
(HarperSanFrancisco, 2001)).
7. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153 (1991) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of Religion at the
University of Virginia, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1969))
[hereinafter Smith, Rise and Fall].
8. Id. at 153 n.12 (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom
Provisions of the Constitution, Address to the Bicentennial Conference on the Religion Clauses
(May 30, 1991)).
9. See Marilyn Perrin, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 207,
233 n.197 (1994).
10. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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addresses overarching issues that complicate the quest to define religion.
Then, the article transitions into an exploration of the development of the
definition of religion in both federal and state courts. Changes in the definition of religion are traced from the early interpretations to more recent
formulations. Next, this article addresses how courts, since the 1940s, have
been reaching beyond the traditional tools of legal analysis to define religion by drawing upon and applying formulations of what constitutes
religion that have been offered by scholars in disciplines outside the legal
field. Theologian Paul Tillich, psychologist William James, and sociologist
Emile Durkheim are three of the most frequent sources of inspiration, but
are not the only examples. This article demonstrates their continuing influence on courts’ understanding of what constitutes religion. Finally, by
drawing on insights from other disciplines, by reaching deeper within these
fields than the courts have already gone, this article discusses problems
with the definitions of religion that have been embraced by courts. But
destroying, postmodernist deconstructionism, is easier than creating, and
creation is necessary for the formulation of jurisprudence.11 Therefore,
drawing on understandings reached throughout this article and insights
from other disciplines, which have already explored some of the same
issues that courts are struggling with, this article will offer seven principles
that will, hopefully, lead to a better understanding of the definition of
religion under the First Amendment.
II. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE
COLONIES AND THE FOUNDERS
In trying to understand the meaning of the term religion in the First
Amendment, history is the beginning of our quest, for in this context, as
often is the case, “[a] page of history is worth a volume of logic.”12 In
striving to understand what religion is, the free exercise of which is protected and the establishment of which is prohibited by the First Amendment, it is important to consider why the Founders chose to protect
religious liberty. Knowing the answer to this question helps reveal the
contours of what it is the Founders were trying to protect and why they
were trying to protect it. As a general matter,
[l]egal enactments should be interpreted to effectuate their purposes. But a law’s “purpose” arises out of, and is a projection of,
11. See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-16 (1986) (criticizing the deconstructionist project of critical legal studies and cautioning of its deleterious
impact).
12. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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its justification. Therefore, if we cannot articulate a convincing
justification for the commitment to religious freedom then we
cannot know its purpose, and we are accordingly paralyzed in our
efforts to interpret the commitment.13
Simply stated, because the Supreme Court, “[i]n light of America’s unique
founding history,” has deemed “it imperative that constitutional jurisprudence retain a loyal faithfulness to those who were central to the conception
and subsequent drafting of the nation’s religious liberty protections,” history cannot be ignored.14 Indeed, having noted that “[t]he word ‘religion’ is
not defined in the Constitution,” the Supreme Court has indicated that there
is nowhere more appropriate than history to turn for its meaning.15
A. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE COLONIES
In examining this history, it is important to look not only at the
Framers’ ideas of religious liberty, but also the context they were drawing
upon, namely the traditions and practices of the colonies. As stated by
Justice Rutledge, “[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to
or given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the
First Amendment. It is at once the refined product and the terse summation
of that history.”16 Justice Rutledge explained that this history “includes not
only Madison’s authorship and the proceedings before the First Congress,
but also the long and intensive struggle for religious freedom in
America.”17 Similarly, Justice Scalia has declared “that fortress which is
our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical
predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations
in the historic practices of our people.”18 Simply stated, to understand the
First Amendment, it is important to consider the historical environment
from which it emerged.19 The religious liberty, or lack thereof, of the
American colonies and the changes the people of the colonies experienced
tells us much about the context in which the First Amendment was framed

13. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 223.
14. Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment
Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 868 (2005). Thus, it
is not surprising that it has been declared that “[t]here is a seemingly irresistible impulse . . . to
appeal to history when analyzing issues under the religion clauses.” Id. (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (3d ed., 1986)).
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
16. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Conor B. Dugan, Note, Religious Liberty in Spain and the United States: A Comparative
Study, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1696 (2003).

2007]

DEFINING RELIGION

129

and ratified, offering insight into “the long and intensive struggle for
freedom in America.”20 As stated by now Tenth Circuit Judge Michael
McConnell, the religion clauses “cannot be understood or appreciated
without knowing what happened before.”21
In the mother country during the seventeenth century while British
colonization of America was beginning, religious intolerance and oppression was omni-present.22 With the Church of England as the official
religion, the government acted to suppress dissent from both extreme
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.23 After a civil war that resulted in
Charles I being deposed and executed,24 “[P]arliament took it upon itself to
rewrite the prayer book and confession of faith, dissolve the episcopal
structure of the Church, and confiscate the property of the bishoprics.”25
Not only were Roman Catholics the target of suspicion and suppression, but
“Baptist leaders were imprisoned, and ministers who insisted on frequent
use of the prayer book were ejected from clerical office.”26 With the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the Church of England was reconstituted.27
The Test Act of 1672 limited public and military office to Anglicans and
“required officeholders to swear an oath in court denying transubstantiation[,] . . . acknowledging the King’s supremacy over the Church[,] and
to present proof that they had taken communion within the preceding year
in accordance with the rites of the Church of England.”28 Under the
Toleration Act of 1688, Anglicans retained a favored position and Catholics
continued to be targeted with repressive measures, but official suppression
of Protestant sects ceased.29
20. Everson, 330 U.S. at 33.
21. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990).
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See generally Kings and Queens of the United Kingdom, Charles I, http://www.
royal.gov.uk/OutPut/Page76.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) (providing background information
on Charles I and the Civil War that led to his removal from power and execution).
25. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1421.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1421-22.
29. Id. at 1422. The Act for Further Preventing the Growth of Popery is one example of the
continuing suppression of Roman Catholicism in Britain. See CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, Penal
Laws, available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11611c.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
The “Act for further preventing the growth of Popery” (11 & 12 Gul. III, 4), passed in
1699, introduced a fresh hardship into the lives of the clergy by offering a reward of
100 pounds for the apprehension of any priest, with the result that Catholics were
placed at the mercy of common informers who harassed them for the sake of gain,
even when the Government would have left them in peace. It was further enacted that
any bishop or priest exercising episcopal or sacerdotal functions, or any Catholic
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A variety of approaches to the relationship between religion and the
government developed in the colonies, in part because “English religious
policy did not automatically extend to the colonies.”30 As a result, in the
period before the proposal and ratification of the religion clauses, the
colonies
experienced 150 years of a higher degree of religious diversity
than had existed anywhere else in the world. They had . . . seen
the results of religious conflict in England and of a variety of
approaches to church-state relations in the colonies, ranging from
near-theocracy to religious pluralism to state domination of the
church.31
Experiences in the American colonies would serve “as laboratories for the
exploration of different approaches to religion and government.”32
When English settlers arrived in America, the idea of separation of
church and state was largely without precedent and perhaps even beyond
contemplation.33 Founded largely for economic rather than religious motives,34 the charter for Jamestown, the first permanent English colony in
North America, nevertheless, demonstrated a deep concern for bringing
Christianity to the native population.35 Virginia, originally governed under
a royal charter that was granted to a group of investors who held governing
rights over the colony, became a royal colony in 1624, which placed it
under the direct control of the English Crown.36 In becoming a royal
colony, the Anglican Church became the official church and would remain

keeping a school, should be imprisoned for life; that any Catholic over eighteen not
taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, or making the Declaration against
Popery, should be incapable of inheriting or purchasing any lands; and any lands
devised to a Catholic who refused to take the oaths should pass to the next of kin who
happened to be a Protestant. A reward of 100 pounds was also offered for the
conviction of any Catholic sending children to be educated abroad.
Id.
30. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1422.
31. Id. at 1421.
32. Id.
33. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1
(John J. Patrick & Gerald P. Long eds., 1999) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES].
34. Although Jamestown was not founded for religious purposes, from the outset religious
law was applied in the Jamestown colony. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage
of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1562-63 (1989) (“[T]he first English legal code in
the New World, required daily church attendance and imposed harsh penalties for blasphemy,
Sabbath-breaking, and speaking maliciously against the Trinity, God’s holy word, or Christian
doctrine.”).
35. THE FIRST CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (Apr. 10, 1606), available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/va01.htm.
36. 13 ORIGINALS: FOUNDING THE AMERICAN COLONIES, available at http://www.
timepage.org/spl/13colony.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
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so until the American Revolution.37 The Anglican Church’s position as the
official church meant that taxes had to be paid through the colonial government to support the Anglican Church and its ministers; also, conformity
with church laws was required, including mandatory church attendance, and
the colonial government was enlisted to punish deviance or dissent from
Anglican rules.38 The Anglican Church itself, however, was not dominant;
rather, the colonial government controlled the official Church in the colony
and utilized it as a means of social control.39 During the seventeenth century, few dissenters came to the colony of Virginia, which resulted in few,
but significant, acts of overt religious coercion by the government.40 By
“the eighteenth century, Virginia was the most intolerant of the colonies.”41
It developed this reputation when the eighteenth century brought increased
immigration to Virginia including immigration by religious dissenters,
especially by Presbyterians and Baptists, who were confronted by authorities that blocked their ability to preach as well as by acts of violence.42
New England’s settlers were Puritans, Congregationalist Calvinists,
who had suffered persecution for their dissent against Anglican beliefs and
practices.43 They had tried, but had been unsuccessful in attempting to
eliminate what they regarded as Roman Catholic elements from the Church
of England.44 Seeking to gain freedom for their Congregationalist faith and
to establish what they believed would be truly a Christian Commonwealth,45 the Puritans adhered to a religiously dictated governance of their
37. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 1.
38. Id. at 1-2; see Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1563 (“This establishment was
demonstrated by public support, glebe lands, compulsory church attendance, punishment of
blasphemy, religious test oaths, and the suppression of dissenting views.”).
39. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1423.
40. Id. Lord Baltimore, who was Catholic, and Puritan ministers attempting to serve a small
Puritan community in Virginia were expelled. Id. The government also approved of laws allowing for the expulsion of Quakers, but there is little evidence to suggest that this was actually
carried out. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 2.
44. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1562-63.
45. See Mark G. Valencia, Take Care of Me When I Am Dead: A Examination of American
Church-State Development and the Future of American Religious Liberty, 49 SMU L. REV. 1579,
1585 (1996).
Puritans believed that God created society as a unified whole. Church and state, the
individual and the public, are not unrelated spheres of life but are complementary,
intimately connected by God’s acts of creation and his continuing providence. This
conviction lay behind the Puritan effort to reform all of English society. It also
provided the stimulus for the Puritan effort to fashion colonies in the New World in
which all parts of colonial life would reflect the glory of God. . . . [I]t led to the highhandedness and intolerance that Puritans sometimes displayed in both Britain and
America when they were in control. Since they presumed to know the will of God so
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churches and governmental institutions.46 Each town constituted a
congregation that would select its own minister and maintain its minister
and his church through taxes.47 Calvinist ministers “were accorded a high
degree of autonomy from civil control, and indeed frequently lectured
colonial authorities on their civic and spiritual derelictions.”48
New England’s Puritans, “[h]aving carved their communities out of the
rocky wilderness of a distant land[,] . . . saw no reason to allow ungodly
individuals to spoil their vision of a Christian commonwealth.”49 Having
“fled England from fear of religious oppression, [the Puritans] replicated
the very conditions of religious intolerance from which they sought safe
harbor in America.”50 The Puritans “who crossed the Atlantic did so not to
found a civilization where all religions would be tolerated, but rather to live

clearly, they felt it was only right that they could force others to comply, even if those
others did not understand God the same way they did.
Id.
46. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1422. Plymouth Bay’s separatist Puritans entirely rejected
the Church of England and its teachings demonstrating
their commitment to higher law, a social compact based on covenantal theology, and
government by consent in the Mayflower Compact of 1620. The nonseparatist
Puritans who founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony still recognized the Anglican
establishment and were less tolerant than their Pilgrim brethren, setting up a
theocentric commonwealth premised on Old Testament law. Their magistrates and
ministers cooperated in expelling dissenters, enforcing church attendance, limiting the
electoral franchise to church members, and supporting the Congregational churches
through taxation.
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1563.
47. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1422.
48. Id.
49. Id. Nathaniel Ward, who was an attorney, minister, and compiler of the code of statutes
for the colonial Massachusetts’ The Body of Liberties, strongly criticized any notion of toleration
of incorrect religions. Answers.com, Nathaniel Ward, http://www.answers.com/topic/wardnathaniel (last visited Mar. 25, 2006). Ward argued “[t]hat State is wise, that will improve all
paines and patience rather to compose, then tolerate differences in Religion.” Nathaniel Ward,
The Simple Cobbler of Aggawamm in America (London, 1647), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
HISTORY TOLD BY CONTEMPORARIES 393-96 (Hart ed., 1898), available at http://www.
swarthmore.edu/SocSci/bdorsey1/41docs/55-war html. See Valencia, supra note 45, at 1587
(citing THE AMERICAN PURITANS 98 (Perry Miller ed., 1956)).
John Cotton, a seventeenth century Puritan leader, explained that “toleration made the
world anti-Christian.” He went on to exhort: “My heart has naturally detested . . .
toleration of diverse religions, or of one religion in segregate shapes.” Cotton further
stated that the only liberty the established sect owed to dissidents was “the liberty to
keep away from us.”
Id.
50. Albert, supra note 14, at 882. “[A]s one scholar has commented with regard to the
American experience, ‘persecuted groups, when they finally escape and gain an ascendancy of
their own, have a tendency to persecute others with the same enthusiasm from which they had
previously suffered.’” Id. at 895 (citing Wendy Dackson & Richard Hooker, American Religious
Liberty, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 117 (1999)); see Valencia, supra note 45, at 1585 (“Puritans, aside
from a few exceptions, adopted a creed that turned out to be contrary to the interests of religious
liberty and as oppressive as the Church of England.”).
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according to their own religious beliefs free from oppression.”51 Thus, they
created a framework in which religious freedom existed for Congregationalists, but not other faiths.52 As but one of many examples, for the first
sixty years of the colony, only Puritans were allowed to vote; even
Anglicans, members of the official religion of the mother country, were
denied the franchise.53 Initially, there was no room in the Puritans’ vision
for religious pluralism or tolerance; dissenters were persecuted to such an
extent that banishment and execution were not unknown.54 Nevertheless,
their rejection of ecclesiastical courts and distinguishing between civil and
religious authority contributed to the future course of religious liberty in the
colonies.55
New England was not without dissent. Roger Williams, who had been
banished from Massachusetts along with John Clarke,56 gathered dissenters

51. Albert, supra note 14, at 882.
52. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 2.
53. Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
211, 235-36 (2003).
Decades of royal pressure were required to eliminate the religious voting restriction.
The Crown was disturbed that an English colony denied political rights to Church of
England members and that restrictions on religious practices were more stringent in
Massachusetts than in England. In 1662, King Charles II ordered the Puritans to
eliminate the religious restriction on the vote. After two years of royal pressure, the
Puritans purported to eliminate the restriction but, in reality, did not do so. In lieu of
an express religious requirement, the vote was limited to men who were (1) at least
twenty-four years old, (2) admitted as an inhabitant by a town in the colony, (3) a
householder, (4) a freeholder, (5) a property taxpayer, (6) religiously orthodox, (7)
“not vicious,” (8) in possession of “a certificate from all the ministers of his town
proving his religious and moral qualifications” and of a certificate from a majority of
the local government officials confirming his status as a freeholder and taxpayer, and
(9) accepted by a majority vote of the general court. Understandably, the King and his
commissioners were not amused. The commissioners were particularly appalled that
“those who came to America to establish liberty of conscience . . . later denied it to
others, in order that their own enjoyments might not be disturbed.” In 1691, after
sixty years of the Puritans’ monopolistic control of government and decades of royal
pressure, the religious restriction on the franchise was eliminated in Massachusetts.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
54. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1423.
55. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1563-64.
56. Two ministers Roger Williams, a Puritan, and John Clarke, a Baptist, founded Rhode
Island. Williams devoted himself to setting forth in writing a theological condemnation of
religious persecution and the separation of church and state. Id. at 1564-65. In his work The
Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for Cause of Conscience, in 1644, Williams argued:
[A]n enforced uniformity of religion throughout a nation or civil state, confounds the
civil and religious, denies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that Jesus
Christ is come in the flesh. [And that], the permission of other consciences and
worships than a state professes, only can (according to God) procure a firm and lasting
peace, (good assurance being taken according to the wisdom of the civil state for
uniformity of civil obedience from all sorts.).
Id. at 1565.
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together in creating Rhode Island.57 Williams preached that a variety of
paths existed to God, and that people should be free to select their own
path.58 The royal charter Williams obtained from King Charles II in 1663
contained a guarantee of the separation of religion and government and
freedom of conscience.59 Despite the broadness of its charter’s guarantee,
Rhode Island imposed restrictions on both Jews, who could not become
citizens, and Catholics, who could not hold public office.60 Nevertheless,
Rhode Island became a haven for many religious dissenters.61
Rhode Island, however, was not the only new world haven for
dissenters; rather, Maryland initially offered religious toleration to all sects
of Christianity.62 George Calvert, also known as Lord Baltimore, and his
son Cecilus Calvert founded Maryland in the hopes of providing a place for
Catholics to escape the persecution that they endured in England and in
other American colonies.63 The Maryland Toleration Act of 1649 provided,
in part:
no person . . . whatsoever within this Province . . . professing to
believe in Jesus Christ, shall . . . be any ways troubled, Molested
or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion nor in
the free exercise thereof . . . nor any way compelled to the belief or
exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent . . . .64
However, the Maryland Toleration Act did not survive long, and by 1689
“the proprietor was removed and the Protestant majority in Maryland
established the Church of England and initiated a program of discrimination
and intolerance toward dissenters, particularly Roman Catholics. In the
eighteenth century, Maryland rivaled Virginia for the narrowness and
intolerance of its laws.”65

57. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 3.
58. Id.
59. Id. The Rhode Island Charter of 1663 provides, in part, as follows:
No person, within said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any wise molested,
punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of
religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony; but that all and
every person and persons may . . . have and enjoy his and their own judgments and
consciences, in matters of religious concernments; . . . they behaving themselves
peaceable and quietly and not using this liberty to licentiousness and profaneness, nor
to the civil injury or outward disturbance of others; any law . . . .
Rhode Island Charter (1663), in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 16.
60. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1425-26.
61. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 3.
62. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424.
63. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 14.
64. Maryland Toleration Act (1649), in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 15.
65. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424.
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A similar fate befell efforts at toleration in the Carolinas. Inspired by
John Locke, who helped the influential Lord Ashley write the Fundamental
Constitutions of the Carolinas in 1669, the Carolinas proprietors, though
declaring the Church of England to be the true church, attempted to provide
religious liberty to colonists of different faiths.66 Other than atheists, “persons of ‘different opinions concerning matters of religion,’” were welcomed
into the Carolinas.67 The Fundamental Constitutions, which were never fully put into effect, included protection for “‘Jews, heathens, and other
dissenters from the purity of Christian religion,’ as well as to the ‘natives of
that place.’”68 However, the protection for religious liberty did not extend
to those who failed to embrace any religion, nor did it cover individualistic/non-institutionalized belief.69 All residents had to be a member of a
church and could not join multiple churches.70 As to what could constitute
a church, “any seven or more persons agreeing in any religion, shall
constitute a church or profession.”71 However, to be a religion, three tenets
had to be embraced: (1) the existence of God; (2) that God is to be publicly
worshipped; and, (3) every church or profession of faith needed an outward
manner in which their members were to publicly worship God.72 The
system of the Fundamental Constitutions was never fully implemented or
put into effect, but the Carolinas did serve for a period of time as a religious
haven for dissenters in the seventeenth century before becoming more
restrictive in the early eighteenth century.73
Like the Carolinas and Virginia, Georgia eventually became a state in
which the Church of England was the official established religion. The
Trustees of Georgia supported the Church of England by financing and
supervising ministers, building churches, and encouraging attendance and
support for religion.74 However, unlike in Virginia, “the Georgia Trustees
demonstrated remarkable tolerance toward Protestant dissenters [and] Jews.

66. Id. at 1428.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1429. The Fundamental Constitutions even extended protection for the religious
liberty of slaves, who were to be “free to select ‘what church or profession any of them shall think
best, and, therefore, be as fully members as any freeman.’” Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1425. Disagreement exists about the state of affairs in the Carolinas. Judge
McConnell argues that by the early eighteenth century, North and South Carolina “instituted a
rigid establishment of the Church of England along lines parallel to Virginia’s.” Id. Judge Adams
insists that establishment in the Carolinas was not formidable, more akin to Georgia than Virginia.
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1567.
74. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424.
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(Savannah contained a substantial Jewish community, which was allowed
to worship in peace and participate in public affairs.)”75 Catholics, however, were excluded from the colony.76 From its founding, Georgia was
home to and welcomed adherents of a broad variety of faiths, including
numerous Anglicans, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Jews.77 One of the
more intriguing elements of Georgia’s government/religion relationship
was that non-established religious groups also “received governmental
funding and support for their own endeavors (including land grants, salaries
for ministers, and some control over church and civil governance).”78
Religious pluralism experienced its strongest adherence and greatest
impact in the middle colonies “where no church was established (except in
the four counties of metropolitan New York) and the widest range of
religious persuasions lived in relative harmony.”79 William Penn’s 80
colony of Pennsylvania was particularly associated with religious liberty, in
part, because of Penn’s popular and widely read work The Great Case of
Liberty of Conscience, which had been published in 1670.81 Under the
1701 Charters of Privileges, though limiting public office to Christians,
Pennsylvania protected the religious practice of all theists.82
Pennsylvania’s assurances of toleration contributed to generating
immigration levels higher than any other colony, resulting in great
prosperity.83 Pennsylvania’s approach to religious liberty was therefore
noticed by citizens of neighboring colonies.84 For example, Madison came
to believe that “Pennsylvania’s ‘liberal, catholic, and equitable way of

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in
Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2005).
78. Id.
79. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1429-30.
80. William Penn had been punished in England for his Quaker religious beliefs.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 4. While Penn was in prison for his preaching, he
wrote a defense of religious liberty entitled The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience. Id. He
argued that religious liberty was critical because coerced religion was of little, or no value. Id.
With the British Monarch in debt to Penn’s father, he was released and was awarded an area of
America that would become Pennsylvania. Id. Penn moved forward with plans to make this area
into a haven for Quakers and other dissenters, who had been persecuted by established faiths. Id.
81. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430. “Combining the roles of religious leader and political statesman, Penn expounded his views on religious liberty in numerous tracts. In the most
famous of these, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience (1671), he stressed that coercion of
conscience destroyed authentic religious experience and ‘directly invade[d] the Divine Prerogative.’” Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1566-67.
82. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430.
83. Id.; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1567 (“Penn’s holy experiment flourished,
tending to prove that social stability could be enhanced by religious freedom.”).
84. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430.
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thinking as to the rights of conscience’ . . . encouraged commerce,
immigration, virtue, industry, the arts, and a productive love of fame and
knowledge.”85 While these benefits accrued from religious liberty, its
converse, “[r]eligious bondage,” in Madison’s view, “shackles and
debilitates the mind and unfits it for every noble enterprise, every expanded
project.”86 In a discourse with a fellow Princeton classmate who was from
Pennsylvania, Madison, reflecting upon the lack of religious liberty in
Virginia, conceded, “I have . . . nothing to brag of.”87
Although
Pennsylvania was receiving more attention from Madison and others who
would found the United States, religious liberty was also to a great extent
being enjoyed in New York and New Jersey, though these colonies, unlike
Pennsylvania, were not founded as havens for religious dissenters.88 With
extraordinary religious diversity existing in New York and New Jersey, for
the most part an approach to government/religion relations emerged that
afforded religious toleration for Protestants and Jews, though Catholics
continued to be targeted.89
The original colonists had “a curious idea of religious liberty, one that
invited (or banished, as it were) dissenters to enjoy religious liberty elsewhere in the New World or stay, risking great persecution were they not to
conform.”90 Nevertheless, by the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania started
to become the leader in a trend towards increased religious liberty in the
colonies.91 Catholics and Jews were generally outsiders, but variations
between the colonies as to who were outsiders and insiders in the various
colonies, and the greater degree of religious liberty than existed in Europe,
created a rapidly growing diversity of sects and churches in the United
States.92 Additionally, the Great Awakening, an evangelical movement that
impacted a variety of sects beginning in the 1730s and 1740s,93 also generated opposition to established religious orthodoxy and created organized

85. LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON & THE FOUNDING
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 81 (1995) (quoting James Madison to Bradford, April 1, 1774, in 1
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 112-13 (William T Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1424.
89. Id.
90. Albert, supra note 14, at 895.
91. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 5.
92. See id. at 6.
93. CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN, THE FIRST GREAT AWAKENING, http://www.nhc.rtp.nc.us:
8080/tserve/eighteen/ekeyinfo/grawaken.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
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political power behind dissenters.94 As the revolution approached, the
adherence to a concept of enforcing religious belief was weakening, and the
trend was towards religious liberty.95 This trend would be accelerated by
the ideology of the Revolution and severing of ties with England.96
B. THE FOUNDERS’ VIEW OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
It has been argued that “[f]or the founders, the substantive idea of
religious liberty—whatever its precise boundaries—was rooted not in
secular philosophy, but in theology.”97 Disagreement exists though as to
whether the desire to protect religious liberty was primarily a product of
secular or religious thinking.98 For a number of reasons, the dichotomy,
however, is a false one in terms of eighteenth century thought on religious
liberty.99 One, the founding generation was deeply influenced by religious
thought, and the distinction between civil and religious authority drawn
upon by the Founders was itself related to the Protestant concept of two
kingdoms, one an earthly, the other a heavenly realm.100 Two, even

94. See CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 7; Adams & Emmerich, supra note
33, at 1567-68 (“[T]he establishments were eroded by the increased diversity arising during the
Great Awakening.”).
95. See CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 33, at 7-8.
96. See id.
97. DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 30 (2003).
98. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 156-66.
99. Id. at 158. Both the approach described sometimes as secular, and the religious approach
“were centrally dependent upon religious, indeed theistic, assumptions.” Id. at 160. The more
explicitly religious style was biblical and evangelical, while the more secular approach adhered
more closely to natural religion being more philosophical in its approach to religion. Id. “[T]he
critical point is that although the religious justification is not universally persuasive, that
justification carried considerable weight with Americans of the founding generation. . . . Its
influence is hardly surprising given the pervasively religious world view then prevailing.” Id. at
156-57.
100. Id. at 157; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 33, at 1561-62.
The American Founders were influenced profoundly by philosophers and theologians
who reflected on the religious conflicts that occurred in the wake of the Reformation.
From Martin Luther and John Calvin they inherited the view that God had instituted
“two kingdoms”—a heavenly one where the church exercised its spiritual authority
and an earthly one where the civil magistrates exercised temporal authority. A liberal
Roman Catholic tradition represented by Erasmus and Thomas More also exerted
significant influence in the colonies, inspiring the Lords Baltimore and the Carrolls of
Maryland to rethink the proper relationship between church and state. The Puritan
poet John Milton, confidant of Oliver Cromwell and friend of Roger Williams, shaped
colonial thought by seeking to prove in 1659 that “for belief or practice in religion
according to this conscientious persuasion no man ought be punished or molested by
any outward force on earth whatsoever.” From Roger Williams and William Penn, the
Founders learned that state control of religion corrupted faith and that coercion of
conscience destroyed true piety. From theorists such as John Locke, they appropriated
concepts such as inalienable rights and toleration for the religious beliefs of others.
These diverse ideas, derived largely from the intellectual currents flowing from the
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Founders like Jefferson, who deviated from Christian orthodoxy, viewed
the world in strongly religious terms.101 Three, “in eighteenth-century
America—in city, village, and countryside—the idiom of religion penetrated all discourse, underlay all thought, marked all observances, gave
meaning to every public and private crisis.”102 The variance in approaches
to religious liberty “is more accurately described as a difference in kinds or
styles of religious thinking, not as a conflict between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ thought in the contemporary sense of those terms.”103
Although at the time of the framing of the Constitution there were a
variety of arguments in favor of religious liberty, “the central justification
[among the founding generation] for religious liberty was distinctly religious, resting on the combination of two theological principles: first, that
religious duties are more important than secular duties, and second, that
individuals must undertake their religious duties voluntarily, not under legal
compulsion.”104 These two principles have been described as the priority
claim and the voluntariness claim.105 The priority claim asserts that “‘religious goods’—that is, the distinctive goods, benefits, or blessings toward
which religious beliefs and practices are directed—are more valuable or
more important than most or perhaps all other human goods.”106 This claim
can also be stated as religious duties have a priority over nonreligious legal
or social duties.107 “The voluntariness claim asserts that religious goods or
duties by their nature entail freedom of choice.”108 Accordingly, consistent
with the voluntariness view, “[i]t is futile, at least from a religious perspective, to force a person to profess a religious creed or conform to a religious
practice because compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled
religion, the voluntariness claim insists, is a contradiction in terms . . . .”109

Reformation, influenced the colonists in developing not only their religious, but also
their political institutions.
Id.
101. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 158.
102. Id. at 157-58.
103. Id. at 160.
104. CONKLE, supra note 97, at 30.
105. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 154.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 154-55. There is a distinction to be drawn between a voluntariness claim and a
view of salvation being achieved through the volitional acts of an individual. Id. While that view
of salvation was accepted by Madison and Jefferson, it was not commonly embraced by many of
their Calvinist allies, who were so critical in helping to promote and advance the cause of
religious liberty. Id. at 155 n.19. “The impact of Puritanism on colonial thought can hardly be
overstated, for as a prominent historian indicates, it ‘provided the moral and religious background
of fully 75 percent of the people who declared their independence in 1776.’” Adams &
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In combination, the priority and voluntariness claims support the constitutional commitment to religious liberty.110 “If religious goods or duties
take precedence over other goods or duties, as the priority claim asserts,
then the state should not interfere with religion in the interest of other
matters that are necessarily less weighty.”111 However, while this priority
claim calls for government’s respect of religion, it does not necessarily lead
to a conclusion that religious liberty or freedom should be the government’s
approach to religion.112 To “the contrary, if religion is the source of
supremely important goods or duties, then it might seem that a government
concerned for the welfare of its citizens should require them to accept such
goods or to perform such duties.”113 Acting as a protector of their citizens,
sometimes almost as a parental figure, “governments commonly oblige
citizens with compulsory education laws, mandatory social security withholding, seat belt requirements, and substance abuse prohibitions, at least in
part on the ground that such compulsion is good even for those citizens who

Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1564. An important link in the alliance connecting the two forces
was the work of Calvinist Issac Backus:
Backus repudiated the social contractarian view that the individual surrenders some
natural liberties by submitting to government. [He] maintained that fallen man in a
“state of nature” is a slave and attains freedom only by entering into government.
Backus divided this freedom-through-government into two types: Christian and civil.
As to Christian freedom, unregenerate “natural” men are not free but slaves to Satan,
ruled by sin. They will attain Christian freedom only by conversion, when they are
brought under direct rule by God to obey the rule of love written in their hearts by the
divine finger. True liberty is doing not as one chooses but as God chooses one to do.
Divine government of the unruly heart is thus necessary for Christian freedom. Civil
freedom, on the other hand, is possible only under a civil government, because
without order sinners will naturally prey upon one another and upon those who have
received grace. God therefore allows men to form governments so as to restrain the
sinners and preserve civil peace. Human governments are formed primarily by
unregenerate men for necessarily limited purposes. The unconverted can have no
authority over true religion, and so they cannot transfer any such authority to merely
civil governments. They exist only to keep the peace, not to promote salvation. God
Himself has assumed complete rule over His own church, leaving no room for human
ordinances . . . .
Thus, in diametric opposition to the argument of Jefferson and Madison, Backus’s
rationale for religious freedom rests on the utter inefficacy of human choice. Backus
believed that civil governments have no power over religion precisely because human
governments are the products of human choice, from which no good can come. Only
God can save man, and so man must be subject only to divine government in religion.
The goal of religious liberty is thus not to leave man free to seek his salvation, but to
leave the Spirit free to act within man without external constraint. The prerogative
protected by the principle of religious freedom is not man’s but God’s.
David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 769, 872-73 (1991).
110. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 155.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
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fail to appreciate the wisdom in these measures.”114 With only the priority
claim supporting religious liberty, the question arises, “[w]hy should
government impose these mundane benefits on its citizens and at the same
time neglect their incomparably greater interest in the salvation of their
souls?”115 Such governmental action historically was considered one of, if
not the primary duties of the state, and remains so in some countries to this
day.116
It is by combining the priority claim and the “voluntariness claim with
its insistence upon the futility of compulsory religion that justifies a public
commitment not just to religion, but to religious freedom.”117 Like the
priority claim, the voluntariness claim alone is insufficient to establish
religious liberty or freedom.118 Because compulsory religion is, under the
voluntariness approach, futile and even self-contradictory, the government
should be discouraged “‘from interfering with citizens’ religious beliefs and
practices in order to secure religious benefits for these citizens.”119 The
voluntariness claim suggests little concern for the practice of religion,
simply prohibiting forcing religion upon citizens.120 If the “government has
nonreligious reasons for regulating religious practices, the voluntariness
claim gives no reason for restraint. Only the priority claim provides such a
reason.”121 Taken together, the priority and voluntariness claims
form a cogent justification for extending special legal protection to
religious freedom. The priority claim suggests that government
should respect religion and avoid subordinating religious goods
and duties in favor of secular concerns. The voluntariness claim
suggests that the way in which government should respect religion
is by securing religious freedom.122
Examples of these two claims in the Founders’ justification and understanding of religious liberty are numerous among the writings, speeches,
and letters of the founding generation. The Founders believed that “individuals had a duty to adhere to their religious beliefs—a duty they owed to
a power higher than civil government—and for this reason, religious liberty
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Jeffrey Usman, Note, The Evolution of Iranian Islamism from the Revolution
through the Contemporary Reformers, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1679, 1683-84 (2002) (discussing the Islamic goals included in the Iranian Constitution).
117. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 155 (emphasis omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis omitted).
120. Id. at 155-56.
121. Id. at 156.
122. Id.
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seemed inalienable not only physically, but also morally. It neither could
nor ought to be submitted to government.”123 Prominent examples of
Framers who had this view, Jefferson and Madison,124 “based their defense
of religious liberty on the assumption that religion is volitionalist: individuals reserve the right to religious freedom from the social contract so that
they may be free to please God (or Providence) and win a reward for their
conduct.”125 The voluntariness claim is featured prominently in Jefferson’s
The Virginia Act For Establishing Religious Freedom:
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by
civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of
our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not
to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do; that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers,
civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible
and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of
others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the
only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them
on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the
greatest part of the world, and through all time; that to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.126
Jefferson also made the priority claim; for example, he argued that “[t]he
rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are
answerable for them to our God.”127
James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments stands as one of the finer examples of the synthesis of the
priority and voluntariness arguments for religious liberty. Responding to a
123. Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 843 (2004).
124. Justice Rutledge suggested the history of religious liberty debates in Virginia is critical
to the framing of religious liberty under the First Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 33-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see Valencia, supra note 45, at 1587 n.46 (“Virginia is clearly
the Constitutional genesis of the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
Consequently, although other colonial developments (for example, Massachusetts and Plymouth)
are relevant, they are not as material to the ideology behind American religious liberty
development.”).
125. Williams & Williams, supra note 109, at 852.
126. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE VIRGINIA ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(1786), available at http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/vaact.html (last visited March
17, 2006).
127. Hamburger, supra note 123, at 844 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE
OF VIRGINIA 159 (Query 17) (William Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1784)).
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bill that would establish a provision for paying teachers of Christianity in
Virginia, Madison stated his opposition in the Virginia General Assembly.
He asserted:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, “that
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence.” The Religion then of every man must
be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is
in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by
their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is
unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men, is a
duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to
the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before
any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must
be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if
a member of Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to
the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.128
In this argument, Madison “used the language of social contract and
obligation to assert the priority of religious duties over other duties. If our
obligation to the Creator precedes our assumption of the obligations imposed by civil society, then the latter obligations are subject or subordinate
to our religious duties.”129 Madison also addressed and asserted the voluntariness argument—arguing that religion is a matter for the conscience of
every individual, as opposed to a matter for the enforcement of the state.130
Although the priority and voluntariness claims are potent forces behind
the Founders’ protection of religious liberty, it would be a mistake to
analyze the First Amendment protection of religious liberty without considering federalism131 and the practical attendant element of merging a
128. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
available at http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html (last visited
Sept. 9, 2007).
129. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at 161.
130. Id.
131. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1605-12 (providing an excellent discussion of
the federalism groundings of the First Amendment).
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complicated patchwork of diverse church/state relations in the various
states into a unified national whole. During the ratification debates in
Virginia, Madison argued that “there is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it,
would be a most flagrant usurpation.”132 It has been argued that the political situation was such “because of the multiplicity of sects existing at the
founding, [that] any leaning or partiality toward one religion would have
been politically unthinkable.”133 Nevertheless, there was considerable concern that, absent express protection, federal interference would occur.134
Thus, the drafters of the Constitution were required to assure, as Madison
did in the Virginia ratification debates, that the federal government would
promote a policy of neutrality towards the diverse faiths of the states.135
The First Amendment was designed to assure concerned citizens that the
federal government would not discriminate, persecute, or show financial
prejudice on the basis of religion.136 Through ratifying the First Amendment, action was taken not only to limit national power, but also “to
preserve the power of the states to address religion and religious liberty as
the states saw fit.”137 As noted by Justice Story, “the whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted
upon according to their own sense of justice, and the State Constitutions.”138 In the attempt to explore the definition of religion, the historical
framework of the emergence of religious liberty, and the purposes of the
First Amendment protection thereof, will regularly be considered and help
frame the subsequent analysis.
III. OVERARCHING ISSUES IMPLICATED IN DEFINING RELIGION
A. SHOULD RELIGION BE DEFINED?
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he word ‘religion’ is
not defined in the Constitution.”139 The Founders did not expressly define
132. James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 88 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
133. Albert, supra note 14, at 900; see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY
NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 12-13 (1992); Valencia, supra note 45, at 1587
(asserting that religious diversity was extremely important in advancing religious liberty).
134. Albert, supra note 14, at 899-900.
135. Id. at 900.
136. Id. at 900-01.
137. CONKLE, supra note 97, at 19.
138. Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century
Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 291 (2003) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1873 (1833)).
139. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
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the term, and a number of commentators have argued that religion should
not, or even cannot, be defined by the courts.140 The arguments against
defining religion can be largely classified into three categories: (1) religions
vary significantly, and there is nothing about them at the core that is common or shared that would lend itself to a definition; (2) courts are not
qualified to define religion, and in so doing pose a danger of bias; and, (3)
defining religion would violate the Constitution by interfering with religious liberty and establishing religion.
The commentators and academics in the first category submit that a
search for a definition of religion is misguided because “[t]here simply is no
essence of religion, no single feature or set of features that all religions have
in common and that distinguishes religion from everything else.”141 Because there is no it—no “religion”—somewhere out there, there is nothing
to be deduced from, thus any definition of religion will be inherently arbitrary.142 Having seen the difficulties in reaching a satisfactory definition,
some scholars have concluded that “[t]he fact is that no definition of religion for constitutional purposes exists, and no satisfactory definition is likely
to be conceived.”143 For these scholars, “[f]ashioning a general definition
of religion seems virtually impossible.”144
Even if a definition of religion could be reached, commentators in the
second category argue the courts are not sufficiently competent or unbiased
to generate a proper definition.145 Some courts themselves have even questioned their own competence in making this determination. For example, a
Delaware court noted that the state had argued that “Black Muslim beliefs
and teachings are not a religion [and even indicated that] [s]ome plausible
arguments are made in support of their contention;” however, the court did

140. Questions as to whether religion should be defined also arise in the context of
international law. Robert Bejesky, United States Obligations Under International Law and the
Falun Gong v. Jiang Zemin Lawsuit: A Justified Reaction to a Threat to Public Security or
Genocide? You Decide, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 295, 327-28 (2005). “One of the
problems in protecting an international right to freedom of religion is establishing how that right
should be defined. There is no international consensus on what constitutes a religion; some even
claim that the term ‘religion’ should not be defined.” Id.
141. George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
“Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1565 (1983).
142. Gidon Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
579, 632-33 (1999) (citing Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A
Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 164 (1977)).
143. Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 832 (1984).
144. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 298 (1987) [hereinafter Smith,
Symbols].
145. Sapir, supra note 142, at 633.
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not consider this argument because it is “clear this court cannot-or should
not-undertake to define or rule on what is or what is not a religion.”146
Similarly, a New Jersey court concluded that “[t]here is no right in a state
or an instrumentality thereof to determine that a cause is not a religious
one.”147
Still other commentators assert that defining religion is itself a
violation of the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment. It has
been submitted that any “attempt to define religion, even for purposes of
increasing freedom for religions, would run afoul of the ‘establishment’
clause, as excluding some religions, or even as establishing a notion respecting religion.”148 Under this interpretation, no definition of religion is
possible, because by defining religion the court is establishing what religion
is. Thus, defining religion would be contrary to the entire concept of religious liberty because “any definition of religion would seem to . . . dictate to
religions, present and future, what they must be.”149 Furthermore, any
definition offered by the court would likely discriminate against unusual
religions that the court was not familiar with or failed to account for, and by
fixing the definition of religion, the court would create stagnancy by
restricting the present and future growth of religion.150 As a result, it has
been argued that a problem will occur “[a]s soon as the Court says that
religion is this, and only this, [because] someone will appear with a religion
that does not fit the definition, and the Establishment Clause may be
violated.”151
Nor is this viewpoint simply some academic wandering; quite to the
contrary, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) through its General Counsel
has embraced this understanding.152 The IRS General Counsel stated:
146. State ex rel. Tate v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 562 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965); see Glen O.
Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 311 n.97 (1997).
147. Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964).
148. Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection “Religion” in the Law, 73 Yale L.J.
593, 604 (1964); see Kolbeck, 202 A.2d at 892 (“Such a censorship of religion as the means of
determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and
included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
149. Weiss, supra note 148, at 604.
150. Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67
B.U. L. REV. 603, 631 (1987) (citing M. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 51-72,
97 (1968)); see Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and The Profane: A First Amendment
Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 160 (1982) [hereinafter Hall, Sacred] (“The danger
in defining religion lies in the possibility of violating the very purpose of the [F]ree [E]xercise
[C]lause by proposing a definition that excludes nontraditional religious beliefs from the
protective canopy of the first amendment.”).
151. Deborah K. Hepler, The Constitutional Challenge to America Civil Religion, 5 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 104 (1996).
152. Christine Roemhildt Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and the “Charitable Scrutiny”
Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 306-07 (2003); see Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial
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An analysis of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States indicates that it is logically impossible to define
“religion.” It appears that the two religious clauses of the First
Amendment define “religious freedom” but do not establish a
definition of “religion” within recognized parameters. An attempt
to define religion, even for purposes of statutory construction,
violates the “establishment” clause since it necessarily delineates
and, therefore, limits what can and cannot be a religion.153
However, despite the view expressed in this memorandum, the IRS has,
nevertheless, continued to apply a set of factors to determine if a group
constitutes a church for purposes of tax benefits.154
Despite the intriguing arguments presented by various academics and
embraced by at least some courts, ultimately we should and in fact must
give some meaning to the word religion. According to the MerriamWebster Dictionary, to define something is “to determine or identify the
essential qualities or meaning of; . . . to discover and set forth the meaning
of; . . . to fix or mark the limits of; . . . to make distinct, clear, or detailed
especially in outline, [or to] characterize[/]distinguish.”155 This article
moves forward with this understanding of what it means to define religion.
While a short pithy statement is not likely to suffice, the term religion must
be defined. Despite the third group of commentators fear that a definition is
unconstitutional, courts have repeatedly concluded that there is no constitutional prohibition or restriction upon defining religion or assessing if
particular practices or beliefs are religious.156 Furthermore, by defining
religion, discrimination between religions is less likely to be subtly hidden
through court presumptions.157
More fundamentally though, despite difficulties, the term must be
defined because “the definition of ‘religion’ plays as integral a role in the
articulation of any well-developed doctrine governing the constitutional
separation of church and state as does the content to be assigned to the
religion clauses’ two substantive terms—‘establishment’ and ‘free

Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?,
11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 100 n.145 (1991).
153. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977).
154. Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV.
309, 317 n.39 (1994).
155. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/define
(last visited June 21, 2007).
156. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing Jones
v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1979)).
157. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 290-91 (1989).
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exercise.’”158 Failure to define religion would not only be a problem in
particular cases, it would be “a fundamental gap in [F]irst [A]mendment
theory.”159 Without a definition of religion, it would be difficult to say
anything about the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty.160
Thus, “the Constitution itself requires that we provide a definition [by] . . .
protect[ing] the free exercise and prohibit[ing] establishment of something
called ‘religion.’”161 Accordingly, a definition is needed; even though the
definition would not determine what constitutes free exercise or establishment, “it determines what is protected and what is not.”162 A definition is
critical to determining “whether such diverse beliefs as Confucianism,
political philosophy, Marxism, Communism, . . . being a millionaire, and
even atheism, are, in fact, religions.”163 Whether there is an unstated
understanding or an express definition, “it is clear that the religion clauses
cannot be applied without at least a working concept of religion. Because
some such working definition is necessary, claims that definition is impossible, undesirable, or unconstitutional must be reduced to admonitions”
suggesting caution in defining religion.164 Succinctly stated, “[t]he Court
can no more escape saying what is religion than it can escape saying what is
speech or press or assembly under other provisions of the [F]irst
[A]mendment.”165

158. Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579, 580 (1982).
159. Johnson, supra note 143, at 839.
160. Id.; Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Demise of the First Amendment as a Guarantor of
Religious Freedom, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 415, 426 (2005) (“[B]ecause the religion clauses protect ‘religion,’ it seems implausible that the clauses could be meaningful without a definition of
‘religion,’ or a definition that includes anything one asserts is a religion. Even if it is offensive to
religions to have the courts decide the meaning of a term in the Constitution, it is less offensive
than having the courts interpret the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause in a manner that provides no
meaningful protection to religion.”).
161. Feofanov, supra note 154, at 315.
162. Id. at 313.
163. Id. at 313-15.
164. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 632-33. These admonitions would include “that the
definition used should be flexible, should aim away from narrow parochialism, should not enmesh
the courts too deeply in theology or in a believer’s mind, and might need to be adjusted from one
context to another.” Id. at 633.
165. John H. Mansfield, Book Review, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 215-16 (1964) (reviewing
PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962)); see T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of
Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 191
(2003) (“While academics have the luxury of debating whether the term ‘religion’ is hopelessly
ambiguous, judges and lawyers often do not.”).
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B. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING RELIGION
However, just because religion must be defined does not mean arriving
at a definition will be without difficulty. When trying to define religion, the
fundamental problem is that the definition arrived at generally is “either too
narrow and excludes many belief systems which most agree are religions,
or [it is] too vague and ambiguous, suggesting that just about anything and
everything is a religion.”166 An extremely broad definition of religious
liberty may be difficult for courts to apply or essentially meaningless because it fails to exclude that which is not religion.167 Thus, a broad definition may fail to separate religion from psychology, philosophy, or even
economics.168 Too narrow a definition of religion threatens to exclude nontraditional faiths, minority religions, and create stagnancy stifling the
possibility of future growth and development in religion.169 Furthermore,
with an enormous variety of religious practice, a narrow definition is likely
to be tied to the cultural and religious perspective of the judge performing
the defining task and fail to recognize other cultural or religious
perspectives.170
C. TWO DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION
Another difficulty in defining religion stems from the two protections
afforded by the First Amendment. The First Amendment guarantees, in
part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”171 Uncertainty exists as to whether
there should be one or two definitions of the word religion; the Supreme
166. AUSTIN CLINE, WHAT IS RELIGION? DEFINING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION,
available at http://atheism.about.com/od/religiondefinition/p/WhatReligion.htm (last visited Mar.
20, 2006). A similar difficulty has been seen in the context of international law. Bejesky, supra
note 140, at 328.
A very narrow definition may include solely the five religions that have an extended
history and an overwhelming global membership—Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism,
Islam and Judaism. On the other hand, a narrow definition may screen other groups
from attaining recognition as a legitimate religion. If the broadest definition were
employed, arguably over six billion religions could exist in the world, as freedom of
conscience preferences of each and every human being might be unique.
Id.
167. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion” A Survey of First Amendment
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 154 (2001).
168. PAUL CONNELLY, DEFINITION OF RELIGION AND RELATED TERMS: WHAT IS
RELIGION, available at http://www.darc.org/connelly/religion1.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
169. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 631 (citing Konvitz, supra note 150, at 97).
170. Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court’s Law of Religious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 624 n.189 (1995); Samuel J.
Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious
Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 176 (1996).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Court has not decided the issue.172 Those who support a singular meaning
point out that the word religion appears only once in the First Amendment.173 This singular appearance led Justice Rutledge to conclude that
“the word governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not
have two meanings, one narrow to forbid ‘an establishment’ and another,
much broader, for securing ‘the free exercise thereof.’”174 Under his textual
analysis, the unifying use of the term “‘thereof’ brings down ‘religion’ with
its entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the
second guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other.”175 From a
natural reading of the First Amendment, it is difficult to conceive of the
term religion as having two different meanings, one for purposes of free
exercise and one for purposes of establishment.176
Nevertheless, Professor Tribe has in the past argued that religion for
free exercise purposes clearly “must be expanded beyond the closely
bounded limits of theism to account for the multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate religious exercise.”177 He found it “equally clear, however, that in the age of the affirmative and increasingly pervasive state, a
less expansive notion of religion is required for [E]stablishment [C]lause
purposes lest all ‘humane’ programs of government be deemed constitutionally suspect.”178 Tribe’s Free Exercise Clause analysis emerged from
the premise that a more limited definition of religion will hew too closely to
orthodox religion excluding the unorthodox. His Establishment Clause
analysis was alternatively pervaded by concern that “if everything can be
religion, then anything the government does can be construed as favoring
one religion over another, . . . [leaving] the government . . . paralyzed . . .
by the Establishment Clause.”179 To avoid this end, “Tribe argued that the
[F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause should apply to any beliefs or practices that are

172. Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461, 486 (2003) (citing ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 973 (1997)).
173. Id.
174. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1946).
175. Id.
176. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 528.
177. Anand Agneshwar, Note, Rediscovering God in the Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
295, 311-12 (1992) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28
(1978)).
178. Id.
179. James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of
“Religion,” 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 70 (1995).
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‘arguably religious,’ whereas the Establishment Clause should not apply to
beliefs or practices that are ‘arguably nonreligious.’”180
Tribe was not alone in this view. Some courts and commentators confronting an increasingly diversified religious society, but concerned about
overly restricting government action, have embraced Tribe’s argument for
the definition of religion being broader for the purposes of free exercise
analysis than for establishment purposes.181 Proponents of the dual definition approach argue four basic premises. First, like Tribe, they warn of the
practical consequences, which include not protecting people’s religious
beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause with too narrow a definition of
religion and overly restricting the government with too broad a definition
under the Establishment Clause.182 Second, they “argue that the two
religion clauses should be interpreted in light of their distinct purposes.”183
Critics offer a wide variety of interpretations of these purposes and divergent explanations for why these purposes suggest that a narrower definition
of religion is appropriate for the Establishment Clause and a broader one for
the Free Exercise Clause.184 Three, they assert that utilizing a dual

180. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 653 n.236 (citing TRIBE, supra note 176, at 828-31).
181. See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1982) (explaining the court’s broad
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528,
1537 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J., concurring); United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2d Cir.
1985).
182. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 652-53.
Accordingly, many advocate a broad free exercise definition of religion in order to fit
that clause’s libertarian purposes to a wide variety of religious beliefs. They argue for
a narrower definition of religion for the [E]stablishment [C]lause, however, partly
because they conceive the purposes of that clause narrowly and partly because they
fear that in these days of pervasive government activity too broad a definition would
make that clause an “awful engine of destruction” and hobble many of the government’s “humane” programs. To these arguments proponents of a unitary definition
respond that the aims of the [E]stablishment [C]lause are broader than supposed and
that the dangers of unduly hampering government’s activities can be avoided by
appropriately narrowing the concept of “establishment.”
Id.; see Donovan, supra note 179, at 32.
If . . . religion is anything in the role of personal ultimate concern, which only the
most compelling of state concerns can override, then almost any statute can be
construed to affect religious beliefs and be subject to constitutional challenge. Thus,
plaintiffs may make First Amendment challenges on the ground that such statutes
infringe upon their personal beliefs and practices or encourage one set of beliefs at the
expense of all others. Such litigation would present a formidable obstacle to the
implementation of any new legislation.
Id.
183. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 652.
184. Id. at 652-53 (citing TRIBE, supra note 177, at 827; Paul Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686 n.14 (1969); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom
in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 217, 265-68 (1966); Gail Merel, The
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 830-36 (1978); William Van Alstyne, Constitutional
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definition “reduces the analytic tension between those clauses and enables
judges to decide in one context without concerns about how it might affect
cases arising in the other context.”185 Whatever the linguistic or semantic
complexities, proponents argue that “the dual definition approach does have
the virtue of potentially minimizing the conflict between competing
constitutional interests” that are contained in the free exercise and
establishment protections.186 Fourth, some proponents have suggested that
multiple definitions of religion are needed because the term should be
interpreted in the context of the legal dispute in which it arises.187 This,
therefore, does not require two definitions—one for establishment and one
for free exercise—but instead multiple definitions to fit the particular
circumstances.188 It has been asserted that:
Because different aspects of religions are relevant in different legal
contexts, what qualifies for protection . . . depends upon the legal
context. In other words, even if there were a uniquely correct
definition of the term “religion” as it occurs in ordinary English, it
should not fix the definition in the religion clauses because what
qualifies as a religion should differ across differing legal
contexts.189
Thus, according to at least one opponent of a unitary definition, the definition of religion should be able to change and diversify in as many ways as
there are contexts in which First Amendment religious liberty issues arise.
Some courts have embraced and utilized the dual definition approach.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue in a challenge to

Separation of Church & State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 865,
874 (1963); Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1083-86; Note, Transcendental Meditation and the
Meaning of Religion Under the Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REV. 887, 904 n.67 (1978).
185. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 528.
186. Donovan, supra note 179, at 33; see Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First
Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 472 (2004). Cf. Oldham, supra note 167, at 167.
Although some scholars have argued that a dual definition is more practical and will
make the two clauses work together more cohesively, these arguments seem misguided. The fact that there has been any friction between the two clauses at all is, at
least in part, because the Court has expanded the definition of religion so broadly.
When a narrower definition was used, the two clauses were complementary and did
not contradict each other. From a pragmatic perspective, a narrow conception can
alleviate the conflict between the two clauses because there will not be the problem of
having some “religious” groups protected under the Free Exercise Clause but not
subject to Establishment Clause requirements, such as secular humanism.
Id.
187. Booher, supra note 186, at 472.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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convictions of anti-nuclear activists.190 The activist argued the government
was establishing the religion of “nuclearism.”191 The Second Circuit conceded “the concept of religion has certainly broadened [noting that] [n]ot
long ago we defined an individual’s religion as his ‘ultimate concern’whatever that concern be.”192 The court went on to state that “[t]his
expansive definition of religion has been developed primarily to protect an
individual’s free exercise of religion, recognizing that an individual’s most
sincere beliefs do not necessarily fall within traditional religious categories.”193 The court, however, concluded that for purposes of the
Establishment Clause “nuclearism” did not constitute a religion.194 The
court expressly indicated that “[i]n so holding, we adopt for [E]stablishment
[C]lause purposes the conventional, majority view, rather than appellants’
view, of what is religious and what is political. Consequently, we must
acknowledge that ‘religion’ can have a different meaning depending on
which religion clause of the First Amendment is at issue.”195 The court
then discussed and cited Professor Tribe’s dual definition analysis
indicating that the judges found “his analysis helpful and provocative.”196
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona also declared
that the Establishment Clause “looks to the majority’s concept of the term
religion” while the Free Exercise Clause looks to the minority’s concept.197
In a concurring opinion, Judge Canby of the Ninth Circuit indicated “there
is much to be said for the view that the definition of religion should vary
with the clause under review.”198 The Ninth Circuit moved forward with
this conclusion in a subsequent Establishment Clause case, relying upon
reasoning set forth by Professor Tribe and the Second Circuit, and
determined that secular humanism for Establishment Clause purposes could
not be a religion.199 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the
Georgia Court of Appeals have also concluded that the definition of

190. United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2d Cir. 1985).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 449-50 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d
430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981)).
193. Id. at 450.
194. Id. at 450-51.
195. Id. at 450.
196. Id. at 450-51.
197. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963).
198. Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J.,
concurring).
199. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994). In dicta
in a subsequent decision, the Ninth Circuit indicated that this apparent dual definition embrace in
Peloza was merely dicta itself. Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1230 n.6 (9th Cir.
1996).
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religion is narrower for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis and
more expansive for free exercise purposes.200
Furthermore, even where courts do not explicitly embrace the dual
definition approach, there is an apparent distinction that repeatedly emerges
in many courts’ analysis as to whether something is or is not a religion
based upon whether the challenge is under the Establishment Clause or the
Free Exercise Clause.201 For example, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that
“neither the Supreme Court nor [the Eleventh Circuit] has determined that
‘secular humanism is a religion for purposes of the [E]stablishment
[C]lause,’”202 and the Ninth Circuit also ruled that secular humanism cannot
be a religion for purposes of the Establishment Clause.203 But, the federal
district court for the Western District of Wisconsin has noted that secular
humanism is a religion for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause,204 as have
the Ninth205 and Seventh Circuits.206
However, as critics of the dual definition approach point out (in
addition to referencing the textual argument), “if the free exercise definition
is broader than the establishment definition, the result might in some sense
discriminate in favor of religions included in the former but not the

200. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 30
n.23 (D.C. 1987); McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 381 S.E.2d 126, 129 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (“[A] narrower definition of religion is employed in [E]stablishment [C]lause
considerations, as compared to use of a broad definition when the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause is
invoked.”).
201. See generally Craig A. Mason, Case Comment, “Secular Humanism” and the
Definition of Religion: Extending a Modified “Ultimate Concern” Test to Mozart v. Hawk County
Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 63 WASH. L. REV. 445, 445
(1988); Peter D. Schmid, Comment, Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 357, 359 (1989); Thomas Marvan Skousen, Case Comment, The Lemon in Smith v.
Mobile County: Protecting Pluralism and General Education, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 69, 75-77
(1997); Theologos Verginis, Case Comment, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board: Is there Salvation for the Establishment Clause? “With God All Things are Possible,” 34
AKRON L. REV. 741, 741 (2001); Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public
Education Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion
Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 703 (1997).
202. McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004); cf. Newdow v. U.S.
Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 504 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
recognized religions exist that do not teach a belief in God, e.g., secular humanism.”).
203. See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
Peloza as “holding that neither evolution nor secular humanism may be defined as religion” for
purposes of the Establishment Clause).
204. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (“[C]ourts
have recognized that pacifism, secular humanism and other non-theistic belief systems are entitled
to the protection of the First Amendment’s [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause.”); Strayhorn v. Ethical
Soc’y of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 458, 466 n.8 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); but see Gibson v. Lee County
Sch. Bd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426, 1431 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (expressing concern that insulation of public
schools from the mention of God may establish religion of secular humanism).
205. Newdow, 313 F.3d at 504 n.2.
206. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005).
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latter.”207 For example, interpreting religion as having “a dual definition
may provide more obscure religions and religious activities with special
treatment, by protecting the free exercise of such religions, without placing
any [E]stablishment [C]lause limits on the government’s ability to promote
and aid such religions.”208 This is particularly problematic because equality
between religions is the governing principle of the First Amendment, and
accordingly should be a governing principle in First Amendment interpretation.209 The First Amendment simply cannot tolerate allowing advantageous treatment for one religious group over another. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that it will apply strict scrutiny and reject as unconstitutional state and federal laws that discriminate between religions.210 A dual
definition approach fails even the most basic discrimination test.211 In
adopting the dualist approach, the court would be violating a fundamental
principle, which has been repeatedly emphasized in religious liberty cases,
by discriminating between various religious groups and/or individuals
based on their faith.212 There is no readily apparent reason why the court
discriminating between religions would be of less constitutional concern
than a state legislature or Congress engaging in the same discrimination.213
In this vein, one critic has indicated that a dual definition approach would
207. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 652 (emphasis in original).
208. Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 536 (1989) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212-13 (3d Cir.
1979) (Adams, J., concurring)); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 814 (1984)).
209. Jay Alan Sekulow et. al, Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality
as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351,
380-405 (1995) (arguing that equality should be/is the guiding principle for interpreting the
religion clauses).
210. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 339 (1987); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.
Id.; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither
engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between
religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“The government must be neutral when it comes to competition
between sects.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . .
prefer one religion over another.”).
211. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 529.
212. Id.
213. See id.
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be “perceived as fundamentally unfair” and noted that no persuasive
constitutional explanation has been offered for discriminating against older
traditional religions in favor of newer and less conventional faiths.214
Accordingly, a minority religion cannot expect the two-fold benefit of the
protection of free exercise and the additional advantage over traditional
religious groups of not being restricted by the Establishment Clause: “The
rose cannot be had without the thorn.”215
Furthermore, although a dual definition is a sensible approach to preventing the problems of inhibiting the free exercise of unorthodox religions
and restricting governmental action via the Establishment Clause, critics of
the dual definition approach question whether these problems would arise
under a unitary definition of religion.216 Professor Tribe himself eventually
accepted this very argument, and “now reject[s] the dual approach, stating
that it ‘constitutes a dubious solution to a problem that, on closer inspection, may not exist at all.’”217 The reason this problem “may not exist” is
that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, if not eliminating, at
least reduces the concerns voiced by proponents of a dual definition.218 The
Establishment Clause “does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions.”219 In other words, the “[Establishment
Clause] does not . . . prevent the government from taking any action that is
consistent with a particular religion or religious tenet.”220 For example,
simply because the State prohibits murder, which corresponds with the prohibition against killing in the Ten Commandments, it does not render that
law an establishment of religion.221 Similarly, because a State promotes
through the force of law the value of equality, which may be religiously
inspired, or adopts social programs advocated for by clerics to aid the

214. Ingber, supra note 157, at 289-90.
215. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 1979).
If a Roman Catholic is barred from receiving aid from the government, so too should
be a Transcendental Mediator or a Scientologist if those two are to enjoy the preferred
position guaranteed to them by the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause. It may be, of course,
that they are not entitled to such a preferred position, but they are clearly not entitled
to the advantages given by the [F]irst [A]mendment while avoiding the apparent
disadvantages.
Id.
216. Clements, supra note 208, at 536.
217. Id. at 536 n.20 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6,
at 187 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, AMERICAN]).
218. Id.
219. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
220. Clements, supra note 208, at 536.
221. Id.; Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979).
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financially poor and impoverished in spirit, such as the homeless or drug
addicts, these actions do not mean that the State is establishing religion.222
Quite to the contrary, State actions to prohibit religious leaders, who may
continue acting from purely religious motivations, from attaining positions
of power and authority in government, are unconstitutional.223
Additionally, a dual definition is simply not the best approach to
resolving any potential conflict between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause; rather, “the preferable perspective is to view religion as a
unitary concept and to resolve any conflict between the clauses by refining
each clause’s substantive mandate.”224 The question of what constitutes a
religion should not be attached to the issue of whether “the constitutional
mandate has been violated or, rather, whether the state interest has
adequately overridden or circumvented the constitutional concern.”225
D. ONE PROBLEM WITH A BROAD DEFINITION OF RELIGION
Before a generous spirit leads one to embrace a broad unitary
definition of religion, it should be noted that under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, the further the definition of religion reaches, the lesser the
protections are that the Free Exercise Clause will afford. When considering
whether to apply heightened scrutiny to generally applicable laws that
impose upon religious activities, the Supreme Court warned that adoption
of such a system of review would breed anarchy.226 This anarchy
“increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs,
and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”227 The Court
noted this problem is particularly acute in the United States because there is
extraordinary religious diversity: “[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up
of people of almost every conceivable religious preference.”228 The Court
222. See Clements, supra note 208, at 536; Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212.
Moreover, the [E]stablishment [C]lause does not forbid government activity
encouraged by the supporters of even the most orthodox of religions if that activity is
itself not unconstitutional. The Biblical and clerical endorsement of laws against
stealing and murder do not make such laws establishments of religion. Similarly,
agitation for social welfare programs by progressive churchmen, even if motivated by
the most orthodox of theological reasons, does not make those programs religious.
The Constitution has not been interpreted to forbid those inspired by religious
principle or conscience from participation in this nation’s political, social and
economic life.
Id.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978).
Ingber, supra note 157, at 290.
Id.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
Id.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
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concluded that because the Constitution requires neutral treatment of
religious groups, strict scrutiny could not be applied in a diverse religious
society, because anarchy would result through the undermining of a broad
variety of laws.229 This analysis leads to the conclusion that even if free
exercise protection was bolstered, it “is unlikely that an extremely broad
definition of religion will be permitted to coexist with an extremely
generous protection of the claims that fall within that definition.”230
Seeking to increase the significance or scope of the right of free
exercise, while balancing the court’s concerns about chaos, it has been
suggested that a solution is “to define more narrowly what constitutes
religion for First Amendment purposes.”231 Critics have complained that an
expansive definition of religion, such as the “ultimate concern” definition
adopted by the Supreme Court in Seeger (discussed in Part IV), “inevitably
blurs the distinction between religion and non-religion” making affording
protections under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause an
almost unmanageable problem.232 Accordingly, the use of “[t]oo broad a
definition of religion tends to dilute protection for everyone.”233 Utilizing a
definition of religion that defines it in accordance with only “the sincerity
and the importance of a belief” to the individual, it becomes “difficult to
understand why ‘religious’ beliefs deserve more protection than other
sincere and important beliefs.”234 By narrowing the definition and more

229. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 888.
230. James M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections by Limiting Them: Preventing
a Repeat of Smith, 17 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996) (quoting JESSIE H. CHOPER, SECURING
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 63
(1995)).
231. Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 425-26.
232. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 30 (2000). Emily
Delacenseri & Marvin Hill, Jr., Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices: Lifestyle Regulations
and Officious Intermeddlers—Bosses, Workers, Courts, and Labor Arbitrators, 57 MO. L. REV.
51, 97 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of the Seeger/Welsh definition of religion being used in
the workplace).
The EEOC has been liberal in its interpretation of what constitutes a religion, adopting
the Court’s definition in Seeger and Welsh. What is particularly distressing for the
practitioner is the absence of a workable definition of religion. After Seeger and
Welsh, one might define religion to include anything that an individual decides is
religious in his own scheme of things. Such a definition would avoid the courts in the
constitutional problem of entanglement with religion, but would create havoc in the
workplace and due process problems for employers who would have no way of
implementing such a broad and vague scheme if charged with an affirmative duty to
accommodate an employee’s religious observances.
Id. (emphasis in original).
233. Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 426.
234. Rebecca Rains, Can Religious Practice Be Given Meaningful Protection After
Employment Division v. Smith?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 687, 699 (1991).
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clearly distinguishing religion from the secular, the result could be a greater
protection of religious liberty.235 Proponents of narrowing the definition
concede that this concept may offend some who regard their practices as
religious, but argue that to allow religion to be anything one asserts it to be
—i.e., any ultimate concern—will defeat any meaningful protection under
the First Amendment.236 And, in weighing the level of offense, proponents
argue that “[e]ven if it is offensive . . . it is less offensive than having the
courts interpret the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause in a manner that provides no
meaningful protection to religion.”237 Justice Goldberg asserted that “[t]he
basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote
and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for
all, and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment
of that end.”238 Although a broad definition may initially attract our default
sympathy, Justice Goldberg’s goal may be better achieved by a narrower
definition of religion that more clearly demarcates what is not religion than
one that falls to distinguish that which is non-religious.
IV. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION
The definition of religion has not been static. Quite to the contrary,
how religion is understood and how it has been defined has changed in
different eras. From the Founders’ understanding of what a religion is, state
courts drew their initial inspiration in defining the term. In its first
attempts, the Supreme Court provided a narrow, theistic definition in Davis
v. Beason239 in the late 1800s. In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme
Court would broaden its understanding of religion in United States v.
Ballard,240 Torcaso v. Watkins,241 United States v. Seeger,242 and Welsh v.
United States,243 before narrowing the definition somewhat in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.244 In the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, the circuit courts
of appeals and state courts have offered various formulations of what
constitutes religion.

235. Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 426.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
239. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
240. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
241. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
242. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
243. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
244. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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A. THE FOUNDERS
Having explored why the Founders protected religious liberty, this
article now turns to how they actually defined religion. Although the
Founding Fathers themselves were uniformly theists,245 the historical evidence stands in conflict with regard to whether they viewed religious
protections as applying only to theistic religions or towards a broader protection that includes non-theistic faiths.246 Most of the Founders appear to
have considered theism and religion to be synonymous and coextensive.247
James Madison and George Mason utilized a theistic definition of religion:
“[T]he duty which we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging
it.”248 Benjamin Franklin argued that the “essentials of every religion” are
belief in “the Deity; [and] that he made the world, and govern’d [sic] it by
his Providence.”249 Even Thomas Paine, the most radical of the founding
generation, defined religion in theistic terms, describing it as “man bringing
to his Maker the fruits of his heart.”250 While not displacing the connection
between theism and religion, Paine’s writings on religion serve to undermine any notion of the necessity of organization for a belief or practice to
be deemed religious.251 Paine eloquently articulated his embrace of the
individuality of religion: “I do not believe in the creed professed by the

245. “Theism” is “a belief in the existence of a god or gods.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2370 (3d ed. 2002).
246. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060.
247. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1520-21.
248. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060 n.26 (citing JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE ON THE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF MAN, in CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 84 (J. Blau ed., 1964)); Freeman, supra note 141, at 1520 (citing K.
ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 244 (1892)). Madison and Mason’s definition of
religion should not be confused with religion meaning exclusively Christianity or various
Christian sects. Quite to the contrary, Madison articulated a position that appears to indicate a
strong opposition to the concept of establishing Christianity as a State religion. Madison poses
the question in his Memorial and Remonstration on the Religious Rights of Man, “[w]ho does not
see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?”
Madison continues, “the proposed establishment [of Christianity] is a departure from that
generous policy, which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and
Religion, promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens.” David
Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion Clause
Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REV. 94, 105 n.55 (2002).
249. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1520 (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
ON RELIGION, in PROFILE OF GENIUS: POOR RICHARD PAMPHLETS 14 (N. Goodman ed., 1938)
(pamphlet IX)).
250. Ingber, supra note 157, at 250-51 n.95 (citing Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, in 4 LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 92 (D. Wheeler ed., 1908)).
251. R.P. NETTELHORST, NOTES ON THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE, http://www.theology.edu/journal/volume2/ushistor.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2006) (quoting Richard Emery Roberts, Excerpts from The Age of Reason, in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 362 (1945)).
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Jewish Church, by the Roman Church, by the Greek Church, by the Turkish
Church, by the Protestant Church, nor by any church that I know of. My
own mind is my own church.”252
Some of the strongest historical support for a non-theistic understanding of religion appears in the writings of the nation’s third President,
the pen of the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson questioned
the ability of the courts to define religious orthodoxy.253 He stated, “I
cannot give up my guidance to the magistrate; because he knows no more
of the way to heaven than I do & [sic] is less concerned to direct me right
than I am to go right.”254 Referring to the Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom in Virginia,255 Jefferson indicated that it “was meant to be
universal . . . to comprehend within the mantle of its protection the Jew and
the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan,256 the Hindoo,257 and the infidel
of every denomination.”258 Jefferson, however, was inconsistent in his
conceptualization of religion; on some occasions his writings provide a
theistic definition of religion. For example, he wrote that religion is “a
matter which lies solely between man and his God.”259 Furthermore,
252. Id.
253. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Jefferson, Notes
and Proceedings on Discontinuing the Establishment of the Church of England (1776), in I THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, 547 (J. Boyd ed., 1950)).
254. Id.
255. See Bruce E. Lowry, Jr., The New Discrimination in America: In Defense of the
Religious Equality Amendment, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 205, 209 (1996) (indicating that the
Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom provides a guidepost for First Amendment
analysis).
256. The author intends no offense to Muslims with this incorrect reference; rather, the
author is merely trying to accurately preserve the historical material given the context of
discussing the historical viewpoint.
257. The author intends no offense to Hindus with this incorrect reference; rather, the author
is merely trying to accurately preserve the historical material given the context of discussing the
historical viewpoint.
258. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060 (citing AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON
SUNDAY LEGISLATION 133 n.1 (W. Blakely ed., 1911) (emphasis in original)); see Freeman,
supra note 141, at 1520 (citing THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66-67 (1903)). Roger
Williams also embraced a broad collection of individuals within the ambit of religious liberty
notably “Jews, Turks, Papists, Protestants, [and] pagans.” Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on
Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 289, 294-95, & n.20 (2005). The
writings of Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams, who wrote on religious liberty nearly a century
before Jefferson, suggest that by the time of the founding the understanding of religion had
evolved beyond the view of religion held by former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy S.
Moore. Former Chief Justice Moore suggested that the Supreme Court erred by embracing an
understanding “that religion could include Buddhism, Hinduism, [and] Taoism.” The Honorable
Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 356-57 (1999). Both
Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams offered analysis that diverges from Moore’s understanding
of religion.
259. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1521 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah
Doge, Ephraim Robins & Stephen Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.
1, 1802), reprinted in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 (1903)).
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although Jefferson’s statement including Hinduism is generally interpreted
as incorporating a broader view of religion than the theistic understanding
of Madison,260 this conclusion does not necessarily follow from his
statement. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam are theistic religions. Whether
Hinduism is a theistic religion raises complicated theological questions,261
but even if a resolution could be reached on whether Hinduism constitutes a
theistic religion, it is almost impossible to assess Jefferson’s understanding
of Hinduism, complicating any analysis of what he meant by including
Hinduism as a protected religion. While we know that Jefferson intended
to protect Hindus within the ambit of religion, we are not sure what
Jefferson knew of the beliefs and practices of Hindus.

260. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1992)
[hereinafter Hall, Religion] (“But Jefferson’s inclusive vision remained subordinate to a continued
emphasis on the exclusive language of theism which ruled judicial rhetoric until well into the
twentieth century.”); Karen F.B. Gray, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 409 n.52 (1990) (“The [F]ounding [F]athers
took an expansive view of religious freedom, believing that it should protect non-theistic as well
as traditional belief systems.”); Clements, supra note 207, at 534; Bruce J. Casino, “I Know It
When I See It”: Mail-Order Ministry Tax Fraud and the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable
Definition of Religion, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 113, 130 (1987) (indicating that Jefferson embraced
a broader view than theism); Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 863, 867 n.18 (1987) (“Evidence of a desire to protect individuals other than
theists through the [F]irst [A]mendment also exists.”); Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and
Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301,
318 (1984) (Jefferson “suggests his intent to . . . transcend theistic boundaries in ensuring
religious liberty.”); Richard O. Frame, Belief in a Nonmaterial Reality—A Proposed First
Amendment Definition of Religion, U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 822 (1992) (“[C]ertain remarks by
Jefferson . . . indicate that he may have been willing to regard nontheistic belief systems as
religious. . . . While this statement does not indicate clearly that Jefferson would have considered
some nontheistic belief systems to be religious, it does at least enlarge the notion of religion
beyond traditional Christianity.”).
261. James P. Dawson, Hinduism, available at http://www.jpdawson.com/modrelg/
hinduism.html (last visited July 2, 2007).
Hinduism is not one religion, but rather a family of religions . . . it is fluid and
changing. Hinduism is a very complex set of beliefs and instructions that they have
derived from ancient scriptures, the Vedas. Hindus have a very wide selection of
beliefs and practices to choose from: they can be pantheists, polytheists, monotheists,
agnostics and even atheists, but to reach the next level in their reincarnation they must
choose and adhere to the teachings that they choose.
Id.; see Koppelman, supra note 3, at 124 (“Hinduism is theistic.”); Alan E. Brownstein,
Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion,
Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 111 n.106 (1990) (“Hinduism is a
polytheistic religion countenancing the worship of numerous Gods and Goddesses through rituals
revering their images. Buddhism, by contrast, is in essence an atheistic faith.”); Eduardo
Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 817 (1997) (indicating certain Hindu
sects are theistic); Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143, 148 n.24 (1994)
(indicating that Hinduism is a non-theistic faith); see also Sri Siva Vishnu Temple, Frequently
Asked Questions About Hinduism, http://www.ssvt.org/Education/Hinduism%20FAQ.asp (last
visited Apr. 1, 2006) (discussing how complicated the questions and answers are as to whether
Hinduism is monotheistic, polytheistic, or non-theistic).
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What is clear, however, is that Jefferson did not stop protection for
those whose beliefs were extremely different from his own or even
heretical, for unlike John Locke,262 from whom Jefferson otherwise took
much inspiration,263 Jefferson concluded that atheists warranted protection.264 This protection of atheists is an extremely important departure from
the writings of Locke and the prevailing ethos of colonies. As seen in the
discussion of religious liberty in the colonies, even in Pennsylvania, the
colony that provided the broadest protection of religious liberty, atheists
were not protected. And, even under the Carolinas Fundamental Constitution, which recognized almost any group as being religious, belief in a deity
was still required.
Nor was Jefferson alone among the Founders in his embracing of
atheists as falling within the protection of religious liberty. Madison, like
his fellow Virginian, afforded atheists the protections of religious liberty.
Madison argued to his fellow Virginia legislators:
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess,
and to observe the religion which we believe to be of divine origin,
we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not
yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offense against God, not against man: To
God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered.265
Thus, any definition of religion that we arrive at, if it is to be true to the
Founders’ guarantee, must encompass a protection for the beliefs of
atheists. However, if we think of atheism as only constituting a religious
belief insofar as it takes a position on the existence of God, then we have
not answered whether non-theistic faiths would fall within the Founders’
understanding of religion.
262. In his A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke expressed no toleration for atheists.
Locke stated:
[T]hose are not to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and
oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The
taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that
by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretense of religion
whereupon to challenge the privilege of a Toleration.
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note
32, at 21-22.
263. Thomas “Jefferson carefully read and made notes on Locke’s The Reasonableness of
Christianity and his Letters on Religious Toleration. Major portions of Jefferson’s Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom derived from passages in Locke’s first Letter Concerning
Toleration.” McConnell, supra note 21, at 1430-31.
264. Id. at 1450-51 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 550 n.2 (J. Boyd ed., 1950)).
265. BANNING, supra note 85, at 93 (quoting JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE (1785)).
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Regardless, even if the Founders understood religion merely in theistic
terms, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that they intended to exclude non-theistic religions. First, the founding fathers irrespective of their
understanding of what constituted religion did not act to support any particular religion.266 Consequently, in defining religion, it can be argued that
“the Founders sought simply to describe what religion itself is like, not to
prescribe which religion or religions people should practice.”267 One argument in favor of non-theistic religions being included in the Founders’
original protection is essentially that the true intent of the Framers was to
create a neutral definition of religion that did not discriminate against the
unorthodox believer.268 During the Founders’ generation, unorthodox believers were, nevertheless, theists.269
However, “[h]ad there been
nontheists among them, the Founders, in the interest of neutrality, might
very well have conceived of religion in broader terms. This seems
especially likely in view of the fact that most non-theistic religions
resemble their theistic counterparts in emphasizing the importance of
worship, rituals, deities, and the transcendent.”270 The Founders strongly
emphasized neutrality in the treatment of religions; thus, it seems plausible
to assume that neutrality is the most critical factor in constructing a
definition of religion based upon original intent.271 Furthermore, even
though the evidence set forth in writings of the Founders primarily, if not
exclusively, defines religion in theistic terms, no clear indication exists that
the Founders denied the religious nature of non-theistic religions.272 And,
the Founders’ “views assist modern courts . . . insofar as they evidence an
intent to construe liberally the scope of religious freedom.”273 As stated by
the United States Supreme Court,
[t]he Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied
and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on
which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of

266. Reiss, supra note 248, at 105 n.55; see Freeman, supra note 140, at 1520 (citing
Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66-67 (1903)).
267. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1521.
268. Id.; see Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1068 n.71.
269. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1521.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1060.
273. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1666.
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government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of
conflicting views.274
The Founders’ actions and beliefs are entirely consistent with the idea
of embracing changes in the nature of religion, such as including nontheistic faiths within the family of protected beliefs. Considering the available historical information, an originalist could certainly argue that the
Constitution restricts religious liberty to theists. But, one could also draw
on this same information, still looking from an originalist perspective, and
strongly argue that it is more consistent with the Founders’ intent to protect
non-theistic faiths as religions due to the Founders’ desire for a neutral
approach to religion, their expansive liberal approach, and their rejection of
static restrictions on religion. Thus, although there are those who argue the
Founders understanding of religion must be rejected because it limits
religion in manner that proves inadequate to modern America,275 this contention seems inaccurate. The Founders anticipated an America in which
religion would grow and develop. Their emphasis on neutrality and liberality, in this regard, seems to create a structure that readily allows for
cohesion and consistency between the Founders’ theistic views and modern
religious practice.
B. STATE COURTS DEFINING RELIGION IN THE MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY
The first judicial attempts at defining religion in the United States
arose not in federal courts, but in state courts. These early forays into the
subject of what constitutes religion provide a meaningful sense of early
judicial interpretations of the term religion. In considering these decisions,
there is certainly some cause for concern about whether religion means the
same thing under a state constitution as it does under the Federal
Constitution, especially given that states were not at this time obligated to
adhere to the First Amendment. However, given the Supreme Court’s
interest in the debates and practices of states for purposes of free exercise
and establishment jurisprudence, and that these state court decisions reveal
no indication that the courts believed multiple meanings of the word
religion existed, there is much to suggest that these opinions are an
important first step in the attempt by the judiciary to define religion in the
United States.

274. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
275. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 34, at 1666.

166

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:123

In 1848, the South Carolina Court of Appeals relied upon a definition
of religion provided by former New Jersey governor and founding father
William Livingston. The court interpreted religion as “an habitual reverence for, and devotedness to the Deity, with such external homage, public
or private, as the worshipper believes most acceptable to him.”276 The
court noted that the South Carolina Constitution included “the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference.”277 Furthermore, the court recognized the state constitution
as guaranteeing
that a man might be of any order of religious worshippers, or of
none at all; that he might worship God, or not, as he pleased; that
his worship might be in any form, at any time or place, or none at
all; and that for these differences in faith or practice, no difference
in civil condition should ever be made by law.278
This abolition of disabilities on the basis of religion extended to the “the
Christian, Israelite,279 Mahometan, Pagan and Infidel, [for] all stand alike,
in the Government and people of S[outh] Carolina.”280
Similarly, in 1846, the General Court of Virginia explored the contours
of religious liberty within the Commonwealth. The court described religion
“as the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging
it.”281 By safeguarding religious liberty, the court indicated that the
Virginia Constitution declared “to the Christian and the Mahometan, the
Jew and the Gentile, the Epicurean and the Platonist, (if any such there be
amongst us,) that . . . all are equally objects of its protection; securing safety
to the people, safety to the government, safety to religion.”282 In reaching
this conclusion, the court was interpreting Virginia’s constitutional protection of religious liberty, which as previously noted has been extremely
influential in shaping the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the First Amendment’s guarantees. By embracing both Epicureanism and
Platonism as religions, depending on how this reference is understood, the

276. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. 508, *12 (S.C.App. L. 1848)
(quoting William Livingston) (emphasis in original).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. As previously discussed with regard to incorrect historical references to Hindus and
Muslims, the author intends no offense to members of the Jewish faith with this incorrect
reference; rather, the author is merely trying to accurately preserve the historical material given
the context of discussing the historical viewpoint.
280. City Council of Charleston, 33 S.C.L. at *12.
281. Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. 632, 1846 WL 2406, at *5 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1846).
282. Id.
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Virginia court may have offered one of the broadest definitions of religion
set forth by any court.
C. ORTHODOXY IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
While Pagans were protected in South Carolina and Platonists in
Virginia, by the late 1800s, when the United States Supreme Court began to
address what constituted religion under the First Amendment, its understanding and application of the definition of religion was narrow. In the
late 1800s, the Supreme Court indicated that “[t]he ‘religion’ valued by the
First Amendment . . . was the sort of theistic belief widely recognized and
long revered by mainstream America—and nothing more.”283 The
Supreme Court defined the term religion in purely theistic terms: “‘religion’
has reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his will.”284 However, as applied by the Court, the definition
of religion proved to be even narrower than theism generally. For example,
the Court concluded in Davis v. Beason that the beliefs of the Mormon
Church, also known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, did
not constitute religious beliefs.285 Justice Field reasoned that because
Mormonism advocated polygamy, which he viewed as conduct that all
rational religious thinkers would view as immoral, it could not be
considered a religion.286 If a belief was “against the enlightened sentiment
of mankind,” then it was merely offered in the “pretense” of being derived
from religious conviction.287 “In other words, any practice claimed to be
religious, while arguably motivated by religious-type sentiments, must meet
a certain level of enlightenment to be considered religious.”288 Essentially,
the Court of this era excluded from the definition of religious beliefs and
283. David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 811 (2002).
284. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
285. Id. at 341-42; see Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890) (upholding the repeal of the Mormon Church charter); see
also Meyer, supra note 283, at 811 n.95 (“[T]he claims of religious minorities received little
serious attention from the Supreme Court through the first part of this century.” (citing 4 RONALD
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 21.7, at 532 (1992)); TRIBE, AMERICAN, supra note 217, at 1179 (“In order to be
considered legitimate, religions had to be viewed as ‘civilized’ by Western standards.”).
286. See Davis, 133 U.S. at 341-42 (“[T]o call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend
the common sense of mankind.”); see also Meyer, supra 283, at 811 (“Thus, in a succession of
cases toward the end of the Nineteenth Century, the Court placed Mormons effectively outside the
scope of protected religion . . . .”).
287. Late Corp., 136 U.S. at 50.
288. Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV.
181, 200 n.97 (2002).
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practices those that did not fit neatly within a mainstream Christian
perspective.
D. BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
However, this understanding of religion did not last because “[t]he
Court’s narrow . . . conception of ‘religion’ began to give way . . . midway
through the Twentieth Century, following a period of dramatic diversification of American religious life.”289 Courts began expanding the definition
of religion in the 1940s. Discussing what constituted religious belief in the
context of a conscientious objector statute, the Second Circuit stated:
[T]he content of the term is found in the history of the human race
and is incapable of compression into a few words. Religious
belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means
of relating the individual to his fellow-men . . . in the most
primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It accepts the
aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief finding
expression in a conscience which categorically requires the
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.290
The Second Circuit’s more expansive approach to religion began to
spread. For example, in a dissenting opinion, United States Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter utilized the Second Circuit definition rather than
the 1890 Supreme Court’s definition of religion.291 However, the movement of the definition of religion away from theism was not immediate.
For example, three years later, interpreting the same conscientious objector
statute as the Second Circuit had, the Ninth Circuit declared:
There are those who have a philosophy of life, and who live up to
it. There is evidence that this is so in regard to appellant. However, no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be, and
no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and
morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be
said to be religion . . . .”292
The Supreme Court made a pronouncement in United States v. Ballard
that is sometimes considered a break with its Beason jurisprudence which
289. Meyer, supra note 283, at 812.
290. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
291. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658-59 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
292. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946).
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defined religion in terms of theism; 293 however, this interpretation is an
incorrect, or at least a not completely correct, view of the case.294 The
Court did begin to widen its understanding of religion, but the theistic definition in Beason was not abandoned. However, the Court would not deem
some religions as real religions that warranted protection, and some religions as untrue religions, which were not worthy of protection.295 There
would be no inquiries allowed into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs or
doctrines.296
The language that occasionally attracts commentators to state that
Ballard rejected a theistic definition of religion is the Court’s statement that
“[f]reedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic
in a society of free men. It embraces the right to maintain theories of life
and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths.”297 However, the Court further stated that the Founders, by
protecting religious liberty, were ensuring that “[m]an’s relation to his God
was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as
he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.” 298
The Court added:
[a]s stated in Davis v. Beason “[w]ith man’s relations to his Maker
and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in
which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those
subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the
laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and
the morals of its people, are not interfered with.”299

293. See Strang, supra note 288, at 201 (stating that the Supreme Court in Ballard
“implicitly expanded beyond theism the definition of religion”); Hall, Sacred, supra note 150, at
145 (“[T]he Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard emphasized the breadth of religious
freedom in such a way as to call into question future attempts to define religion according to the
measuring rod of theism.”); Casino, supra, note 260, at 130-31 (regarding the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the Beason definition, the Court noted that “[t]his theistic notion of religion was
dominant until the 1940’s, when the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, changed direction in
regard to both the belief/action distinction and the theistic definition of religion”).
294. See Eli A. Echols, Note, Defining Religion for Constitutional Purposes: A New
Approach Based on the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 126-27
(2003) (“[Ballard] does not actually repudiate the theistic definition of religion. Rather, it implicitly embraces this definition by explaining that the First Amendment removed ‘man’s relation to
his God’ from the State’s concerns.”).
295. See Meyer, supra note 283, at 812 (indicating that in Ballard “the Court insisted that the
First Amendment valued unorthodox faiths as well as conventional religion.”).
296. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944).
297. Id. at 86 (internal citations omitted).
298. Id. at 87.
299. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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What the Ballard Court did change in the definition of religion was
perspective. In looking at theories of life, death, and the hereafter, the
Court was looking at what the faith was oriented towards: what types of
questions it was asking and what answers it was providing. With regard to
theism, the Court’s understanding of religion in Ballard can best be
described in terms of having “offered the possibility that nontheistic faiths
would be entitled to [F]irst [A]mendment protection.”300 Justice Rutledge
in his Everson dissent would embrace this understanding, viewing religion
as an expression of the practitioner’s “feeling toward ultimate issues of
existence.”301 What the Ballard Court and Justice Rutledge had emphasized were “generic areas of religious belief—life after death, for example
—rather than specific beliefs—faith in a supreme being, for example—that
must be held in order for the belief system to be considered religious.”302
Although Ballard has also been described as having stripped content from
the definition of religion,303 “the language of Ballard [actually] remained
content-oriented.”304 But, it began moving that content analysis in an
intriguing direction that presented an as yet unresolved issue insofar as the
Court “left uncertain the extent to which the protected beliefs must embrace
what have been termed ‘extratemporal consequences’ or ‘transcendent
realities.’”305
Whether Ballard embraced a non-theistic definition of religion or
simply helped pave the way towards one being embraced, the Court clearly
expanded its understanding of religion beyond theistic belief in a god or
gods in the 1961 case of Torcaso v. Watkins.306 The Court included within
its definition of religion Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular
Humanism, which are faiths that do not embrace a traditional Western
concept of God or Gods or, arguably, any concept of god whatsoever. 307
While the Supreme Court concluded in Torcaso that the government could
not discriminate to favor religions that embraced a concept of god against
those that do not, and provided a list of religions not based on a belief in
God, the Court did not explain why these particular beliefs constituted
religions nor did it provide a definition that would allow for determining

300. Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 322 (1984).
301. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 45 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
302. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 322.
303. See Echols, supra note 294, at 127 n.64.
304. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 322.
305. Id. at 322-23.
306. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
307. Id.
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what other beliefs constituted religions.308 Thus, although it was clear that
religion was not limited to theism, it was not entirely clear what religion
was.
In two conscientious objector cases, the Court provided a definition of
religion. The Court in Seeger adopted the following understanding as the
test of belief: “whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies.”309 In Welsh, the
plurality indicated that to be religious, this sincerity must “stem from the
registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and
wrong[,] and . . . these beliefs [must] be held with the strength of traditional
religious convictions.”310 The plurality determined,
[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely
ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any
war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that
individual a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally
religious persons.311
Thus, purely moral and ethical beliefs, both in their source and content,
were religious beliefs.312
However, with Justice Blackmun not participating, four justices
rejected this view.313 Justice Harlan would have found the exemption for
conscientious objectors who were opposed to the war because of their
religious beliefs to be an Establishment Clause violation.314 Such a violation occurred in his view because the conscientious objector legislation
preferred theists to those who ascribed to a non-theistic religion, and as
applied to the plaintiff, over those with strong, but secular, conscience
based opposition.315 Even defining religion so as to include non-theists
would not resolve the problem, for the basic difficulty was a preference for
religion over non-religion.316 For Justice Harlan, the plaintiff’s beliefs were

308. Id. at 495.
309. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion).
310. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.
311. Id.
312. Id.; see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (holding that meaningful and sincere beliefs are
religious beliefs).
313. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 333.
314. Id. at 345.
315. Id. at 356-66 (Harlan, J., concurring).
316. Id.
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clearly secular, not religious.317 Justice White, writing for Justice Stewart
and Chief Justice Burger, like Justice Harlan, similarly did not regard the
plaintiff’s beliefs as religious.318 Justice White’s dissenting opinion,
however, rejected Justice Harlan’s conclusion that an exemption for
religious objectors without including those with passionate, but secular,
non-religious, beliefs would be unconstitutional.319
Although the Court in Seeger and the plurality in Welsh were
construing the terms of a statute, the Court strongly suggested that this
understanding of religion carried over to the First Amendment.320 There
have, however, been questions raised as to whether the Court truly intended
the Seeger and Welsh definitions of religion to be applied to the First
Amendment as opposed to being limited to the conscientious objector
statutory provision.321 Regardless of the Court’s original intent, Seeger and
Welsh have had and continue to have a significant influence on how courts
approach and understand what religion means for purposes of the First
Amendment.322
Despite the continuing impact of these decisions, “[i]n subsequent
cases, the Court appears to have retreated somewhat from the most expansive implications of Seeger’s functional approach to defining religion and
that of Welsh.”323 In Yoder, the Court indicated that a “way of life” would
not amount to religion, nor would philosophical beliefs.324 “Thus, if the
Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and
rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself

317. Id.
318. Id. at 367-74 (White, J., dissenting).
319. Id.
320. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring);
see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579,
589 (1982) (analyzing Seeger as “hav[ing] significant constitutional portents, particularly because
the Court’s straining of the language of the statute . . . was prompted by its desire to [avoid]
imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and
excluding others”); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1425 (1967)
(“[Seeger] seems to suggest the Court’s ultimate definition of religion for constitutional
purposes.”).
321. Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Whether Seeger meant to define
religion as used in the First Amendment is doubtful. Instead of discussing the history of the First
Amendment, the Court there discussed the history of the draft.”).
322. See, e.g., Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing and
applying the definition of religion set forth in Seeger and by the plurality in Welsh); Kong v.
Scully, 341 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing the Seeger definition of religion).
323. Meyer, supra note 283, at 813.
324. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 216 (1972).
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at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.”325
Distinguishing between philosophy and religion, the Court indicated that
“Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and
such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.”326 The
Court’s discussion of how to treat views such as those of Thoreau, although
merely dicta, embodies the change in the Supreme Court’s understanding of
religion from Seeger to Yoder. Justice Douglas sounds this retreat, noting
that the type of personal and philosophical choice made by Thoreau would
have fallen within the definition of religion provided by Seeger.327
Torcaso, a 1961 decision, and Yoder, a 1972 decision, in both of which the
Court’s discussion of defining religion is merely dicta, and Seeger and
Welsh, two statutory interpretation cases from 1965 and 1970 respectively,
stand as the last significant pronouncements from the Supreme Court on
what constitutes a religion. None of these decisions offer a commanding
pronouncement of what the law is, instead they serve only as loose
guidance for the state courts and lower federal courts.328
E.

RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS TO A BROADER
DEFINITION OF RELIGION

Without definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, the various
Circuit Courts of Appeals have responded to this vacuum by creating a
variety of tests, which generally, but not completely, overlap. There are
five primary approaches. In Africa v. Pennsylvania,329 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals offered a three part-test:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions
having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a
religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system
as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be
recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.330

325. Id. at 216.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). William James also found Thoreau’s
philosophy to be religious. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 222
(1985) (providing Thoreau’s work as an illustration of personal spirituality).
328. See, e.g., Bodensteiner, supra note 160, at 421 n.31 (explaining the heterogeneous
religious composition of the United States); Caroline L. Kraus, Note, Religious Exemptions—
Applicability to Vegetarian Beliefs, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 197, 214 (2001); Val D. Ricks, To God
God’s, To Caesar Caesar’s, and to Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053,
1065-66 (1993); William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost From the Vietnam War:
Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REV. 179, 220 (1993).
329. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).
330. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032.
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This Third Circuit definition, which grew out of a concurring opinion by
Judge Arlin Adams in Malnak v. Yogi,331 has been enormously influential
with other circuit courts, federal district courts, and state courts.332 The
United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit views
religion as belief systems that address “underlying theories of man’s nature
or his place in the Universe.”333 In United States v. Meyers, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, navigating the unsettled waters surrounding what
is and is not a religion, adopted a test composed of a variety of religious
factors that various courts have identified.334 These factors include ultimate
ideas, metaphysical beliefs, a moral or ethical system, comprehensiveness
of beliefs; and the accoutrements of religion, which includes a founder,
teacher or prophet, important writings, gathering places, keepers of
knowledge, ceremonies and rituals, structure or organization, holidays, diets
or fasting, prescribed appearance and clothing, and propagation.335 The

331. 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979).
332. See, e.g., Udey v. Kastner, 644 F. Supp. 1441, 1443 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (providing a twopart test for deciding whether a prisoner’s religious dietary demands could be denied); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Jane M. Ritter, The Legal Definition of
Religion: From Eating Cat Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV. 751, 776-777 (2004).
333. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
334. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482-84 (10th Cir. 1996).
335. Id. The Tenth Circuit explained these terms as follows:
1. Ultimate Ideas: Religious beliefs often address fundamental questions about life,
purpose, and death. As one court has put it, “a religion addresses fundamental and
ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters.” These matters
may include existential matters, such as man’s sense of being; teleological matters,
such as man’s purpose in life; and cosmological matters, such as man’s place in the
universe.
2. Metaphysical Beliefs: Religious beliefs often are “metaphysical,” that is, they
address a reality which transcends the physical and immediately apparent world.
Adherents to many religions believe that there is another dimension, place, mode, or
temporality, and they often believe that these places are inhabited by spirits, souls,
forces, deities, and other sorts of inchoate or intangible entities.
3. Moral or Ethical System: Religious beliefs often prescribe a particular manner of
acting, or way of life, that is “moral” or “ethical.” In other words, these beliefs often
describe certain acts in normative terms, such as “right and wrong,” “good and evil,”
or “just and unjust.” The beliefs then proscribe those acts that are “wrong,” “evil,” or
“unjust.” A moral or ethical belief structure also may create duties—duties often
imposed by some higher power, force, or spirit—that require the believer to abnegate
elemental self-interest.
4. Comprehensiveness of Beliefs: Another hallmark of “religious” ideas is that they are
comprehensive. More often than not, such beliefs provide a telos, an overreaching
array of beliefs that coalesce to provide the believer with answers to many, if not
most, of the problems and concerns that confront humans. In other words, religious
beliefs generally are not confined to one question or a single teaching.
5. Accoutrements of Religion: By analogy to many of the established or recognized
religions, the presence of the following external signs may indicate that a particular set
of beliefs is “religious:”
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals looked at religion not in a systematic or
cultural manner, but instead psychologically, defining religion as “the
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as
they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may
consider the divine.”336 Thus, expressly relying on Seeger, the Second
Circuit held that for beliefs to be considered religious, “[a]n individual
claiming violation of free exercise rights need only demonstrate that the
beliefs professed are ‘sincerely held’ and in the individual’s ‘own scheme
of things, religious.’”337

a. Founder, Prophet, or Teacher: Many religions have been wholly founded or
significantly influenced by a deity, teacher, seer, or prophet who is considered to
be divine, enlightened, gifted, or blessed.
b. Important Writings: Most religions embrace seminal, elemental, fundamental,
or sacred writings. These [sic] writing often include creeds, tenets, precepts,
parables, commandments, prayers, scriptures, catechisms, chants, rites, or
mantras.
c. Gathering Places: Many religions designate particular structures or places as
sacred, holy, or significant. These sites often serve as gathering places for
believers. They include physical structures, such as churches, mosques, temples,
pyramids, synagogues, or shrines; and natural places, such as springs, rivers,
forests, plains, or mountains.
d. Keepers of Knowledge: Most religions have clergy, ministers, priests,
reverends, monks, shamans, teachers, or sages. By virtue of their enlightenment,
experience, education, or training, these people are keepers and purveyors of
religious knowledge.
e. Ceremonies and Rituals: Most religions include some form of ceremony,
ritual, liturgy, sacrament, or protocol. These acts, statements, and movements
are prescribed by the religion and are imbued with transcendent significance.
f. Structure or Organization: Many religions have a congregation or group of
believers who are led, supervised, or counseled by a hierarchy of teachers,
clergy, sages, priests, etc.
g. Holidays: As is etymologically evident, many religions celebrate, observe, or
mark “holy,” sacred, or important days, weeks, or months.
h. Diet or Fasting: Religions often prescribe or prohibit the eating of certain
foods and the drinking of certain liquids on particular days or during particular
times.
i. Appearance and Clothing: Some religions prescribe the manner in which
believers should maintain their physical appearance, and other religions
prescribe the type of clothing that believers should wear.
j. Propagation: Most religious groups, thinking that they have something
worthwhile or essential to offer non-believers, attempt to propagate their views
and persuade others of their correctness. This is sometimes called “mission
work,” “witnessing,” “converting,” or proselytizing.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
336. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)) (emphasis in original);
see Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)).
337. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fifth Ave. Presbyterian
Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965))).
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Although also referencing Seeger and the plurality definition from
Welsh, in framing its own definition of religion, the Seventh Circuit’s
approach to religion is somewhat different than the Second Circuit’s
approach. In the Seventh Circuit’s definition, “when a person sincerely
holds beliefs dealing with issues of ‘ultimate concern’ that for her occupy a
‘place parallel to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons,’
those beliefs represent her religion”338 for purposes of free exercise.339 The
court, however, also noted Yoder and indicated that “[t]he Supreme Court
has said that a religion, for purposes of the First Amendment, is distinct
from a ‘way of life,’ even if that way of life is inspired by philosophical
beliefs or other secular concerns.”340 For the Seventh Circuit the definition
of religion that results from combining these two decisions appears to be
more content-based than the Second Circuit’s definition. In the Seventh
Circuit, religion is something that is “taking a position on divinity”341 and
an issue of “ultimate concern,”342 rather than simply sincere beliefs that are
in the “individual’s own scheme of things, religious” as the Second Circuit
holds.343 These views represent the five primary approaches with other
circuits generally deferring to and applying one of these respective
viewpoints,344 although occasionally only using a test for purposes of the
particular case—assuming arguendo the test properly defines religion.345
F.

STATE COURTS’ RESPONSE TO A BROADER DEFINITION OF
RELIGION

State courts have addressed a variety of statutory provisions that relate
to exemptions for religious activity and religious organizations.
If a state court is addressing an issue to which both the U.S.
Constitution and the applicable state constitution have applicable
338. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Fleischfresser v.
Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal citation and quotation
omitted); see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-88 (1965).
339. Fleischfresser, 15 F.3d at 688 n.5.
340. Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 681-82; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
341. Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682 (“If we think of religion as taking a position on divinity, then
atheism is indeed a form of religion.” (citing Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th
Cir. 2003))).
342. Id. at 681.
343. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fifth Ave. Presbyterian
Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965))).
344. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2003); Doswell v. Smith,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4644, at *9-10 (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 1998).
345. See Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94
F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996).
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clauses—such as free speech, free exercise and nonestablishment
of religion, or equal protection—then the court has some
obligation to use the federal authority to define the minimum
applicable threshold concerning individual rights.346
Furthermore, the state courts have needed to define religion and to
approach it in a manner that is consistent with the First Amendment.
Of the various definitions of religion set forth by state courts, the
Supreme Court of Missouri has provided one of the more controversial
formulations.347 The Missouri state tax commission had concluded that
although the Missouri Church of Scientology
has some of the trappings and accouterments of an organized
religion, it appears to be more an applied philosophy which has a
certain religious connotation, but which falls short of being
devoted to the worship of the Supreme Being, which [the]
Commission [concluded was] necessary for the property owner to
have its property considered exclusively for religious worship.348
The state tax commission determined that “‘an applied religious
philosophy’ is not identical for purposes of exemption ‘with an organized
religion devoted to religious worship.’”349 Thus, the Commission decided
that the Church of Scientology’s use of land was not for religious
purposes.350
Relying upon Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,351 the
Missouri Church of Scientology argued that the Missouri Supreme Court
should have rejected the tax commission’s definition and instead adopt the
understanding of religion and religious worship delineated by a California
appellate court in the aforementioned case.352 The California court in
Fellowship of Humanity, indicated that “the proper interpretation of the
terms ‘religion’ or ‘religious’ in tax exemption laws should not include any
reference to whether the beliefs involved are theistic or nontheistic.”353
Thus, “[r]eligion simply includes: (1) a belief, not necessarily referring to
supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious association openly
346. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1218 (1999).
347. See David Young, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment: Lexicography
and Constitutional Policy, 56 UMKC L. REV. 313, 322 (1988).
348. Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm’n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc) (emphasis in original).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
352. Alameda, 315 P.2d at 406.
353. Id.
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expressing the belief; (3) a system of moral practice directly resulting from
an adherence to the belief; and, (4) an organization within the cult designed
to observe the tenets of belief.”354 For the California court, “[t]he content
of the belief is of no moment. Assuming this definition of ‘religion’ is correct, then it necessarily follows that any lawful means of formally observing
the tenets of the cult is ‘worship,’ within the meaning of the tax exemption
provision.”355 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, did not find this
argument persuasive, and instead affirmed the tax commission’s conclusion
that the practices of the Missouri Church of Scientology did not constitute
religious worship.356 The court concluded that to warrant an application of
tax-exempt status accorded to property dedicated to religious worship, an
organization as a “minimum requirement [must have] a belief in the
Supreme Being.”357 The court reasoned that “[g]enerally religious worship
is expressed by prayers, reverence, homage and adoration paid to a deity
and include the seeking out by prayer and otherwise the will of the deity for
divine guidance.”358 Although indicating that a religious organization did
not need to use the term God or Supreme Being, the Missouri Supreme
Court concluded that the United States Supreme Court in Seeger had not
“excised the concept of a Supreme Being from ‘religion.’”359 Quite to the
contrary, the court stated that “it can reasonably be said that when [the
United States Supreme Court] spoke of ‘claimed belief’ as occupying ‘the
same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in
the life of one clearly qualified for exemption,’ . . . the term necessarily
includes God or Supreme Being.”360 For the court, the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Seeger was more a matter of semantics: that
the religious group or individual might not refer to their god or gods as God
or a Supreme Being was of no import so long as they nevertheless had a
God or a Supreme Being included in their beliefs.361 Furthermore, the court
noted that “[t]he Seeger definition is not one of constitutional construction
but of statutory interpretation” of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.362 Thus, according to the Missouri Supreme Court, to be

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
Id.
Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm’n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. 1977).
Id. at 842.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 842.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 841-42.
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religious, belief in a Supreme Being or God, although not under that
particular name, remains an essential component of religion.363
In a case presenting issues similar to those before the Missouri
Supreme Court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Church of Pan, Inc. v.
Norberg considered whether the Church of Pan (Pan) was a “church” or
“other religious organization,” which would entitle it to a tax-exempt status
under Rhode Island law. The trial court had determined Pan was operated
for purely religious purposes and was therefore entitled to the tax exemption.364 In analyzing the trial court’s findings, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court viewed the following facts as being important to its analysis: Pan
had a founder, who served as the church’s senior minister,365 but none of
the members of the group’s ministry were formally trained in theology.366
“The church’s doctrines include[d] belief in ‘the natural god’ [and] [c]entral
to the organization’s teachings is a duty to serve this god through the study,
care, and preservation of nature.”367 As part of this mission, Pan maintained 150 acres as a preserve for wildlife and the ecosystem, and its primary activities consisted of “forestry, wildlife care and recycling programs
in which both members and nonmembers participate.”368 The organization
also made “monetary contributions to such organizations as the Audubon
Society and the Sierra Club.”369 Members of the twenty-five person
congregation were free to adhere to other faiths, and many members were
actually practicing members of other religions.370 Pan conducted monthly
services, which consisted of a “general discussion, usually forty-five
minutes to one hour in length, on a topic chosen by the senior minister.”371
During these services, “[n]o hymns are sung, no prayers are recited, and
there are no scripture readings.”372 As for physical facilities, Pan “has no
church building or other formal place of worship. Weather permitting,
monthly services are conducted in a meadow or in woodlands on 200 acres

363. Id. at 842. Subsequent decisions and commentators have reiterated that Missouri law
requires belief in a Supreme Being to qualify for a religious tax exemption. See, e.g., Ozark
Avalon v. Lachner, 2001 WL 909165, at *8 (Mo. St. Tax. Comm’n 2001); Sch. of Metaphysics v.
McIntire, 1992 WL 18304, at *6 (Mo. St. Tax. Comm’n 1992); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET
AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 401, n.20 (Rev. 2d ed. 2006).
364. Church of Pan, Inc. v. Norberg, 507 A.2d 1359, 1361 (R.I. 1986).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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of leased property. . . . In inclement weather, services are held indoors
wherever space is available.”373
The Rhode Island Supreme Court framed its analysis by noting that
“[t]he mere fact that the claimant characterizes itself [as a religious
organization] is not determinative.”374 The court indicated it “is permitted
to inquire into the true purposes for which the organization was established
and is conducted.”375 Nor will the stated purpose of the organization
suffice to demonstrate that it is a religious organization; instead, the court
will look to the organization’s actual activities.376 Citing the 1890s
Supreme Court decision in Beason, the court noted that religion “has
traditionally been defined as one’s views of one’s relationship with, and
obligations to, a supreme being.”377 Since the Supreme Court’s Torcaso,
Seeger, Welsh, and Yoder cases have failed to provide a binding First
Amendment definition to the contrary, the court viewed religion for
purposes of the First Amendment as having “reference to one’s views of his
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for
his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”378 For the court, it
was essential that “[o]rganizations operated exclusively for religious
purposes must be distinguished from those organizations dedicated
primarily to the furtherance of philosophical, scientific, sociological,
ecological, charitable, or political principles.”379
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that even though the
“plaintiff’s motives and the sincerity of its beliefs are not in question,” Pan
simply was not a religion.380 The court found the following factors to
undermine Pan’s claim that it was a religious organization: (1) “members
are free to continue to practice other religions;” (2) the “congregation has
neither any formally trained or ordained ministry nor any sacraments,
rituals, or formal education courses;” (3) Pan’s “[m]onthly services consist
simply of a general discussion rather than religious worship;” and, (4)
“[d]uring the services no hymns are sung, no prayers are recited, and there
are no scripture readings.”381 Considering Pan’s tenets and activities, the
court concluded that they were “primarily secular rather than religious.”382
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id.
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The court indicated that “[t]he plaintiff’s activities, which include forestry,
wildlife care, recycling programs and monetary support of environmental
organizations, are best described as environmental and conservational
programs.”383 The court determined that the “organization’s purpose is
primarily the preservation of the environment, any religious connotation or
purpose is merely incidental to this secular purpose.”384 These factors were
critical to the court’s understanding of what constitutes a religion for
purposes of its state tax laws, as interpreted in a manner consistent with the
First Amendment.
The Pan court drew upon the analysis utilized in a similar Minnesota
case, Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington.385
However, in a subsequent decision, In re Collection of Delinquent Property
Taxes,386 the Minnesota Supreme Court, although not overruling Ideal Life,
did further clarify the Ideal Life decision.387 The court indicated that the
“test for determining whether an organization is properly considered [a
religious entity] for tax purposes is a subjective one, focusing on the
sincerity of belief and taking into account evidence on issues such as those
articulated in Ideal Life.”388 For the issues similar to those articulated in
Ideal Life, i.e., for the objective component of the test, the Minnesota courts
have chosen to look to factors identified by the IRS in determining whether
a legal entity is a church for tax purposes.389 These characteristics include:
a distinct legal existence, a recognized creed and form of worship, a definite
and distinct ecclesiastical government, a formal code of doctrine and discipline, a distinct religious history, a membership not associated with any
other church or denomination, an organization of ordained ministers, a prescribed course of study for ordained ministers, a literature of its own,
established places of worship, regular congregations, regular religious
services, Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young, and schools
for the preparation of its ministers.390 The In re Collection of Delinquent
Real Property Taxes court continued to look to objective factors while tying
these objective factors to its sincerity analysis. In concluding that the
organization was not a religious entity, the court stated

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Id.
304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981).
530 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1995).
In re Collection of Delinquent Real Property Taxes, 530 N.W.2d at 205.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBL’N NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR
CHURCHES AND OTHER RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (Draft July 26, 1994)).
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that while [the party seeking to be described as religious entity]
meets several of the criteria articulated in Ideal Life, absence of
certain other characteristics undermines an assertion of sincerity of
belief . . . . In particular, we note the lack of association with other
congregations, the lack of a prescribed course of study for
ordained ministers and the dearth of sacrament, ritual, liturgy or
recognized form of worship.391
The Minnesota appellate courts have also wrestled with the convergence and distinctions between “conscience,” “creed,” and “religion.” The
Minnesota Commission on Human Rights concluded that refusal to deliver
food to an abortion clinic violated the state’s public accommodation laws
by discriminating based on creed.392 The Commission noted that the
refusal to deliver to the clinic was “because of [the clinic’s] commitment to
pro-choice beliefs” and that such action, failing to deliver food, constituted
“discrimination based upon ‘creed.’”393 The Commission defined “‘creed’
as a ‘formulation or epitome of principles, rules, opinions, and precepts
formally expressed and seriously adhered to and maintained.’”394 The
Commission reasoned that because the head of the clinic and the organization itself “are ‘adamantly pro-choice for women’ and are committed to
providing abortion services, and their pro-choice position ‘demonstrates a
seriously maintained set of principles and opinions,’”395 their “pro-choice
position constituted a ‘creed.’”396 Reversing, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals determined the term creed included only religion and religious
beliefs and that “the Commission erred in defining ‘creed’ to include political, sociological and philosophical beliefs.”397 The appeals court concluded
that “[b]oth the ‘common meaning rule’ of statutory construction and the
existing case law supports this court’s holding that the definition of ‘creed’
extends only to religion and religious beliefs and not, as the Commission
held, to any beliefs on any subject.”398
In Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca,399 the Georgia Supreme
Court considered whether the Ravenwood Church of Wicca, a nonprofit
corporation dedicated to the practice of Wicca, was a religious entity and

391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 206.
Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982).
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whether its practices constituted religious worship, which would qualify the
organization for a tax exemption.400 Ravenwood is a particularly interesting
case because of the distinctions drawn by the majority and the differing
conclusions reached by the majority and the dissent, despite both applying
the same definition of religion. The court indicated that “in order to constitute a religion, there is the requirement that there be a belief in a deity occupying a place parallel to that occupied by God in traditional religions.”401
These beliefs must be sincerely held, and there must be a dedication on the
part of the adherent to the practice of those beliefs.402
In applying this definition and determining that Wicca constituted a
religion, the majority looked to the Wicca doctrine, training of ministers,
and its ceremonial or cultural aspects. With regard to doctrine, the court
relied on the deposition testimony of Lady Sintana, the head of the
Ravenwood Church, wherein she stated that in Wicca “there is a belief in a
deity, but not in the sense of an anthropomorphic God. Rather, the Wiccan
belief is that there is a primordial, supernatural force which is the creator of
the world and universe and which permeates everything therein.”403 She
further indicated that in Wicca “there is a deification of this force, and all
individuals are seen as divine sparks from this divinity with a concomitant
moral and ethical responsibility to themselves and to everything in
nature.”404 The duty owed “arises from the fact that each individual is
connected to all things in the universe in what is known as the ‘karmic
circle,’ and each individual both causes the events occurring within the
circle and is affected thereby.”405 The court also found it important that
Lady Sintana was trained for ten years before being ordained as a Wiccan
minister.406 In looking to the ceremonial and cultural aspects of the
religion, the court noted that Wicca has eight Sabbaths that mark festivals
for various seasonal changes.407 The court also noted the existence of
sacraments and ceremonies “of the Wiccan doctrinal theology [which]
include: honoring the deity through reverence and homage, communion,
marriages (referred to as ‘hand fastings’), funeral ceremonies, and

400. Roberts, 292 S.E.2d at 657-58.
401. Id. at 661. See, e.g., Lamad Ministries, Inc. v. Dougherty County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
602 S.E.2d 845, 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (providing an illustration of the continuing influence of
Ravenwood in Georgia courts).
402. Roberts, 292 S.E.2d at 661.
403. Id. at 658.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
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ceremonies for naming babies.”408 Moreover, last but certainly not least,
the court considered that the State of Georgia permitted Lady Sintana to
perform marriages recognized by the State.409
The Georgia Supreme Court determined that “[a]dherents to the
Wiccan faith do not practice the stereotypical ‘bubble, bubble, toil and
trouble’ witchcraft, and Voodoo-like curses and hexes play no part in the
Wiccan philosophy.”410 To be considered a religious organization, it was
important that the Wiccans differed from such groups because the majority
concluded that “demonology and stereotypical witchcraft most
emphatically do not constitute religion.”411 Justices Jordan and Clarke, the
dissenting justices, agreed with the majority’s definition of religion that the
“essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation.”412 The dissenting justices,
however, concluded that Wicca “does not meet this test;” they believed that
Wicca did not escape the majority’s distinction.413 The dissenters noted
that,
Lady Sintana, the founder of Ravenwood, refers to herself as “a
pagan and a witch.” Male followers are called “warlocks.” Each
individual is connected to everything in the universe by what is
known as the “karmic circle.” There is no belief in a deity in the
sense of an anthropomorphic God, only a belief in some strange
supernatural force which permeates the world.414
For the dissenters, the majority’s approach raised a clear concern that,
under what the dissent considered a “nebulous” understanding of religion,
“there could be as many ‘places of religious worship’ as there are homes or
tents where humans meditate on the mysteries of life. It would certainly
include places in which Satanic cults worship a supernatural evil force
which dominates the world.”415 The dissenters did not believe that “such
cults or beliefs” were religious.416
Although the majority and dissent differed in their conclusion on
whether Wicca is a religion, they both agreed on a general understanding of
what constitutes religion, including that a belief in some form of deity is an
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essential component. This view is largely reflective of the states’ general
approach to this issue. Although there is certainly variance between states
as to what they consider to be a religion, in general, states have been
reluctant and resistant to embracing the potentially radical implications of
the Supreme Court’s definition of religion in Seeger. They often note that
Seeger and Welsh are merely statutory interpretations and sometimes look
to Yoder as modifying the United States Supreme Court’s understanding of
religion.
The Texas Court of Appeals, however, is an exception, embracing
Seeger and Welsh.417 In Strayhorn v. Ethical Society of Austin,418 the
Ethical Society of Austin sought tax-exempt status as a religious
organization under the Texas state tax code.419 The Texas Comptroller
denied the Ethical Society’s application “on the ground that the Ethical
Society must demonstrate that it requires belief in a ‘God, Gods, or higher
power’ . . . in order to qualify.”420 The question before the court was
“whether a state government may, consistent with the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, require a group to demonstrate its belief in a
‘Supreme Being’ in order to be considered a religion for statutory purposes.”421 The court concluded that “[b]ecause the Comptroller’s test fails
to include the whole range of belief systems that may, in our diverse and
pluralistic society, merit the First Amendment’s protection, we will affirm
the trial court’s judgment.”422
Members of the Ethical Society view themselves as being ethical
humanists, who place ethics at the center of human relations.423 The Texas
Comptroller argued that its test—requiring belief in god, gods, or a higher
power—created “a necessary bright-line rule protecting the state from being
required to award tax exemption to any group that calls itself
‘religious.’”424 Relying on Yoder, the state argued that its rule adheres to
the principle that religious beliefs and personal or philosophical beliefs are
not synonymous.425 In reaching this conclusion, “[t]he Comptroller relies
on the [S]upreme [C]ourt’s declaration in . . . Yoder that a way of life,
however virtuous and admirable, will not have First Amendment protection
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unless it is rooted in ‘religious belief.’”426 The state argued that Yoder
“counteracts any expansive reading of religion undertaken in the
conscientious objector cases, because it focuses the First Amendment
analysis squarely, and exclusively, on the distinction between religious and
personal or philosophical beliefs.”427 The Comptroller believed its test to
be
the
only
adequate
means
of
distinguishing
between
personal/philosophical beliefs and religious beliefs.428 The Ethical Society,
however, argued that this definition presents too narrow an understanding
of religion.429 Relying on Torcaso, Seeger, and Welsh, the Ethical Society
asserted that the state’s definition of religion “does not adequately account
for the range of belief systems which comprise the broad spectrum of
religious faith in contemporary society.”430 However, “because the test
encompasses the generic concept of a supernatural reality, the Comptroller
assert[ed] that it is sufficiently broad to account for the various diverse
religious views existing in contemporary society.”431
In analyzing these arguments, the court began with an indication “that
the State has a compelling interest in insuring that only qualified religious
organizations receive the tax exemption—it cannot be sufficient for a group
simply to label itself as a religion in order to enjoy tax-exempt status.”432 It
noted that Ethical Culture Societies “have no creed of theology or
metaphysics, no set doctrines concerning the unknown mysteries of life.
There is no claim to a belief in a supernatural universe or Supreme
Being.”433 However, the court also referenced a book setting forth Ethical
Society thought:
What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith that
it expresses itself in the human world as the power which inspires
in men moral purpose. Thus the ‘God’ that we love is not the
figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisaged
by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements
which retard its progress toward “the knowledge, love, and
practice of the right.”434

426. Id. at 464.
427. Id. at 465.
428. Id. at 464-65.
429. Id. at 463.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 465.
432. Id. at 464 (citing Church of the Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247,
1252-53 (D. Minn. 1982)).
433. Id. at 466.
434. Id. at 467 n.9.
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Although stating that only religion, not personal belief, is protected under
Yoder, the Texas Court of Appeals indicated that the Yoder decision fails
“[to] articulate a workable test for distinguishing personal from religious
beliefs.”435 The Texas court agreed with Justice Clark’s statement in
Seeger that “the distinction between personal and religious beliefs is
inherently difficult because ‘in no field of human endeavor has the tool of
language proved so inadequate.’”436 The court also expressed concern that
“[a]ny inquiry that delves . . . closely into the textual references made by a
religion to the existence of God puts the courts in danger of making
determinations based on dimly understood, and perhaps misconceived,
characterizations of unfamiliar religions.”437 To protect “the full range of
religious belief, as expressed in Seeger,” the court concluded that it had to
reject the Comptroller’s test.438 The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the
Ethical Society’s tenets and beliefs may not explicitly reference a divinity,
they evidence enough of a sense of spiritual feeling that the Society’s claim
to religious status should be carefully assessed.”439 Citing the Third Circuit
decision in Malnak, the Texas Court of Appeals found the test therein to be
an appropriate measure of whether an entity constituted a religion:
The test requires that a set of beliefs: (1) address fundamental and
ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable
matters such as the meaning of life and death or man’s role in the
universe; (2) be broad in scope and comprehensive in nature; and
(3) be accompanied by the presence of certain formal and external
signs.440
Under this test, the court concluded that the Ethical Society constituted a
religion.441 Thus, while the presence of a deity has been critical to many
state courts in assessing whether an organization constituted a religious
entity, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected this conclusion. In reaching its
definition of religion, the Texas Court of Appeals, like the United States
Supreme Court in Seeger, looked to the understanding of religion provided
by academics outside the legal profession, raising the question of why the
views of non-legal experts are of such importance.
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OTHER DISCIPLINES’ DEFINITIONS
OF RELIGION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas
having their essence in their form; they are organic, living
institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is
vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the
words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line
of their growth.442
In endeavoring to find or present a legal definition of religion, while looking beyond a dictionary is necessary, why should the legal community care
or consider what other disciplines have to say regarding what constitutes a
religion, especially since there are a number of reasonable concerns
associated with doing so? For example, it has been argued that “[r]eligion
is one thing to the anthropologist, another to the sociologist, another to the
psychologist, another to the theologian, and another to the philosopher.”443
These variations between academics in their respective fields, specifically
the differences in their understanding of what constitutes a religion, is at
least in part attributable to the type of inquiry being conducted.444 “[P]ostmodern . . . theory contends that ‘[e]very field is defined by its own special
devices . . . by existence theorems, arguments from invisible hands, and
appeals to textual probabilities or archives. . . .’”445 Thus, for example,
because a sociologist is looking more to the cultural dynamic, her vision
will be limited by tools of her discipline, and because a theologian is
focused more upon doctrine, her understanding will be confined by the
lenses of her analysis. Thus, we may expect that in any discipline we are
getting only part of the picture of what constitutes a religion, and that
picture will be taken standing from a particular vantage point. While this
concern cautions restraint in simply embracing the wholesale theological,
philosophical, or sociological definition of religion, it does not counsel

442. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
443. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial
Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 721-23 (2004) (citing JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1973)) [hereinafter Modak-Truran, Reenchanting].
444. Mark Modak-Truran, The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making and the De
Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 255, 257 n.5 (1998) [hereinafter Modak-Truran,
Religious Dimension].
445. David M. Zlotnick, The Buddha’s Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 957, 1006 (2001).
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against trying to utilize the insights of these fields in framing a legal
definition of religion.
Although as a general matter, originalists may be opposed to consulting commentators outside the legal profession, there are reasons why
they would not necessarily be opposed to doing so in this instance.
Originalists normally “eschew an approach that would consider the values
of a modern interpreter.”446
Approaching the Constitution using
“[o]riginalism requires that we give effect to the Framers’ values, as expressed in the language of the document itself.”447 Thus, “[i]n determining
whether an interpretation would conform with the purposes of a provision,
one may consider the normative effects of that interpretation, but only if
they are of the kind that the framers’ generation would have embraced.”448
In contrast, “normative effects reflecting modern sensibilities that would be
alien to the Framers are not relevant to an originalist interpretation.”449 But
as previously discussed the Founders had concern for the emergence of new
religious groups and included them within the ambit of the protections of
religious liberty, rather than merely imposing a stagnant, preservative protection of the contemporary religious faiths. Moreover, theology and
philosophy inspired the Founders’ creation of religious liberty, and a preformal variant of sociology inspired an awareness on the part of the
Founders of some of the religious diversity in their colonies, states, and the
emerging nation. If it is helpful to look to those disciplines that study religion to understand the contemporaneous practice of religion in the United
States, and that assists in fulfilling the Founders’ values of preserving
religious liberty by safeguarding growth and changes in religious belief and
practice, then considering the insights of other disciplines should not
necessarily be deemed an improper project from an originalist perspective.
There are at least five reasons for looking at other fields’ understanding
of religion in the quest for a legal definition of religion. One, the United
States Supreme Court and various federal and state courts have already
looked to other fields in defining religion. In endeavoring to understand the
definitions of religion used by the courts, it can be advantageous to understand the definition provided by the particular theorist relied upon by the
court. Thus, there already has been a move by courts to consider these
other disciplines and their insight into what constitutes religion. In order to
apprehend what these courts are doing, it would be wise to consider the
446. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional
and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 391 (2003).
447. Id. at 391-92.
448. Id. at 392.
449. Id.
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sources they are utilizing. The influence of theorists and scholars in various
fields on the courts will be discussed more fully in the next section of this
article. Two, knowledge is not limited to any particular discipline. To
develop a more complete picture or understanding of religion, it would be
prudent to draw upon knowledge, regardless of whether its source is across
an academic discipline border. Three, many of the questions that courts are
struggling with in defining religion have also been challenges and questions
that other disciplines dedicated to studying religion have confronted and
explored. By looking to these other disciplines, it becomes easier to avoid
pitfalls experienced by theorists in these various fields and to draw upon
their considerable research and analysis. Fourth, the United States is an
incredibly complicated and diverse pluralistic religious country. Judges are
not experts in religion. To avoid concerns about judges failing to appreciate the full scope of religious diversity in the United States, it is prudent
to draw upon experts in the field. Fifth, drawing on advice and insights of
religious experts in endeavoring to understand what constitutes religion is
not unlike the influence of experts with regard to various other legal issues,
for example psychologists’ influence in shaping the legal debate regarding
the law’s understanding of mental defect issues.
It has been claimed that “a profession, like an individual, has come of
age when it has developed capacity for interdependent relationships,
notable qualities of which are readiness to give and take without anxiety
and without need to dominate or to suffer loss of identity.”450 By taking
insights and understanding from various disciplines, that is, by employing
interdisciplinary study and analysis, a better understanding may be
reached.451 For example, it has been argued that interdisciplinary education
can lead to “the development of the level of human cognition that stimulates thought about an issue from all viewpoints, taking into account varied
and, as yet, unthought possibilities.”452 Advocates of an interdisciplinary
approach contend that it offers an opportunity at what can be described as
“wisdom.”453 For these interdisciplinary proponents, “[w]isdom cannot be
confined to a specialized field, nor is it an academic discipline; it is the
consciousness of wholeness and integrity that transcends both. Wisdom is

450. Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary
Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 319, 319 (1999) (quoting CHARLOTTE TOWLE,
THE LEARNER IN EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS 19 (1954)).
451. See Anita Weinberg & Carol Harding, Interdisciplinary Teaching and Collaboration in
Higher Education: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 15, 22-23
(2004).
452. Id.
453. Id. at 23.
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complexity understood and relationships accepted.”454 As an illustration, a
family law practitioner and professor has noted that in family law “interdisciplinary studies are not a distraction from, but a critical part of, modern
lawyering. It would be futile to isolate legal doctrine and practice from
psychology, economics, sociology, religion, and history.”455 Similarly,
determinations on what constitutes due process and free speech in the
public school setting are also linked to an interdisciplinary, rather than
purely legal, discourse.456 Theologians, psychologists, and sociologists can
provide understandings of religion that are worthy of consideration.457
Although there are certainly reasons to be cautious in transferring insights
and observations from one discipline to another, academic institution
divisions “should not be allowed to stand in the way of the transfer or joint
production of information and modes of knowledge.”458
The Supreme Court, in defining religion in Seeger, looked beyond
dictionaries to an understanding of religion produced by a prominent liberal
Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich. In exploring the discoveries and understanding of other disciplines, the Supreme Court should have analyzed the
definition of religion “more deeply. Had it done so, the Court would have
found that while it has been grappling with the religion clauses with increasing sophistication, an academic discipline called ‘religious studies’ has
been developing rapidly.”459 Religious studies scholars have been studying
religion using the tools of theology, sociology, psychology, anthropology,
and history to create a methodology for understanding religion.460 “Much
of the academic work has focused on defining, explaining, and describing
religion in order to make sense of the place of religion in contemporary
society.”461 But why should the legal community care what these scholars
have to say regarding religion? In part, because “[m]any of the questions
addressed by these scholars are . . . identical to the questions with which the
Supreme Court has had to grapple in construing the [F]irst

454. Joseph W. Meeker, Wisdom and Wilderness, LANDSCAPE, Jan. 1981, available at
http://www.cop.com/info/meekart.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
455. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice
to Life, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1977, 1991 (1993).
456. Sarah E. Redfield, The Convergence of Education and Law: A New Class of Educators
and Lawyers, 36 IND. L. REV. 609, 620-21 (2003).
457. See Knechtle, supra note 6, at 523-24.
458. Manuel A. Utset, Back to School with Coase: The Production of Information and
Modes of Knowledge Within and Across Academic Disciplines, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1063, 1096
(1995).
459. Agneshwar, supra note 177, at 320.
460. Id.
461. Id.
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[A]mendment.”462 Where problems are analogous, the legal community
should look to other disciplines for advice, techniques, data, and new
insights.463
Unlike theologians and philosophers, judges, who must perform the
difficult and delicate task of defining religion, have no special competence
with regard to religion.464 By not being experts in religion, an extraordinarily complicated subject matter, the judges’ “actions in defining
religion run the risk of establishing the Justices’ own views of religion,”
thereby posing a threat to the free exercise rights of religious practitioners
of unfamiliar faiths.465 However, it has been argued that by drawing on the
work of “academics—[including] anthropologists, sociologists, historians,
philosophers, psychologists—who have a sub-specialty in studying religious behavior,” judges may be able to avoid this danger.466 Thus “religious
studies can help lawyers and judges to acknowledge the religiousness of
Americans without establishing it.”467 Furthermore, even assuming one
does not hold a view of judges’ ability that limits their approach in such
manner, the religious environment is so complicated and pluralistic that in
defining religion “a meaningful discussion requires references to other disciplines such as philosophy.”468 By deriving their understanding from the
experiences of individuals, a common tool in these disciplines, the possibility is also presented of arriving at a more phenomenological definition—
learning what religion is from the ground up, rather than imposing a topdown definition.469
Additionally, the incorporation of religious studies into the examination of what constitutes religion is consistent with practices in a wide
variety of legal fields, which provide for including the insights and observations of experts outside the legal field to add a more scientific element to
the analysis. United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, in
referencing a religious studies scholar, noted that the individual offered a
scientific approach to the study of religion.470 It has been argued that “[u]se
of a generalized scientific concept as part of a legal rule or standard

462. Id.
463. Utset, supra note 458, at 1094.
464. Mitchell, supra 150, at 632 n.117 (citing P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1964)).
465. C. John Sommerville, Defining Religion and the Present Supreme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 167, 169 (1994).
466. Id. at 168.
467. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 442 (1998).
468. Feofanov, supra note 154, at 315-16.
469. Sommerville, supra note 465, at 169.
470. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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presumptively fosters correct and consistent adjudication.”471 However, we
should expect these advantages to be lesser where the legal term is skewed
by or attached closely with policy considerations and where the science is
of lesser sophistication in classifying the term or phenomena.472 In making
a legal concept scientific, difficulties are particularly likely to occur where
the science is “concerned with mental and emotional conditions.”473 Nevertheless, consulting scientific practitioners is still warranted. For example,
“whether the test of criminal responsibility is framed in terms of ‘mental
disease or defect’ or in terms of capacity to know ‘right from wrong,’
adjudication would proceed foolishly if it failed to seek guidance from the
discipline that makes abnormal mental condition its special province of
study.”474
VI. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION FROM
PAUL TILLICH, A THEOLOGIAN, WILLIAM JAMES, A
PSYCHOLOGIST, AND EMILE DURKHEIM, A SOCIOLOGIST
Whatever their reasons for drawing on insights into what constitutes
religion from other disciplines, courts have certainly embraced the views of
a number of different significant figures in other disciplines. The views of
theologian Paul Tillich, psychologist William James, and sociologist Emile
Durkheim have been particularly influential. Courts have used aspects of
their theories to define religion for purposes of the First Amendment.
A. PAUL TILLICH’S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS
The writings of theologian Paul Tillich profoundly influenced various
courts’ interpretations of what constitutes a religion.475 The Third Circuit
noted Tillich’s “thoughts have been influential both with courts and
commentators.”476 The definition of religion adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Seeger and Welsh was “derived largely from Tillich.”477
In Seeger, the United States Supreme Court sought to embrace the
increasingly broad understanding of religion that was becoming manifest in

471. Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1096
(1966), in JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1011 (9th ed. 1997).
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1097.
474. Id. at 1096.
475. Gianella, supra note 320, at 1424-26; Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1066-68.
476. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979).
477. Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 n.10 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby,
J., concurring).
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the religious community.478 To this end, on more than one occasion in
Seeger, the Court referenced and quoted approvingly theologian Paul
Tillich, who it described as an eminent Protestant theologian.479 The Court
noted that Tillich “identifies God not as a projection ‘out there’ or beyond
the skies but as the ground of our very being.”480 In trying to identify nontraditional religions that would qualify for protection under the First
Amendment, the Court looked to Tillich’s ultimate concern:
And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it,
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being,
[of] your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God . . . .481
With religion no longer requiring a god or gods, the Seeger/Tillichian
functional phenomenological482 approach “treats an individual’s ‘ultimate
concern’—whatever that concern be—as his ‘religion.’”483 It is not
“difficult to see why this philosophy would prove attractive in the
American constitutional framework.”484 For, as noted by the Third Circuit,
“[o]ne’s views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more
imponderable questions—the meaning of life and death, man’s role in the
Universe, the proper moral code of right and wrong—are those likely to be
the most ‘intensely personal’ and important to the believer. They are . . .
ultimate concerns.”485 Courts shifting their analysis from traditional
definitions of religion towards an “ultimate concern” approach is indicative
of the significant impact of Tillich.

478. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965); Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1066
(“In Seeger, the majority explicitly relied on the views of several progressive theologians, notably
Paul Tillich, and in so doing, tapped into one of the most respected, yet most expansive, traditions
in the phenomenological approach to religion.”).
479. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180. Cf. Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(describing Tillich without the accolades, simply as a liberal theologian).
480. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180.
481. Id. at 187 (citing PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)).
482. “Phenomenology” is “the typological classification of a class of phenomena.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 869 (10th ed. 1993).
483. Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Int’l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981); see United States v. Levy, 419
F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1969) (“[Religion] in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is
ultimate concern.” (citing PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 7-8 (1959))).
484. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979).
485. Id.
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B. WILLIAM JAMES’S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS
The writings of philosopher, psychologist, theologian, and sociologist
William James have also profoundly affected the Courts. Justice Jackson’s
conclusion in Ballard “that religious faith is more a matter of emotional
experience than of rational inquiry was heavily influenced by the psychological and phenomenological studies of religious conversions by William
James.”486 Jackson stated that “William James, who wrote on these matters
[religion] as a scientist, reminds us that it is not theology and ceremonies
which keep religion going. Its vitality is in the religious experiences of
many people.”487 Jackson’s embrace of an internal, psychological, and
individualistic definition of religion incorporates James’s understanding of
religion.488 Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals borrowed from
James its definition of religion: “the feelings, acts, and experiences of
individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”489 According
to the Second Circuit, James conceives of the divine with god or gods being
unnecessary, instead it is used “in its broadest sense as denoting any object
that is godlike, whether it is or is not a specific deity.”490 Consequently, the
Second Circuit broadly construes divinity, while looking for an intense
psychological reaction to the divine. As noted by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York, application of the Jamesian
definition requires “the factfinder to delve into the internal operations of the
claimant’s mind” in determining whether a belief is religious in nature.491
C. EMILE DURKHEIM’S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS
Sociologist Emile Durkheim contributed his social and behavioral492
definition of religion. The Third Circuit’s test for determining if something
is a religion developed out of the philosophical and sociological works of

486. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 339 n.162.
487. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
488. Michaelson, supra note 300, at 339 n.162 (1984); see Garrett Epps, What We Talk
About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 563, 564 (1998).
489. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGION 31 (1910)); see Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153,
157 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGION 32 (1910)); Selah v.
Goord, 255 F.2d 42, 44 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
490. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (citing James, supra note 326, at 34).
491. Keesh v. Smith, No. 9:04CU0779NAMGJD, 2006 WL 516793, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
2006).
492. Epps, supra note 488, at 564.
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Emile Durkheim.493 The Third Circuit indicated that external/formal
ritualistic elements are “helpful in supporting a conclusion of religious
status given the important role such ceremonies play in religious life.”494
The court specifically referenced Durkheim’s finding that these external/
formal ritualistic elements “are always common to a determined group
which makes profession of adhering to them and to practicing rites
connected with them[.]”495 A point Durkheim summarized by stating that
“[i]n all history, we do not find a single religion without a Church.”496
Courts utilizing Durkheim’s definition find “that religion implies community.”497 Consequently, these courts look for an external and formal nature,
rather than an internal one. This is the inverse of the approach of the
Second Circuit, which is modeled on James’s view of religion.
VII. REACHING DEEPER INTO OTHER DISCIPLINES FOR INSIGHTS
INTO DEFINING RELIGION FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
PURPOSES
By reaching deeper into other disciplines than the courts have so far, it
becomes easier to see problems with the definitions of religion that have
been adopted by courts, particularly the aforementioned definitions based
on the views of Tillich, James and Durkheim. Furthermore, other disciplines have already confronted many of the same questions and difficulties
in defining religion with which courts are currently struggling. In doing so,
they have achieved insights that can be helpful in formulating a better
definition of religion for First Amendment purposes.
A. ONE ULTIMATE CONCERN FOR EVERYONE
A deep yearning and restlessness within the human soul forces it to
struggle and strive for fulfillment, as it endeavors to reach beyond itself into
the infinite.498 Paul Tillich recognizes this internal need to seek fulfillment:

493. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 n.44 (3d Cir. 1979); see Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662
F.2d 1025, 1032 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (adopting Judge Adams’s concurrence as the Third Circuit’s
definition of religion).
494. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209.
495. Id. at 209 n.44 (citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS
LIFE 43-44 (1915)); see Way Int’l v. Limbach, 552 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Ohio 1990) (citing EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 43-44 (Joseph W. Swain trans.,
1915)).
496. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 n.44.
497. Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1239 (N.Y.E.D. 1974) (citing DURKHEIM, supra
note 495, at 42-47).
498. See PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 13 (1957) (explaining that humans seek
fulfillment in the infinite).
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“the human heart seeks the infinite because that is where the finite wants to
rest.”499 However, if, as Søren Kierkegaard theorized, an infinite gulf exists
between the infinite and finite, a problem develops when people attempt to
bridge the gap between humanity’s finite constraints and the infinite
itself.500 Although people may desire to rest in the infinite, their finite
constraints prevent this happy slumber and leave them with a conditioned
understanding of the infinite, which is itself unconditional.501 One result of
this conditioned understanding is that certain concepts of religion become
difficult to accept after the separation between the two spheres is shattered.
Consequently, humans seek to reconcile and to justify certain facets of
religion into a comprehensible, accessible form, an act which perhaps does
not demonstrate weakness as Freud or Marx 502 would argue, but which is
instead a manifestation of an inherent and reasonable human response.
According to Tillich, the need to be oriented by something beyond the finite
realm is a necessity that is inherent within human existence; without it,
people have a gap in their existence.503 An ultimate concern fills this
gap504—religion expressed through an ultimate concern cannot be avoided
even by the most antagonistic opponents of god or gods. For Tillich,
everyone has a religion because everyone possesses and is possessed by an
ultimate concern.505
B. LACK OF UNITY OF SELF/MORE THAN ONE ULTIMATE CONCERN
A significant problem in Tillich’s analysis is the objection that people
do not in this era, or perhaps any era, possess a unified sense of self.
Consequently, they do not have a single ultimate concern, but rather a broad
array of transitory and sometimes conflicting, important, though not ultimate, concerns. With the classical image of God being fractured under the
potent force of materialistic progress, cultural relativism, and alternative
scientific paradigms for defining the world, the conceptualization of self is
being deconstructed in a corresponding manner with every fracture in the
model of God deepening the cracks in our imaginings of the deficient

499. Id.
500. See, e.g., Lynn Poland, The New Criticism, Neoorthodoxy, and the New Testament, 65
J. Religion 459, 474 (1985); STEPHEN TOMKINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 223
(2005); ARLAND USSHER, JOURNEY THROUGH DREAD 123 (1968).
501. See TILLICH, supra note 498, at 14.
502. Doug Padgett, Anthropology of Religion, May 1998, http://www.indiana.edu/~wanthro/
religion.htm (explaining Freud and Marx’s view of origins of religion).
503. TILLICH, supra note 498, at 1-2.
504. Id.
505. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1076 (citing TILLICH, supra note 498, at 63-64).
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reproduction: the self.506 Although Western civilization is still pervaded by
an abundance of the assumed truths of its philosophical parents and ancestors, including notably Augustine’s sense of self as existing in imperfect
reflection of God, the rise of postmodernist thought and relativistic
understandings of the world have substantially effaced for the
contemporary world the Augustinian model of the self as derived from
God.507 Without a seemingly infinite singular locus of orientation for the
self in the medium of God, individuals, it can be argued, have been
transformed into the Platonic concept of the democratic soul.508 Plato
conceived of the democratic soul as being the kaleidoscopic person with his
or her orientation being directed towards a myriad of finite elements, which
both cooperate and compete to define the concept of self.509 Thus, people
are not unified toward one object God, nor toward one ultimate concern.

506. See Augustine, supra note 2, at 19.
507. See generally Augustine, supra note 2, at 19.
For even then I was; I lived: I felt: even so early I had an instinct for the care of my
own being, a trace in me of that most profound Unity whence my being was derived;
in my interior sense I kept guard over the integrity of my outward sense perception,
and in my small thoughts upon small matters I had come to delight in the truth. I
hated to be wrong, had a vigorous memory, was well trained in speech, delighted in
friendship, shunned pain, meanness and ignorance. In so small a creature was not all
this admirable and reason for praise? Yet all these were the gifts of my God, for I did
not give them to myself. All these were good and all these were I. Therefore He Who
made me is good and He is my Good: and in Him I shall exult for all the good
qualities that even as a boy I had. But in this lay my sin: that I sought pleasure,
nobility, and truth not in God but in the beings He had created, myself and others.
Thus I fell into sorrow and confusion and error. Thanks be to Thee, my Joy and my
Glory and my Hope and my God: thanks be to Thee for Thy gifts: but do Thou
preserve them in me. Thus Thou wilt preserve me, and the things Thou hast given me
will increase and be made perfect, and I shall be with Thee: because even that I exist is
Thy gift.
Id.
508. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 252-53 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans.,
1985) (describing the “democratic man” as analyzing everything with “the rule of equality”).
509. Id. at 253. Plato contends that the rise of a democratic age destroys the unity of
people’s orientation towards any particular value. Id. at 252. They no longer have one goal,
honor in the timocratic age, or wealth in the oligarchic age, but instead people have a multitude of
orientations that reflect the unleashed confusion of a democratic state that fails to orient its people
towards a single objective. Id. at 253-54. A democratic soul
divides his expenditures of time, money, and effort equally between the necessary and
unnecessary pleasures. . . . He yields to each appetite as it makes its presence felt so
that it appears to be a matter of random choice. Then gives himself over to it until he
is satisfied. After that, he turns to some other pleasure, rejecting none and treating all
as equally enjoyable. . . . So he lives his life day by day, indulging each appetite as it
makes itself felt. One day he is drinking heavily and listening to the flute; on the next
he is dieting and drinks only water. Then he tries some exercise, only to lapse into
idleness and lethargy. Sometimes he seems to want to be the philosopher. More
frequently, he goes in for politics, rising to say or do whatever comes into his head. If
he develops an enthusiasm for military men, he rushes to join them; if for
businessmen, then he is off in that direction. His life lacks all discipline and order, yet
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Tom Wolfe, a prominent American writer and cultural critic, illustrates
Plato’s point about the democratic soul. Wolfe writes, “[n]ow is a great
time for new religions to pop up. There are people who get religious about
jogging, they get religious about sex. . . . Health foods have become the
basis of a religion. ESP, of course, flying saucers, anything is fertile
ground now. There’s a new messiah born every day.”510 Depending upon
the analyst’s perspective, either people have been freed from the monolithic
orientation of self as an inaccurate replica of God and released into a world
with a nearly limitless multitude of potentialities that create numerous
ephemeral conceptualizations of self, or the self has been imprisoned within
a relativistic funhouse with swiftly tilting mirrors that briefly reflect
distorted images that keep people enslaved by their constantly changing
nature. Regardless, there is an embrace in society of the surface and the
swiftly changing as opposed to the deeper and the unchanging.511
Consequently, it becomes difficult to have only one ultimate concern.
As an illustration, the deconstruction of the unity of self seems to
culminate in the almost absolute annihilation of the unitary self as portrayed
by Cindy Sherman in her photographic self-portraits.512 Sherman created a
picture gallery of “self-portraits” which cannot be identified from an
objective viewpoint as containing the same subject, namely the artist
herself. Although she seems to endeavor to present a visual poetry with
every moment possessing enormous reality, truth, emotion, meaning, and
significance, Sherman does not present the complete image of herself in any
of her photographs. In addition to the literal aspect of removing at least
some part of her physical body from each photograph, Sherman does not
present any progression between the photographs, thus leaving the audience
with a controlled glimpse of an incomplete moment, rather than an
extended portrayal of the self. Her work, which does not provide enough
information to complete any story, invites the audience to define and to
explain, what they see in that moment. The varying presentations of self
provided by Sherman in her photographic self-portraits unveil an
understanding of the self that exists in a myriad of diverse moments and
forms, which are completely disconnected. In her self-portraits, Sherman
he calls it a life of pleasure, freedom, and happiness and is resolved to stay the
course. . . . He is a kaleidoscopic man, a man of many different humors, fair and
colorful as the city itself. Many men and women would count him fortunate as the
one who displays the greatest diversity in personal qualities and life styles.
Id. at 252-53.
510. TOM WOLFE, TWENTY YEARS OF ROLLING STONE: WHAT A LONG STRANGE TRIP IT’S
BEEN 340 (J.S. Wenner ed. 1987).
511. See Pamela McCorduck, Sex, Lies, and Avatars, WIRED, Apr. 1996, at 108.
512. See CINDY SHERMAN, CINDY SHERMAN (1987).
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appears as animals, pieces of plastic, grass, curtains, monsters, men, and
women; she is dead, alive, elegant, tawdry, young, and old. Her concept of
self is imparted as a completely diverse array of unconnected elements that
cannot be classified as different parts of the same self; rather, they are
different notions of self, which exist independently. Each photograph
reveals a different self in her multiplicity of beings. Unlike Augustine,
whose sense of self was organized around God, Sherman destroys the
concept of a singular orientation; thereby, she prevents the formation of a
unitary order. She presents a postmodern self with no clear center of
orientation for defining the world. Her concept is of a diverse multitude of
selves such as would be presented by looking through a constantly
changing kaleidoscope. The problem raised by this concept of self for
Tillich’s paradigm is that there is no singular ultimate concern, because the
individual lacks the consistency necessary to have a single ultimate
concern.
C. DIVINE AND DEMONIC
In his text Dynamics of Faith, Tillich imparts his view that humanity
endeavored to create within the realm of finite understanding a clear,
distinct dichotomy between good and evil, rather than accepting the
complication that one God of both good and evil would present to a unified
image of self.513 Therefore, humans have discovered a compartmentalized
separation between the divine and demonic in various forms, for example,
Christianity’s revelation of a God of love and Satan, a manifestation of evil.
Consequently, people’s orientation toward God, who permeates the finite
and relativistic world, is transformed from “both divine and demonic” into a
quest for the “morally good and the logically true.”514 Humanity desires to
alleviate the confusion and pain that is suffered as a result of the ambiguity
and contradictions, which people’s finite minds perceive when attempting
to understand a demonic and divine God.515 This causes a fight to be
“waged against the demonic-destructive element in the holy.”516 Tillich
describes this fight as having been “so successful that the concept of the
holy was changed.”517 He believes, however, that this new finite conceptualization of God does not provide “genuine meaning.”518 Because
513. See TILLICH, supra note 498, at 15 (describing the ambiguity of “the holy” as “divinedemonic”).
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id.
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humanity endeavors to rest in its true home, a home which its finite
constraints prevent it from reaching, people create a false image of God and
religion.519 This religion lacks, according to Tillich, the intimations of God,
as “the ‘separated,’ the ‘transcending,’ the ‘fascinating and terrifying,’ the
‘entirely other.’”520 For Tillich, this provides an indication of the lack of
“genuine meaning” derived from such a finite conception of God.521 He
contends that a dichotomy between good and evil results from humanity’s
attempt to create a constrained and conditioned finite understanding of the
infinite.
Although Tillich understands the desire of the human soul to extend
beyond itself into what is “true and good,” he, nevertheless, calls for the
death of humanity’s creation of a true God, who is constrained and
conditioned by the finite shackles imposed by our limitations.522 This, in
his view, is necessary in order to transcend toward the infinite. Because
Tillich recognizes “the infinite distance of the finite from the infinite,” he
decries any attempt to reach the infinite via finite means.523 For Tillich,
every attempt to get deeper into a religion by eliminating the ambiguity and
conflicts perceived by people’s finite minds in a search for the truth of God
does not in fact bring people closer to God.524 Quite to the contrary, Tillich
believes that the more a person understands about God, the farther away
that person moves from the infinite.525 Every attempt to explain God produced via people’s finite minds, hearts, and souls leads to a more erroneous
understanding of God.526 Therefore, once subjugated by the conditional,
God is removed from a position of being and misplaced into a position of
existence as a being, which mutates God into an “object.”527 Once finite
limitations are placed upon God, the infinite does not exist within
humanity’s finite realm as the All; rather, God is transformed into the allpowerful, all-knowing, all-loving God. This destroys the infinite separation
between God and humanity.
Consequently, Tillich disagrees with the view of God as divine; rather,
for Tillich, God is “both divine and demonic.”528 He indicates that humanity has witnessed and endured some horrible atrocities due to orientation
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

Id. at 12-17.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 30-35.
Id. at 30-35.
Id. at 30-40.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
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towards a God. More controversially, he disagrees with the dismissal of
these actions as completely disassociated from true faith.529
The holy which is demonic, or ultimately destructive, is identical
with the content of idolatrous faith. Idolatrous faith is still faith.
The holy which is demonic is still holy. This is the point where
the ambiguous character of religion is most visible and the dangers
of faith are most obvious: the danger of faith is idolatry and the
ambiguity of the holy is its demonic possibility. Our ultimate
concern can destroy us as it can heal us.530
While humanity endeavored to create a compartmentalized or clear
dichotomy between good and evil with God only manifesting within the
good sphere, Tillich disagrees with this separation by arguing that God is
“both divine and demonic” and “both creative and destructive.”531 For
example, the nation for the Nazis is an idolatrous faith, but even though
idolatrous, the nation is an ultimate concern and Nazism a religion.532 Furthermore, perhaps revealing some of his Protestant religious background,
Tillich states, “the holy originally lies below the alternative of the good and
the evil,” which correlates in some aspects extremely well with the Old
Testament representation of God as a Creator and Destroyer.533 Within the
Old Testament, God creates the world and destroys Sodom and
Gomorrah.534 While both of these actions could be explained as a synthesis
of creation and destruction, the story of the flood perhaps provides a better
explanation of the intertwining of creation and destruction.535 For God with
one act, both destroys the current state of existence of humanity via the
flood and creates, via Noah and the Ark, a new order and a new orientation
for humanity.536
For Tillich, God is “both divine and demonic,” yet God is in some
respects neither good nor evil.537 God exists beyond these finite constraints; God transcends our finite perceptions of what is justice, truth, real,
529. Id. at 16.
530. Id. (emphasis added).
531. Id. at 14-15.
532. Id. at 44 (“If the nation is someone’s ultimate concern, the name of the nation becomes
a sacred name and the nation receives divine qualities which far surpass the reality of the being
and functioning of the nation.”).
533. Id. at 15.
534. See Genesis 1:1-1:3 (“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. And the
earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of
God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was
light.”); Genesis 18:16-19:29.
535. See Genesis 6:1-11:31.
536. See id.
537. TILLICH, supra note 498, at 15.
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love, compassion, etc. For Tillich, God remains inexplicable; the closest
humanity can get to know God is to say that God is qualitatively beyond the
limits of people’s finite understanding. God does not embody the qualities
of goodness or even complete goodness. God exists in an unconditioned
state, which is fundamentally indescribable. Therefore, when Tillich argues
that God is “both divine and demonic,” he does not simply present the Old
Testament God, which performs acts of creation and destruction.538 God
transcends these finite constraints. For Tillich, God stands at a point where
chaos and the void merge to become one unitary, absolute, infinite being:
God is contradiction—everything yet nothing.
William James, Emile Durkheim, and Mircea Eliade, a Romanian
religious studies scholar, among others, would vigorously disagree with
Tillich’s understanding of religion as being an approach to the divine and
the demonic, the sacred and the profane. James defined religion as “the
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as
they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may
consider the divine.”539 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this
Jamesian definition of religion.540 To be divine, the belief in a god or gods
is deemed unnecessary. For James and the Second Circuit employ the word
divine “in its broadest sense as denoting any object that is godlike, whether
it is or is not a specific deity.”541 The Second Circuit, believing that “[i]n
every religion there is an awareness of what is called divine and a response
to that divinity,” accepted James’s understanding of religion as an individual’s relation to what they consider divine.542 Helping to provide an
indication if something is divine or not, James noted that “the individual
feels impelled to respond to [the divine] solemnly and gravely, and neither
by curse nor jest.”543 The key component of religion is that a person stands
in apprehension of that which they consider to be divine or sacred, not as
Tillich would suggest standing in apprehension of the demonic and divine.

538. Id. at 16.
539. Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE
VARIETIES OF EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)).
540. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing JAMES,
supra note 539, at 31); see Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157 (citing JAMES, supra note 539, at 31); Selah v.
Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
541. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227; see WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 48 (1958) (“[W]e must interpret the term ‘divine’ very broadly, as
denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.”) (emphasis in original).
542. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (citing 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 143
(1972)).
543. Donovan, supra note 178, at 80 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE 31, 38 (1916)).
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Similarly, Emile Durkheim defined religion as “a unified system of
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart
and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral
community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”544 This “classic
definition of religion includes the fundamental dichotomy of sacred/profane
as universal absolute.”545 Though nothing is inherently or intrinsically
sacred or profane, for Durkheim the distinction between the sacred and the
profane is essential to religiosity.546 Mircea Eliade also focused on this
distinction between the sacred and the profane. For Eliade, the sacred “is
identified as the source of significance, meaning, power and being, and its
manifestations as hierophanies, cratophanies, or ontophanies accordingly
(appearances of the holy, of power, or of being).”547 For Durkheim and
Eliade, the distinction between the sacred and the profane was the foundational cornerstone of all religion; without it, a religion does not exist.
Tillich’s more expansive definition of religion would include within its
ambit all that James, Durkheim, or Eliade would find to be religion, but
they would exclude some views that Tillich would not. Implicit within
their more constrained view of religion as approaching the divine or the
sacred, not the demonic or profane, rests an assumption that religion is in
pursuit of good as opposed to evil. Though James argued that a healthy
religion tries to understand “pessimistic elements” and “evil facts,”548 he
would not accept religion as pursing the purely demonic.549 If the divine is
not the absolute whole of things, divine and demonic, religion must be in
pursuit of “the most ideal part.”550 This viewpoint is not a denial of status
as religion on the basis of the fact that a religious group promotes or
engages in immoral or improper conduct. Rather, the group that is pursuing
the demonic and not the divine, the profane and not the sacred, would
simply not be religious, regardless of their good morals or ethics.
Alternatively, Tillich’s view allows for greater inclusion of groups that
expressly embrace the demonic or the profane. The distinction between

544. Epps, supra note 487, at 569 (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 494, at 47).
545. JOEL ELLIOTT, ÉMILE DURKHEIM AND RELIGION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
n.41 (1999), at http://www.unc.edu/~elliott/durkheim.html (citing Edmund Leach, Anthropology
of Religion: British and French Schools, in II NINETEENTH CENTURY RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN
THE WEST 215-62 (Ninian Smart et al. eds., 1985).
546. LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT 137 (2d ed., 1977).
547. Bryan Rennie, Mircea Eliade, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1998),
available at http://www.westminster.edu/staff/brennie/eliade/mebio.htm.
548. JAMES, supra note 541, at 151.
549. Id. at 83-151.
550. Id. at 126 n.4.
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Tillich’s view of the demonic as opposed to James, Durkheim and Eliade’s
views, leads to the question whether Satanism is a religion.
Courts approach this issue with timidity; they have not reached a
determination of which of the aforementioned approaches to adopt in
addressing Satanism. Frequently, courts will indicate that they are assuming for purposes of analysis that Satanism is a religion,551 but then afford
extremely little protection552 to its adherents or exercise little concern about
its establishment.553 These cases generally arise in the prison context.
Courts assume that the prisoner is a devout religious believer in Satanism
for purposes of analysis, then find that the department of corrections or
bureau of prisons acted for legitimate penological reasons in restricting
access to Satanist materials, such as the Satanic Bible.554 Legitimate
penological interests are implicated, according to some courts, because
“large portions of The Satanic Bible have great potential for fomenting
trouble of all kinds in a prison setting, leading to difficulty in maintaining
security and order and in delivering rehabilitative services in the
prisons.”555 Similarly, in at least one case, the court has assumed that

551. See, e.g., Kunselman v. W. Reserve Local Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 931, 931
(6th Cir. 1995) (assuming that Satanism was a religion).
552. See Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 528, 530 (1996) (holding that a prison
inmate’s Satanic Bible could be prohibited).
553. Kunselman, 70 F.3d at 531.
554. Carpenter, 946 F. Supp. at 528, 530.
[T]his case is about a very narrow issue: whether there are legitimate penological
reasons for prohibiting the plaintiff from possessing The Satanic Bible. The Court
concludes that there are. The Court draws no conclusion regarding whether the prison
ever can or should completely prohibit the practice of Satanism, since that has not
been made an issue in this case. Here, all that is concluded is that prohibiting the
possession of The Satanic Bible does not substantially burden the plaintiff’s ability to
practice his “religion” and is validated by legitimate penological concerns for safety
and security.
Id.; see McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 995-96 (11th Cir. 1989); Doty v. Lewis, 995 F. Supp.
1081, 1086-87 (D. Ariz. 1998); Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1030 (D. Colo.
1994).
555. Carpenter, 946 F. Supp. at 529.
In addition, much of the publication advocates preying on the weak in any way
possible for one’s own gratification—clearly an extremely dangerous “teaching” in
any setting, but especially in a prison where the weak have fewer avoidance strategies
at their disposal. A few examples of isolated quotations will suffice to illustrate the
point. The Satanic Bible states:
Hate your enemies with a whole heart, and if a man smite you on one cheek, SMASH
him on the other!; smite him hip and thigh, for self-preservation is the highest law!
Give blow for blow, scorn for scorn, doom for doom—with compound interest
liberally added thereunto! Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, aye four-fold, a hundred-fold!
Make yourself a Terror to your adversary, and when he goeth his way, he will possess
much additional wisdom to ruminate over. Thus shall you make yourself respected in
all the walks of life, and your spirit—your immortal spirit—shall live, not in an
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Satanism is a religion and that the plaintiff was a sincere practitioner
thereof, but allowed prison officials to restrict access to cloth and incense
for Satanists, while at the same time the prison officials allowed Native
American tribal religious groups in the prison to keep and use similar
items.556 A plaintiff was also denied access to a copy of the The
Necronomicon, a Satanic book of magic, because of fears that he would use
it to try to cast spells on other inmates, thereby allowing him to pray on
other prisoners by instilling fear in them.557 The same inmate was denied
access to a Satanic Bible because of its approval of brutality, masochism,
and racism, among other things, which could be disruptive to the penal
institution environment.558
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this issue in another context, a
death penalty case.559 In a plurality opinion, the court determined that the
prosecutor improperly utilized the defendant’s religious beliefs in Satanism
to demonstrate bad character in violation of the defendant’s First Amendment free exercise rights as incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.560 In dissent, Justice Steffen did not deny that
Satanists have First Amendment protections to the right to free speech, but
intangible paradise, but in the brains and sinews of those whose respect you have
gained.
The seven deadly sins of the Christian Church are: greed, pride, envy, anger, gluttony,
lust, and sloth. Satanism advocates indulging in each of these “sins” as they all lead to
physical, mental, or emotional gratification.
Satanism encourages its followers to indulge in their natural desires. Only by so doing
can you be a completely satisfied person with no frustrations which can be harmful to
yourself and others around you. Therefore, the most simplified description of the
Satanic belief is: INDULGENCE INSTEAD OF ABSTINENCE[.]
The only time a Satanist would perform a human sacrifice would be if it were to serve
a two-fold purpose; that being to release the magician’s wrath in the throwing of a
curse, and more important, to dispose of a totally obnoxious and deserving
individual. . . . The question arises, “Who, then, would be considered a fit and proper
human sacrifice, and how is one qualified to pass judgment on such a person?” The
answer is brutally simple. Anyone who has unjustly wronged you—one who has
“gone out of his way” to hurt you—to deliberately cause trouble and hardship for you
or those dear to you. In short, a person asking to be cursed by their very actions.
Intense sexual feeling should accompany this step of the [sexual] ritual, and after
sufficient imagery is obtained, as strong an orgasm as is possible should serve as
climax to this step. This climax should be attained using any masturbatory or autoerotic means necessary.
Intense, calculated hatred and disdain should accompany this step of the [destruction]
ceremony, and no attempt should be made to stop this step until the expended energy
results in a state of relative exhaustion on the part of the magician.
Id. at 529-30 (citing THE SATANIC BIBLE, 33, 46, 81, 88-89, 132, 134 (1969)).
556. Doty v. Lewis, 995 F. Supp. 1081, 1085-86 (D. Ariz. 1998).
557. Id. at 1087.
558. Id. at 1086-87.
559. Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1993).
560. Id. at 1058-59 (plurality opinion).
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denied that Satanism constituted a religion.561 He stated that generally
accepted or popular connotations of the word religion do not include
Satanism.562 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Steffen incorporated James,
Durkheim, and Eliade’s rationale for excluding demonic adherences from
being classified as religious: “The point to be made is that Satanists have
tattooed themselves with character impressions of an unambiguous nature.
They have embraced evil, including amorality and lawlessness, as desirable
objectives.”563 Such considerations were certainly not far from the minds
of the dissenting Georgia Supreme Court justices in Ravenwood when they
accused the majority of having framed an approach to determining what
constitutes a religion that would errantly allow “places in which Satanic
cults worship a supernatural evil force which dominates the world” to be
considered places of religious worship.564 Nor were such considerations far
from the view of the Georgia Supreme Court majority when it responded to
the dissenters by attesting that “demonology and stereotypical witchcraft
most emphatically do not constitute religion.”565 The unambiguous pursuit
of evil would exclude Satanism from being considered a religion in the
Jamesian vision and under the Georgia Supreme Court and Justice Steffen’s
viewpoints, but not in Tillich’s understanding of religiosity.566
D. INDIVIDUALIZED OR COMMUNAL, INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL
Another complexity in defining religion is whether religion should be
understood as being individual or communal, and internal or external.
Tillich’s phenomenological definition of religion stresses the importance
that belief plays within the individual’s life both externally through symbols
and internally through orientation.567 Religious studies scholar Lynda
Sexson rejects the external component of this definition; she argues against
viewing religion through the cultural dynamic or communal understanding.
Sexson asserts that even “[i]f there is no political body to verify occurrences or images as religious or sacred, . . . these particularized images still
have . . . connotations . . . sacred or . . . religious.”568 Similarly, James’s

561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.

Id. at 1060 (Steffen, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1982).
Id. at 661.
JAMES, supra note 540, at 126; TILLICH, supra note 498, at 15.
Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067.
LYNDA SEXSON, ORDINARILY SACRED 3 (1992).
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definition of religion provides a cognitive definition that is purely internal
and individualized.569
It is this distinctive focus on the internal attitude of religious
believers that has made James’ psychological understanding of
religion . . . appealing to courts and commentators who have been
reluctant to interpret freedom of religion by reference to the
external features of religious belief, lest by doing so they enshrine
religious orthodoxy.570
However, as a consequence of these definitions, which are dependent on the
inner state of mind of the individual, “the courts [are] in the position of
measuring the sincerity of professions of belief rather than the consistency
of religious practices.”571
Alternatively, Durkheim defined religion as “a unified system of
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart
and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral
community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”572 This
definition provides a “purely social and behavioral definition” of
religion.573 Durkheim’s “definition casts religion as . . . a question of
behavior and relationships, something that happens outside the individual
consciousness and thus is capable of objective measurement.”574 For
Durkheim, religion existed not as a private or individual phenomenon, but
instead was “eminently social.”575 He asserted that “[r]eligious representations are collective representations which express collective realities. . . .
[T]hey are rich in social elements.”576 Within this scheme, religion provides a collective attempt to overcome a sense of meaningless in order to
bring meaning to the world.577
It is not necessary that these collective expressions actually be a literal
church. Rather, a “cultural system that ‘function[s] to synthesize a people’s
ethos—the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic
style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way
things in sheer actuality are,’ is religious.”578 Durkheim, however, would
569. Epps, supra note 488, at 564.
570. Timothy Macklem, Faith as a Secular Value, 45 MCGILL L.J. 1, 23 (2000).
571. Epps, supra note 488, at 570.
572. Id. at 569 (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 495, at 47).
573. Id. at 564.
574. Id. at 569.
575. Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public
Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293, 318 (1993) (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 495, at 22).
576. Id.
577. Id. at 319.
578. Id. (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 89 (1973)).
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not accept the proposition that the appropriate explanation for this search is
in the form of psychology; rather, he embraced sociology and studied social
phenomena.579 In exploring religion, he focused not on individual believers; quite to the contrary, believing religion exists outside of and
independently of the individual, he focused on social interaction.580
Durkheim’s “principal objective [was] . . . to extend scientific rationalism
to human behavior.”581 By focusing on social interactions and external
features as opposed to internal ones, Durkheim intended to provide a
rationale means of approaching religion.582 Anything else, he concluded,
ignored what religion is, a communal force or associational approach to
divinity.
“Durkheim argued that religious phenomena emerge in any society
when a separation is made between the sphere of the profane—the realm of
everyday utilitarian activities—and the sphere of the sacred—the area that
pertains to the numenous, the transcendental, the extraordinary.”583 This
distinction between the sacred and the profane cannot be made by an
individual, but can only be created by a group or cult through social interactions.584 Something becomes sacred or profane depending on valuation
assigned by the group not by any individual.585 “Sacred activities are
valued by the community of believers not as means to ends, but because the
religious community has bestowed their meaning on them as part of its
worship.”586 For example, wine in a Catholic Mass places sacred ritualistic
significance upon communal wine as the blood of Christ.587
Noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz continued the development of
Durkheim’s approach to religion. 588 He argued for defining religion as a
cultural system.589 He also vigorously challenged the predominant view in
the academic anthropology community that “saw in religion an archaic
mode of thought and action” standing behind the modern programs of

579. COSER, supra note 546, at 137-38.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 142 (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE xxxix (The Free Press ed., 1951)).
582. Id. at 136-38, 142.
583. Id. at 137.
584. Id. at 137-38.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 138.
587. Id. at 137-38.
588. See ELLIOTT, supra note 546, at n.60, available at http://www.unc.edu/~elliott/
durkheim.html (citing Talcott Parsons, “Durkheim on Religion Revisited: Another Look at The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,” in BEYOND THE CLASSICS? ESSAYS IN THE SCIENTIFIC
STUDY OF RELIGION (1973)).
589. PADGETT, supra note 502.
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science, law, politics, and education that would one day drop away.590
Geertz defined religion as dynamic entity that is “(1) a system of symbols
which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and
motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”591 Like
Durkheim, Geertz shifted the analysis to the external; a person’s “design for
living” or way of life becomes the criteria for determining religiosity.592
His definition of religion does not exclude general ideas of order or
affirmation of something beyond the self. However, instead of analyzing
internally, Geertz looked to see “the empirical differentia of religious
activity [and] religious experience.”593
Geertz was prepared to accept a broad array of religions including
seemingly frivolous ones such as golf. For golf (or anything else) to be a
religion, there must be external manifestations that denote not merely
playing with passion or every Sunday at 10 a.m., but which are instead
sufficient to demonstrate visibly to the observer that the would-be religion
is “symbolic of some transcendent truth” for the person.594 Religion
synthesizes “what is known about the way the world is, the quality of the
emotional life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it.”595
Geertz noted that “[t]hough in theory we might think that a people could
construct a wholly autonomous value system independent of any metaphysical referent, an ethics without ontology, we do not in fact seem to have
found such a people.”596 Such a view strongly argues that moral ethical
systems of belief to which there is practicing adherence and some form of
communion, like the Ethical Society of Austin or a practicing society of
Neo-Platonists or Epicureans, would necessarily be religious because their
value structure would have a metaphysical core. According to Geertz,

590. Id.
591. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 90 (1973); see Donovan,
supra note 179, at 88-89 (citing Talal Asad, ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION:
REFLECTIONS ON GEERTZ, 18 MAN 237 (1983)) (Asad asserts that Geertz’s essay “[is] perhaps
the most influential, certainly the most accomplished, anthropological definition of religion to
have appeared in the last two decades.”).
592. Donovan, supra note 179, at 88 (citing Clifford Geertz, Religion: Anthropological
Study, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 398, 406 (David L. Sills
ed., 1968)).
593. GEERTZ, supra note 591, at 98.
594. Id.
595. Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the Establishment
Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1775 n.73 (1993) (citing Arlin M. Adams & Charles J.
Emmerich, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 82-83 (1990)).
596. Id.
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communities share these qualities externally, though they are deeply felt
internally. Geertz’s focus was on the communal and external nature of
religion, not the internal view of James and the Second Circuit.
The general response of courts to this on-going discussion of the
existence of religion as internal or external, individualistic or communal has
five basic components. First, a broad declaration is made that religion may
exist without any formal external or communal signs of traditional religions
such as formal services, ceremony, presence of clergy, structure or
organization, propagation efforts, holidays being observed, and other
similar activities.597 Second, courts refuse to allow religion to become a
limitless self-defining category or classification.598 Third, courts consider
the sincerity of the religious belief of the party,599 which is sometimes
termed the devotional component of the definition of religion.600 Fourth,
the courts look to communal and external elements as proof of the sincerity
of the person’s belief.601 Fifth, even if this belief is sincerely held, many
courts include these external and communal elements as factors in determining whether the belief is religious.602 Thus, although courts assert that
these external or formal elements are not essential for beliefs or practices to
be religious, courts are, nevertheless, skeptical of the sincerity of beliefs
when the individual’s practice of their faith does not include these external
or communal elements, and they are uncertain that the belief is even
religious if it does not include such public communal expressions.
Nevertheless, Judge Arlin Adams, who has been extremely influential
in defining religion,603 concedes that the worldviews of Seeger and Welsh,
597. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979); Africa v. Pennsylvania,
662 F.2d 1025, 1036 n.21 (3d Cir. 1981); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 900 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (“[N]either the trappings of robes, nor temples of stone, nor a fixed liturgy, nor an extensive
literature or history is required to meet the test of beliefs cognizable under the Constitution as
religious.”).
598. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209; Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035; Johnson v. Pa. Bur. of Corr., 661 F.
Supp. 425, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
599. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“[T]here remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly
held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case.”); see
Vetter v. Farmland Indus., 120 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d
1475, 1482 (10th Cir. 1996).
600. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1993).
601. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209; Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d
430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1156
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
602. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209; Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1482-84.
603. Peñalver, supra note 261, at 799; Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion” A
Survey of First Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 139-44 (2001);
Feofanov, supra note 154, at 375-77; see Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 125
Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 678 (Cal. App. 2002). An analysis conducted by a California State Appellate
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which were determined by the Supreme Court to be religious, are not
supported by any external or communal ceremonial, ritualistic, or organizational elements.604 He admits that it is possible to be religious without
these external or communal elements: “Of course, a religion may exist
without any of these signs, so they are not determinative, at least by their
absence, in resolving a question of definition.”605 However, Judge Adams
notes that these elements “can be helpful in supporting a conclusion of
religious status given the important role such ceremonies play in religious
life. . . . Thus, even if it is true that a religion can exist without rituals and
structure, they may nonetheless be useful signs that a group or belief system
is religious.”606 As applied by circuit and district courts, these external and
communal elements are more important to determining if something is a
religion or not, or if a particular person is religious, than the conscientious
objector cases would seem to suggest.607

Court found that “[a]lthough Judge Adams’s analysis only appeared in a concurring opinion, his
discussion immediately began to find direct as well as indirect acceptance with other federal
appellate court decisions.” See, e.g., DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52, n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); Love v.
Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000) (providing an analysis based on a Third Circuit ruling
premised on Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in Malnak); United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d
1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a religion issue using in part a Third Circuit ruling
premised on Judge Adams’s Malnak concurring opinion); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d
1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994); Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1986); Grove v. Mead
School Dist. No. 344, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985); Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663,
666 (8th Cir. 1985) (adopting Third Circuit test); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033-34
(3d Cir. 1981). Similarly, district court judges have relied upon Judge Adams’ concurring opinion
in whole or in part. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Angelone, 82 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (E.D. Va. 1999);
Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 45 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, & rev’d in part on other grounds, 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1503 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff’d, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996); Church of
Scientology Flag Services v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498, 1509-1510 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, & rev’d in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993);
May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1568-69 (D.N.J. 1983), aff’d, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.
1985); Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D.N.J. 1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1984);
Church of the Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (D. Minn. 1982); Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1144 (D. Mass. 1982); Africa v.
Pennsylvania, 520 F. Supp. 967, 970 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff’d, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).
Similarly, state courts have utilized directly or indirectly the analysis in Malnak. See, e.g.,
Needham Pastoral Counseling Ctr. v. Bd. of Appeals of Needham, 557 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. App.
1990); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 601 (Or. App. 1982).
604. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 n.43 (3d Cir. 1979).
605. Id. at 209.
606. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209-10 (citing DURKHEIM, supra note 495, at 43-44) (“[T]he really
religious beliefs are always common to a determined group which makes profession of adhering
to them and to practicing rites connected with them . . . . In all history, we do not find a single
religion without a Church.”); see K. DUNLAP, RELIGION: ITS FUNCTIONS IN HUMAN LIFE 255-70
(1946); E. UNDERHILL, WORSHIP 20-41 (1937); see generally Note, Transcendental Meditation
and the Meaning of Religion Under the Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REV. 887, 906-08
(1978).
607. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 n.43.
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However, given that Tillich, whose view of religion formed the basis
for Seeger and the Welsh pluralities’ approach to defining religion,608 conceives of the ultimate concern as fully permeating a person’s being, external
signs can be reasonably expected.609 In employing Tillich’s understanding
—the ultimate concern test—such considerations are entirely appropriate.
Through this understanding of Tillich’s definition, external manifestations
can be reintegrated into the courts’ ultimate concern analysis. Thus, in
considering the external component, Judge Adams actually had no reason
for concern in having departed from Seeger. While the Third Circuit
traveled the route of incorporating Durkheim’s view of religion to embrace
external elements, a court following Seeger can arrive at the same point by
continuing to follow Tillich’s insights. Where the break occurs is in the
Second Circuit’s utilization of James’s definition and allowing religion to
dwell exclusively internally within the mind and psyche. A Tillichian
ultimate concern will necessarily surrender itself to public manifestation,
but the Jamesian understanding can remain purely an internal light, not
shown or revealed to the world. That is not to say that James did not
believe that there will be some external effects of religion, of standing
before the divine, but unlike Tillich’s or Durkheim’s understanding of
religious experience, in James’s view we are not necessarily going to fill
our world with symbols. We are not necessarily going to build churches,
attend meetings, wear particular clothing, eat certain foods, etc. Thus,
Tillich, Durkheim, and Geertz would suggest that we look for the symbols,
the churches, the gatherings, how we spend our time, but James would
argue that only by looking at the mind and psyche can we know if beliefs or
practices are religious.
E.

HOW ULTIMATE AN ULTIMATE CONCERN?

Regardless of whether religion is viewed as being communal or
individualized, or external or internal, the question of how intense or
important the belief must be in order to be deemed religious cannot be
ignored. As applied to Tillich’s definition of an ultimate concern, the word
ultimate “signifies that the concern must be of an unconditional, absolute,

608. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965); Grove v. Mead School Dist. No.
354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 n.10 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J. concurring); Harvard Note, supra note
3, at 1066; Peter D. Schmid, Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. Ill. U.
L.J. 357, 364-65 (1989).
609. See The Honorable Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial
Decision-Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 515-16 (1998); Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067;
Ingber, supra note 157, at 268; Richard H. Jones, Concerning Secularists’ Proposed Restrictions
on the Role of Religion in American Politics, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 343, 345 (1994).
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or unqualified character;” the word “concern” indicates an affective or
motivational component of a person’s experience.610 Unlike Tillich, who
believed that religion was composed of a single essence,611 James
emphasized a flexible understanding of religion.612 He argued that religion
did not have one essence, but many characteristics that were of equal
importance to the experience of religion or divinity.613 However, divinity
for James was not unlimited. He indicated that “[t]he individual feels
impelled to respond to [the divine] solemnly and gravely, and neither by
curse nor jest.”614
Regarding the sacred or divine, Eliade indicated that sacred space or
time makes it possible “to acquire orientation in the chaos of homogeneity,
to ‘found the world’ and to live in a real sense.”615 Profane space and time,
however, “maintains the homogeneity and hence the relativity of space [and
time].”616 Eliade maintained an affinity for religious peoples that embrace
a world of absolute dichotomous spheres separating the sacred and the profane, Gods and nothingness. He recognized and abhored the problem of
lessened religiosity, of non-singular orientation, of multiple concerns as
opposed to an ultimate concern.617 But, Eliade did not think that religion is
dead. “To whatever degree he may have desacralized the world, a man who
has made his choice in favor of a profane life never succeeds in completely
doing away with religious behavior.”618 In the modern world, according to
Eliade, even the experience of the profane contains religiosity, that is,
breaks from the homogeneity:
There are for example, privileged places qualitatively different
from all others—a man’s birthplace, or the scenes of his first
love . . . . Even for the most frankly nonreligious man, all of these
places retain an exceptional, a unique quality; they are the “holy
places” of his private universe, as if it were in such spots that he

610. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067.
611. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1553 (citing PAUL TILLICH, WHAT IS RELIGION? 56-86
(J.L. Adams trans., 1969)) (“[T]he concept of essence . . . is the first and basic task of philosophy
and religion.”); see Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1066-83.
612. Macklem, supra note 570, at 23.
613. Freeman, supra note 141, at 1553 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 26 (1920)).
614. Donovan, supra note 179, at 80 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE 31, 38 (1916)).
615. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED & THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 23
(Willard R. Trask trans., 1959).
616. Id. at 17-18, 23.
617. Id. at 1-28.
618. Id. at 23.
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had received the revelation of a reality other than that in which he
participates through his ordinary daily life.619
Eliade, however, termed this behavior crypto-religious; it stands lesser than
real religion.620 It is a “sort of degradation and desacralization of religious
values and forms of behavior.”621
Sexson further explored the deeper significance of these breaks in
profane time and space. She argued that toppling the barrier between the
sacred and the profane “brings one into the sphere in which ordinary reality
is saturated with the sacred.”622 For Sexson, the individual may even be
unaware of her own religiosity or what is sacred to her.623 She asserts that
in our society the ordinary becomes religious: “if religion or the sacred is to
be discovered or reaffirmed in this culture, it will have to be found under
the bed, in the box, like a string of dogwood berries upon which the rosary
of life can be sung.”624 For her, “[i]t is the weaving of imagination and
discovery, of the divine and the human, of the past and the present, that
creates the fabric of our existence. We all have bits and scraps of
experience, dream, and thought out of which we weave the texture, the
story, of our lives.”625 For Sexson, the flotsam of life that is preserved is
sacred, which means that old tickets saved from concerts, an old tattered
baseball glove, family stories that are told and not forgotten, rocks collected
from the roadside, or even lint from the dryer can all be sacred.626 Sexson,
however, recognizes the problem with this definition: “If everything is
sacred, nothing is. Or, how can we decide that one kid’s pocket is filled
with divine objects and another is just trouble for the washer?”627
Although we likely do not want to embrace Sexson’s radical breaking
of the barriers of objectivity, destroying a notion that there is an objective
sacred and profane, this is an almost unavoidable implication of Tillichian
approach. For Tillich, religion was an ultimate concern, everyone has an
ultimate concern, and ultimate concerns are otherwise unconstrained. An
ultimate concern can be anything from collecting baseball cards, to being an
obsessive Star Trek fan, a Christian, a business executive, a Neo-Platonist,
619. Id. at 24.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. SEXSON, supra note 568, at 10.
623. Id. at 13. “Some of the boxes that will draw our attention have already been perceived
as containers of the sacred; others are the boxes that anyone except the owner, and perhaps even
the owner, would say contain junk.” Id.
624. Id. at 6-7.
625. Id. at 34.
626. Id. at 16.
627. Id.
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and beyond. The field of ultimate concerns is limitless. This major problem with using the ultimate concern definition for religion will be discussed
further below. However, first there is another problem, which the Sexson/
Tillich approach needs to address: since the apparently ordinary can be
sacred, how can we distinguish the two? Which set of rocks are religious
icons and which are simply ordinary objects? After all, not all rocks should
qualify for First Amendment protection under Tillich’s approach; only
those gathered as part of an ultimate concern deserve such protection.
In drawing upon Tillich, the Supreme Court alludes to the issue of the
intensity of an ultimate concern. “The word ‘ultimate’ signifies that the
concern must be of an unconditional, absolute, or unqualified character.”628
However, a test that is this demanding “probably forecloses constitutional
protection for a large number of ordinary church—or synagogue-goers.” 629
Also, the entire concept of ultimate concerns is based upon the premise that
individuals concerns are capable of being ranked with one being clearly
more important than all the others,630 which is a questionable proposition.
“Many people care a great deal about a number of things—their own
happiness, the welfare of their family, their country, perhaps their
religion—without any clear ordering among these and without any single
ordering principle for clashes between them.”631 Either these people lack
ultimate concerns or their ultimate concerns could be understood as some
sort of amalgamation of this multitude of important concerns.632 However,
under the Tillichian definition, an ultimate concern cannot be compromised;
it excludes all other concerns from being ultimate.633 No amalgamation is
possible. This viewpoint seems strikingly excessive given the fact that human weaknesses in the Tillichian paradigm are unanticipated, unacceptable,
and unexplainable except as being non-religious. Thus, the person who
misses church most Sundays for football games in the fall and winter and
baseball games in the spring and summer is religious about sports, not
church.

628. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067.
629. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion Under The Constitution,
31 EMORY L.J. 973, 995 (1982).
630. Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 1067.
631. Greenawalt, supra note 208, at 808.
632. Id.
633. Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal
Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (“[R]eligious concern is
ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary.
The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or
circumstance.” (citing PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 11-12 (1967))).
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For purposes of this discussion though, there are two fundamental
problems with Tillich’s demanding form of an ultimate concern being
applied in courts of law. First, if the Tillichian approach is truly applied,
then the courts raise the stakes exponentially for the level of commitment
that someone must manifest to be considered religious. The level of commitment demanded by Tillich is not reasonable in this or any other era.
Tillich’s definition of religion requires that a person hold to Abraham’s
level of sacrifice and commitment;634 to be religious, one must be prepared
to sacrifice all to one’s ultimate concern.635 Although Tillich argued that
everyone has an ultimate concern, the level of commitment to one’s ultimate concern demanded by Tillich has led at least one critic to suggest that
perhaps almost no one has an ultimate concern.636 A second complicating
problem, if courts require this level of commitment for a non-traditional
religion to be given religious status, whereas a nominal Christian, Jew,
Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu is considered protected under the First Amendment, then the courts essentially establish a preference for traditional over
non-traditional religions. However, without this demanding standard of
recognition, the distinction between a rock picked up along side the road
and a sacred rock becomes an infinitely more complicated question.
Having received a glimpse of the slope down which the ultimate
concern definition of religion, which lacks much of a harness, can easily
slide, it would, perhaps, be wise to remind ourselves why this definition is
often so attractive to courts: “There is a common perception that religion is
defined not so much by particular doctrines (like the existence of a god) or
in particular functions (like providing a structure for morals) but instead by
attitude.”637 One the foremost ways of expressing this sense of religion is
Tillich’s contention that religion is not these doctrines or functions, but is
instead “the focus of our ‘ultimate concern.’”638 And, it should not
discount that “[t]here seems to be a certain validity to this position because
so much about religion appears to revolve around a person’s attitude
towards life, the universe, and what is most important to them.”639

634. See Genesis 22:1-14 (relating the story of Abraham being asked to sacrifice his son
Isaac, who God spared).
635. Ingber, supra note 157, at 269.
636. Id.; see Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 160 n.402
(1990) (discussing Ingber’s views).
637. Austin Cline, Religion as Faith and Ultimate Concern, http://atheism.about.com/od/
aboutreligion/a/UltimateConcern.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
638. Id.
639. Id.
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IS EVERYTHING REALLY SACRED?

However, deficiencies in the ultimate concern test cannot be ignored.
For example, a problem identified by a sociological view of the ultimate
concern definition of religion is that “[i]t seems to include so much under
the umbrella of religion that little is left over—and if everything qualifies as
a religion, then the term itself stops being very useful anymore.”640 Sexson,
although she is untroubled by it, showed us the slippery slope and just how
easy it is to slide down. Tillich’s definition of religion provides little ability
to stop religion from moving from belief in God or Gods and devotion of
one’s life to pursuing his, her, or their will, to pursuing money and devoting
one’s life to its pursuit. Professor John Mansfield described this failing of
the Seeger definition as follows:
Is it not also true that a belief that no one would dignify as
religious may occupy an important if not dominant place in a
man’s life, profoundly affecting his conduct, thoughts, and feelings? A person may make his pocketbook his master or his
stomach a god, or consider that the highest virtue is the preservation of his own life and the advancement of his own interests, but
no one would say, except ironically, that because of his devotion
to these ends his belief in them is religious.641
The problem is that “an honest application of Tillich’s theory would
not in any way limit the field of constitutionally protected conduct.”642 A
faithful application of Seeger in its broad form would include within the
category of religion “anything that has the same importance to an individual
that a belief in God has to a traditional believer, no matter how secular that
belief might appear.”643 Accordingly, “[n]ot only does it include philosophies that are specifically anti-religious such as atheism, Marxism, and
secular humanism, but by making it subjective, it opens the doors to virtually anything someone wishes to assert as ultimate. By making it so
relative and universal, it robs the word of virtually any meaning.” 644
Additionally, “there is nothing about most strongly held beliefs that
necessarily lies outside of the competence of legislatures or courts, unlike

640. Id.
641. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 661 n.263 (quoting John H. Mansfield, Conscientious
Objection—1964 Term, 2 RELIGION AND PUB. ORD. 9-10 (1964)).
642. Gey, supra note 634, at 160.
643. Collier, supra note 627, at 983 (emphasis in original).
644. Knechtle, supra note 6, at 527.
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those qualities peculiar to religion, such as their non-rational and faithdriven nature, that are not easily evaluated by government.”645
VIII. CONCLUSION
In defining religion, “[f]lexibility and careful consideration . . . are
needed. Still, it is important to have some objective guidelines in order to
avoid ad hoc justice.”646 Some have argued that there cannot be an acceptable definition of religion.647 Nevertheless, regardless of the difficulties,
courts must develop an understanding of religion to be applied in cases
before them.648 With regard to the non-legal theorists reviewed in the
course of this discussion, one point, the plurality of their understandings of
religion, is apparent. This diversity of views leads some to the conclusion
that what religion is depends upon who is looking and what her vantage
point happens to be.649

645. Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts on
Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 131 (1997).
646. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 1979).
647. Freeman, supra note 141; Modak-Truran, Religious Dimension, supra note 444, at 257
n.5.
648. Mansfield, supra note 165, at 215-16; see Sullivan, supra note 459, at 454.
649. Modak-Truran, Religious Dimension, supra 444, at 257 n.5 (citing JOHN HICK,
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1973)).
However, this results in part from the different purposes of the many types of inquiries
that analyze the nature of religion including the anthropology of religion (e.g., Clifford
Geertz), sociology of religion (e.g., Emile Durkheim, Peter L. Berger), psychology of
religion (e.g., William James), history of religions (e.g., Mircea Eliade), theology
(e.g., Paul Tillich), and philosophy of religion (e.g., Charles Hartshorne).
Id. “For example, sociology of religion views religion ‘in terms of social interaction’ and studies
religion ‘with reference to the general concepts of sociology, including leadership, stratification,
and socialization.’” Id. (quoting GEORGE A. THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A
MODERN DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 406 (1969)). In his text Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche
advances a related point:
Little by little I came to understand what every great philosophy to date has been: the
personal confession of its author, a kind of unintended and unwitting memoir; and
similarly, that the moral (or immoral) aims in every philosophy constituted the actual
seed from which the whole plant invariably grew. Whenever explaining how a
philosopher’s most far-fetched metaphysical propositions have come about, in fact,
one always does well (and wisely) to ask first: “What morality is it (is he) aiming at?”
Thus I do not believe that an “instinct for knowledge” is the father of philosophy, but
rather that here as elsewhere a different instinct has merely made use of knowledge
(and knowledge [sic]) as its tool. For anyone who scrutinizes the basic human instincts to determine how influential they have been as inspiring spirits (or demons and
goblins) will find that all the instincts have practiced philosophy, and that each one of
them would like only too well to represent itself as the ultimate aim of existence and
as the legitimate master of all other instincts. For every instinct is tyrannical; and as
such seeks to philosophize.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE 8
(Marion Faber trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).

220

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:123

Further complicating matters, the word religion possesses a seemingly
limitless array of potential meanings and possible interpretations. Much of
the uncertainty that fills the text of various courts’ struggles to define
religion is deeply imbued with post-modern thought, the deconstructionism
advanced by Nietzsche. In a post-modern world, what is a religion becomes to some extent a question without an answer. An objective reality in
defining religion becomes an almost laughable matter and qualifications
become necessary before a discussion is even begun. The thoughts and
objections that are raised by postmodernist thought are not mere “childish
philosophical skepticism and linguistic nihilism.”650 However, postmodernists’ view of “a world of many competing and equal ideas”651 is
only half right when it comes to the law. Within the law, not all ideas are
equal, nor are all understandings of religion of the same value, worth, or
legitimacy in terms of striving for a definition of religion for purposes of
constitutional analysis. In part, the problem with postmodernist thought in
general becomes actualized in the law. In the ethereal world of aesthetics
and the arts, there is freedom for words to be fully undefined, for conversations to not communicate. In that world, language can be powerful and
boundless:
What most characterizes deconstruction is its notion of textuality,
a view of language as it exists not only in books, but in speech, in
history, and in culture. For the deconstructionist, language is
everything. The world itself is “text.” Language directs humanity
and creates human reality. (A reality that cannot be named or
described is illusory, at best.) Yet, upon close examination, words
seem to have no connection with reality or with concepts or
ideas.652
When the courts embrace postmodernism, as they deconstruct the
concept of religion, it is not for its radicalism that postmodernism gains
adherence in the law. Rather, it is because of its capacity to embrace
diversity and to be inclusive, which is of particular concern in dealing with
religion.
The problem generally with regard to the limitations of postmodernist
thought in the field of law, and with the area of religion in particular, is that
650. RadicalAcademy.com, Cultural theory, Structuralism, Postmodernism & Deconstructionism, http://www.radicalacademy.com/adiphipostmodernism.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2007). Cf. VINCENT B. LEITCH, AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM FROM THE THIRTIES TO THE
EIGHTIES 305 (1988) (noting that W. Jackson Bate derided deconstructionism as “a childish
philosophical skepticism and nihilism”).
651. Id.
652. Id.
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the courts cannot abandon a working definition, but courts also cannot
abandon the limitations imposed by their perceptual lenses. For example,
courts make implicit assumptions about religion that render creation science
religion, but physical science not religion. From the post-modern viewpoint, it is difficult to see why science should not be deemed to be a
religion. The French philosopher Michel Foucault would argue that it is
exactly those things that seem true and that we do not question that are our
religion. It is the unquestioned that is held with the deepest faith.
Philosophers from George Berkeley to David Hume to Jacques Derrida
could question the postulate that scientific knowledge is distinct from
religious belief. Berkeley, Hindu mystics, and Buddhist scholars could
offer an explanation of reality and truth that is plausible, but which denies
science. Nevertheless, the reason that science is not religion and creation
science is religion stands as the same reason that a definition of religion
must exclude those rocks picked from the side of road, and the same reason
that law may use postmodernism as a tool, but may never embrace it fully.
Because in the final analysis, beyond all theory and beyond all thought and
debate, questions and problems, shortcomings and failures, the law must
function. It must work; it must resolve disputes and reach conclusions.
Schools must be able to teach, and judges must be able to decide cases.
The definition of religion will never be perfect. Its growing expanse or its
contracting limits will ebb and flow as courts struggle to find the right
balance. But, courts must continue to do so, for in an era, where God is
dead, religion is very much alive.
So how should courts approach the task of defining religion? I will
discuss seven principles that I have come to believe, in the course of
researching for this article, provide helpful governing parameters regarding
defining religion under the First Amendment. First, the courts cannot avoid
defining religion. Courts are necessarily operating under some understanding of what religion is in applying the First Amendment. That understanding should be express, rather than assumed and hidden from public view.
Second, there should be a singular definition of religion. Courts should
desist in explicitly or implicitly giving religion two different meanings, one
for purposes of establishment and one for purposes of free exercise. The
core of the First Amendment protection of religious liberty is government
not preferring one religion over another; the dual-definition approach inherently creates such a preference for non-traditional over traditional faiths. If,
for example, the court determines that secular humanism is a religion for
purposes of free exercise, then it should be a religion for Establishment
Clause purposes. If the court is unconcerned about the establishment of
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secular humanism, it is the substantive determination of what constitutes
establishment, rather than what is a religion, that should be applied.
Third, the broad Seeger ultimate concern test should be rejected or
many reasons; two will be discussed. First, people do not have one ultimate
concern; they experience life with a variety of competing and conflicting
concerns. We are not all Abrahams prepared to sacrifice Isaac. And without this clarity and dedication, we cannot give true meaning in a legal
context to Tillich’s understanding of religion. Second, there is no limiting
principle in the Seeger test; Tillich would allow anything, any concern,
however, secular to be deemed religious. As noted by Professor Mansfield,
“‘a religious belief is first of all a belief, that is to say the affirmation of
some truth, reality or value. In addition it addresses itself to basic
questions’ about ‘the meaning of suffering and death and the existence of
spiritual reality.’”653 Pursuing ultimate concerns, such as wealth or Star
Trek memorabilia no matter how fanatical, simply is not a religion under
the First Amendment.
Fourth, the court should not return to the definition of religion that was
utilized in the 1890s in cases like Beason. Moral judgment regarding the
validity of religion and its value simply has no place in the First Amendment context. Tillich is correct in indicating that God can encompass both
the divine and demonic, the creative and the destructive. There are enough
varieties of religious beliefs, including arguably those set forth in the Old
Testament, that present an understanding of God that is beyond our limited
human comprehension of good and evil. Thus, if Satanism or demonology,
etc., otherwise satisfies the test for what constitutes a religion, it should be
regarded as such and afforded First Amendment protection.
Fifth, as stated by the Supreme Court:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us.654
This is a bedrock First Amendment principle, but the conclusion does not
follow that all of these beliefs are protected by the guarantee of free exercise and the prohibition on the establishment of religion. In designing a
definition of religion, we should be cognizant of the extremely important
653. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 661 (quoting John H. Mansfield, Conscientious
Objection—1964 Term, 2 RELIGION AND PUB. ORD. 10, 33-34 (1964)).
654. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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protections afforded by the free speech provision and not merely look to use
the religion clauses as a repository for all areas of thought and conscience
that we seek to protect from governmental intervention. Many of the questions and beliefs that we hold which are secular in nature should find
protection in rights of free speech, rather than religion.
Sixth, to constitute a religious belief or practice under the First Amendment, the belief or practice should be an approach toward or duty imposed
by an authority that is part of some reality or understanding that is beyond
the ordinary. While extra-temporal consequences are unnecessary, the authority must be sacred, that is not profane, and addressed to fundamental
questions of existence. A distinction should also be drawn between the
philosophical/personal beliefs and religious beliefs. Returning to our earlier
discussion of why the Founders entrenched religious liberty in the Constitution, they understood religion as part of a duty owed to some sacred authority that existed beyond the State. If there is no separate authority, then there
is no conflicting duty that can be considered religious. Philosophical and
personal commitments can be strongly held, but insofar as they are not
duties originating from an authority beyond the individual; they are not
religious.
Seventh and most importantly, whatever definition of religion is
applied, it should be applied in a consistent manner, and though courts
should act with caution in defining religion, they should do so without fear.
It is readily apparent that religion is incredibly difficult to define; scholars
and courts have stumbled and will continue to do so in approaching this
extraordinarily complicated subject. In endeavoring to formulate the best
possible definition, the most important elements of the continuing effort by
judges and academics to define religion are: (1) adherence to equality as a
guiding interpretative principle; (2) employing the definition in a consistent
manor; and (3) being cautious but not so frightened that the courts retreat to
so vague a definition that the term religion loses its meaning.

